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THE MYTHOLOGICAL PARADIGM IN GREEK AND LATIN POETRY.

[For a statement of the ground covered in this article, see p. 205.—Ed.]

The use of the paradigm (*παράδειγμα*, *exemplum*) is one of the more important rhetorical means offered, by nature as it were, to a speaker or writer for giving to his hearer or reader illustration, amplification, and reinforcement of the subject under discussion, as also for imparting embellishment to his material. Its employment constitutes at the same time a means for securing persuasion, carrying conviction, or establishing proof in the mind of hearer or reader as to that about which the speaker or writer wishes to effect persuasion, conviction, or proof.¹ More specifically the effect of the paradigm is to con-

¹ Alewell, Über das rhetorische ΠΑΡΑΔΕΙΓΜΑ in der römischen Literatur der Kaiserzeit (Diss. Leipzig, 1913), pp. 5-35, gives an examination of rhetorical theory governing the use of the paradigm of historical type, as found in Anaximenes (particularly), Aristotle, and later rhetoricians. A discussion of the paradigm's terminology, divisions, purpose, effect, etc. is found in Volkmann, Rhet. der Griech. und Römer² (Leipzig, 1885), pp. 233-39. Definitions are abundant. The following (to note only a few) will suffice as good working principles: Anon. Rhet. Gr. I, 447, 3-13 (Spengel): *παράδειγμα δέ . . . ἐμφέρεις καὶ δυοιον καὶ εἰκὸς τῷ ζητουμένῳ πράγματι, ἀφ' οὗ ὡρμημένος ἀν τις ἀξιώσαι δύοιων τὰ δυοιον φρονεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ζητουμένου . . . παράδειγμά ἐστι λόγος ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἦτοι ἐπὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἐπάγων, η ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου, η ἐκ τοῦ δύοιον ἐπὶ τὸ δυοιον . . . παράδειγμά ἐστι γενομένου πράγματος ἀπομημόνευσις, εἰς δύοιωσιν τοῦ νῦν ζητουμένου. Arist. Rhet. II, 20, 1-2: *εἰσὶ δ' αἱ κοιναὶ πλεῖτεις δύο τῷ γένει, παράδειγμα καὶ ἐνθύμημα . . . δύοιον γάρ ἐπαγωγὴ τὸ παράδειγμα, η δ' ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχὴ. Παραδειγμάτων δ' εἰδη δύο· ἐν μὲν γάρ ἐστι παραδειγμάτος εἶδος τὸ λέγειν πράγματα προγεγενημένα. ἐν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸν ποιεῖν. Auct. ad Her. IV, 49, 62: "exemplum est alicuius facti aut dicti praeteriti cum certi auctoris nomine propositio. Id sumitur isdem de causis, quibus similitudo. Rem ornatiorem facit, cum nullius rei nisi dignitatis causa sumitur; apertiores,**

firm general principles, statements, inferences, and conclusions (whether these are formally expressed or merely implied) as natural, self-explanatory, and true. Moreover, general principles are effectively amplified and illustrated by examples, particularly if these are chosen not so much to enlarge by introducing numerous details as to illustrate by the fitting character of the details presented. Thus as an instrument for illustrating general principles the example makes for vividness of presentation through the specific and the concrete. From the standpoint of logic the paradigm's use rests on a simple conclusion from analogy, that what has once happened can and probably will happen again,² although its persuasive value doubtless greatly exceeds its logical cogency. Finally, in addition to the paradigm's significance as a means of effectively presenting the views of the speaker, its employment has the advantage of gripping and holding the interest of the hearer.

The paradigm, at least in partially developed form, appears used in harmony with the above mentioned aims already in the epic.³ But, as is evident from the material presented below, the mythological type of paradigm is by far most frequent in

cum id, quod sit obscurius, magis dilucidum reddit; probabiliorem, cum magis veri similem facit; ante oculos ponit, cum exprimit omnia perspicue, ut res prope dicam manu temptari possit"; Cic. De Orat. III, 205: "tum duo illa, quae maxime movent, similitudo et exemplum"; De Invent. I, 30, 49: "exemplum est, quod rem auctoritate aut casu alicuius hominis aut negotii confirmat aut infirmat"; Quint. V, 11, 6: "exemplum, id est rei gestae aut ut gestae utilis ad persuadendum id, quod intenderis, commemoratio"; Vict. Rhet. Lat. Min. 239, 10 (Halm): "exemplum est, quo rem aliquam . . . aut hortamur aut dehortamur"; Beda, 618, 16: "paradigma est praepositio exempli exhortantis aut deterrentis."

² Arist. Rhet. II, 20, 8: δημοια γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὰ μέλλοντα τοῖς γεγονόσιν.

³ Noted by Alewell, op. cit., pp. 5 f., are Iliad, I, 262-68 (where Nestor cites five instances of mighty men of old); IV, 370-400 (Agamemnon challenges Diomedes to bold encounter by a rehearsal of the heroic deeds of Diomedes' father); IX, 524-99 (Phoenix names heroes of unappeasable anger). The list can easily be extended; see XVIII, 117-19 (where Hercules' fate is given as an illustration of death's inevitability); XXIV, 534-40 (an instance of mortals for whom the gods planned lives of pain, i. e. Peleus had wealth and a goddess wife, but only one son and him doomed to untimely death).

the shorter, personal forms of poetry—lyric, elegiac, iambic, epigrammatic, and pastoral—although it is not without representation in the drama, especially in the choral parts. Although examples of historical character,⁴ especially in Latin Literature,⁵ have received a good deal of attention, no comprehensive investigation of the mythological paradigm⁶ seems as yet to have

⁴ The historical example is the only kind recognized by Anaximenes (Rhet. Gr. I, 195 ff.). Aristotle, however, speaks (see n. 1 above) of two kinds, the historical, which consists in relating things that have happened (*πράγματα προγεγενημένα*), and another, which consists in inventing them one's self (*τὸ αὐτὸν ποιεῖν*), the latter being subdivided into comparisons (*παραβολαί*) and fables (*λόγοι*). The two-fold division set up by Aristotle was not maintained by later rhetoricians, but its effect was to place the historical example in the foreground, and in subsequent technical writers, when *παράδειγμα* or exemplum occurs, the term uniformly means an example of the historical type, generally regarded (at least as far as prose is concerned) as the most effective kind. Valerius Maximus' practical handbook, Factorum et Dictorum Memorabilium, was used by authors as a source for examples; cf. Alewell, p. 16: "Die Hauptzahl der Beispiele . . . wird durchaus von der Geschichte gestellt; schon weil es dem Redner bequemer war, das bereite und bald auch in eigenen Büchern gesammelte Material zu verwenden, als selbst sich Fabeln und Gleichnisse zu ersinnen." Practical restriction by the ancients to the historical type is well stated by L. Traube, Sitzungsber. der Münch. Akad. der Wissenschaften, 1891, p. 397: "Man verstand unter exempla im engeren Sinn Belege aus der Geschichte, den Altertümern, den Kuriositäten und anders Material, das in Handbüchern nach gewissen Rubriken für den Gebrauch hauptsächlich der Rhetoren zusammengetragen war." Still another type of example (it one of poetry's chief resources for amplification) used rhetorically, but seemingly not defined as an example by the ancients, embodies phenomena drawn from various spheres and phases of life and nature. Some instances found combined with mythological examples are noted below under the heading "Mixed paradigms." For an excellent discussion of paradigms from life and nature, see Smith, Elegies of Albius Tibullus (1913), notes on I, 4, 11-14; 17-20; 28-38.

⁵ A collection of such exempla found in Latin literature of the Empire, with a brief discussion of their use and relative frequency in authors and in various types of literature, is presented by Alewell, op. cit., pp. 54-86; 100-18. For their use in Cicero's orations, see Schoenberger, Beispiele aus der Geschichte, ein rhetorisches Kunstmittel in Ciceros Reden (Diss. Augsburg, 1910).

⁶ Doubtless the dominant importance of ancient oratory, in which the historical example was naturally most appropriate, was responsible for practically limiting the term *παράδειγμα* (exemplum) to those taken

been attempted. From the earliest times Greek poetry illustrated themes by examples drawn from legend, with observance of due measure and proportion. The Alexandrians took their examples from the more recondite sources and presented them often in an allusive fashion.⁷ The Roman poets chose theirs from the general field of mythology, with a tendency to employ examples freely, and introduced them in various ways.

It is the purpose of this study, based upon an examination

from history. In fact the mythological type was in some writers specifically rejected (cf. Apsines, *Rhet. Gr.* I, 373, 23: *χρὴ δὲ τὰ παραδείγματα γνώριμα εἶναι καὶ σαφῆ, καὶ μὴ πάντα ἀρχαῖα μηδὲ μυθώδη*), and it is noteworthy that authors who indulge freely in historical paradigms almost entirely neglect the mythological; cf. Alewell, p. 55, n. 3. But the surprising thing is that the mythological paradigm, with its hundreds of occurrences in poetry, is practically ignored in ancient rhetorical discussion. That the poets recognized in it an important and effective instrument for ornamentation and illustration is clear from its extensive use by them, as well as from the fact that it is not infrequently combined with historical examples as a part of the same illustration or proof (see "Mixed paradigms" below). The historical example is not uncongenial to most types of poetry, but poets strongly prefer the mythological. These, however, at last analysis are in a real sense akin to the historical type, since a deeper meaning, resting on the experience of the race, lies at the base of the mythological example; cf. Schoenberger, *op. cit.* p. 10; "Zu den geschichtlichen Beispielen gehört auch alles Material, das der *historia fabularis*, der *Mythologie* entnommen ist, da deren Sagen eine allgemeine höhere Wahrheit zugrunde liegt." The place of the mythological type among rhetorical exempla is recognized by modern writers, e. g. Baldwin, *Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic* (New York, 1924), p. 24 [following Aristotle; cf. n. 1 of this paper]; Volkmann, *op. cit.*, p. 236: "In der That können auch Erzählungen aus der *Mythologie*, sowie poetische Fabeln als Beispiele dienen, nur haben sie nach Quintilians Ansicht weniger überzeugende Kraft als wirkliche Beispiele." Quintilian's view (V, 11, 17) of course reflects the preference of the orator. But for the latter's use Quintilian elsewhere (XII, 4, 1-2) recommends not only historical examples but also "ea quae sunt a clarioribus poetis facta . . . nam haec quoque aut vetustatis fide tuta sunt aut ab hominibus magnis praceptorum loco facta creduntur."

⁷ Knox, *Herondas: Mimes and Fragments* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1922), Introd. p. XVII; cf. Wheeler, "Catullus as an Elegist" (*A. J. P.* XXXVI, 170): "The allusive manner in which they [*παραδείγματα*] are introduced is a favorite trick of Callimachus and the Augustans"; p. 171: "The allusive treatment of myth, often very obscure, shows that Catullus may have taken this trait from Callimachus . . . Among the Augustans Propertius especially follows the same method."

of the several types of Greek and Latin poetry (except epic and purely didactic), to contribute in some measure to a further understanding of the mythological paradigm. To that end it brings together, if not all, at least the most outstanding and representative occurrences (in number about one thousand), classified broadly according to the form which they take and the principle or truth which they exemplify, following which it gives brief statements of details of usage with respect to different types of poetry and individual authors, including frequency and extent of paradigm, paradigms used anonymously, mixed types, position of paradigm, and technique of its insertion. As a convenient and economical arrangement paradigms are treated under the following classification:⁸

I. The most important class, instances which represent most fully the form and purpose of the rhetorical paradigm, are those which are introduced (now formally, now informally) by statements, conclusions, or inferences, with the purpose of illustrating and confirming general truths, principles, moralizings, etc. The

⁸ Noted here as having something of the force of paradigms, but not properly considered as such, are enumerations of various kinds which vividly recall well-known myths. Hackneyed poetic themes (epic, tragic, elegiac): *Anacreon tea* 23; *Anth. Gr.* XII, 2; *Tib.* I, 4, 63 f.; *Verg. Ecl.* VI, 41-81 (eight named); *Geor.* III, 4-6 (six); *Hor. Od.* I, 6, 5-16 (six); *Prop. II*, 34, 33-40 (five); III, 9, 37-42; 9, 47 f.; *Pers.* V, 8; 17; *Am.* I, 3, 21-24; *Mart.* IV, 49, 3-6; X, 4, 1-10 (eleven); 35, 5-7; *Juv.* I, 5-11 (seven); 52-54; 162-64; *Nem. Cyn.* 15-45 (seventeen); *Vesp. Iudicium Coci et Pistoris* 51-90 [P. L. M. I, 592-96 Wernsdorf] (twenty-five presented through pun and parody). Mythical characters immortalized by poets: *Pind. Nem.* VII, 20-24; *Hor. Od.* IV, 6, 12-28 (seven); *Am.* III, 12, 21-40 (nineteen). Persons about whom center legends of love: *Trist.* II, 2, 371-408 (thirty-one). Impossible beings of mythology: *Trist.* IV, 7, 11-18 (eleven). Sufferers of punishment: *Verg. Culex* 234-57 (eleven); *Prop. III*, 5, 39-44 (nine); *Sen. H. F.* 750-58; *Med.* 744-47; *Ag.* 15-21; *Thy.* 6-12. Victims of changed fortune: *Pentad. De Fort.* [P. L. M. II, 315-18] (fourteen). Victims of unhappy love: *Auson. Cupido Crucis Adfixus* P. L. M. I, 645 f. (nineteen). Loves of rivers: *Am.* III, 6, 25-82 (nine). Loves of Neptune: *Her.* XVIII, 129-36 (seven). Loves of Hercules: *Sen. H. O.* 363-73 (four). Achievements of Bacchus: *Prop. III*, 17, 22-28 (six). Marvels and horrors: *Prop. III*, 22, 5-14 (nine); 27-38 (seven). Persons who reached Elysium through merit: *Verg. Culex* 261-71 (ten mythological, nine historical).

fairly wide range of topics which make up the subject-matter of the paradigm is obvious from the citations that follow:

Love⁹—its power (Hercules won Iole, but slew her father; Zeus made Semele his bride, but she perished in the lightning's flash; Paris stole Helen, hence the arming of heroes and the beginning of strife): Eur. Hipp. 545-62; Iph. A. 573-86; bondage for sake of (Apollo, Hercules, Melampus): Tib. II, 3, 11-28; III, 4, 67-72; Prop. II, 3, 51-54; A. A. II, 218-21; 239 f.; rules gods and men: Soph. Trach. 498-530; Theoc. XIII, 5-72; Prop. II, 30, 34-36; triumphs over guards (Io was won in spite of Argus, Danae despite her dungeon): A. A. III, 631 f.; Am. III, 4, 19-22; mainspring of daring (Achilles, Hector, Agamemnon, Mars, Leander): Am. I, 9, 33-40; II, 16, 31 f.; A. A. 249 f.; rescues loved ones from death (Anchises, Mezentius, Admetus, Eurydice): Stat. Silv. III, 3, 188-94; drives to sinful deeds (Ariadna, Dido, Medea, Myrrha, Paris, Pasiphae, Phaedra, Phyllis, Scylla, Tarpeia, Tereus): Eur. Hipp. 337-39; Prop. IV, 4, 39-42; Rem. Am. 55-68; 99 f.; Corn. Gall. Eleg. 27-36 [P. L. M. II, 245]; drives to death (Haemon, Sappho): Prop. II, 8, 21-24; Plaut. Mil. 1247; leads to ignoble action (Achilles): Plaut. Mil. 1289; feeds on luxury (Phaedra): Rem. Am. 743-46; parts friends and kindred (Helen, Medea, Paris): Sappho 38; Prop. II, 35, 7 f.; causes war (Hippodamia, Sabine maidens): Prop. II, 6, 15-22;

⁹ Exempla under this heading are many for various reasons. The erotic motive is the main one in most myths; the Roman elegiac poets (who contribute a large number of exempla) wrote chiefly the subjective-erotic type of elegy; all three of the great elegists, Tibullus, Propertius and Ovid, assume (the last two self-confessedly) the rôle of erotic experts (*praeceptores amoris*), hence utter numerous erotic precepts (seen most fully in the *Ars Amatoria*) supported by examples. Erotodidaxis in these poets, with incidental treatment of the mythological paradigm, is ably discussed by Wheeler: "Propertius as *Praeceptor Amoris*" (Class. Phil. V, 28-40) and "Erotic Teaching in Roman Elegy and the Greek Sources" (Part I, Class. Phil. V, 440-50; Part II, Ibid. VI, 56-77). In Catullus Wheeler (loc. cit. n. 7 above) fails to find erotodidaxis, but he comments on Catullus' use of mythological *παραδειγματα*. For extended discussions of Propertius' use of myths (without, however, any special treatment of the paradigm), see Schöne, *De Propertii ratione fabulas adhibendi* (Diss. Leipzig, 1911), pp. 7-66; Otto, *De fabulis Propertianis*, Part II (Progr. Gross-Glogau, 1886), pp. 3-21.

condones infidelity (Helen, Venus) : Prop. II, 32, 31-40; victims of its frenzy (Paris, Theseus, Ajax) : Theog. 1231-34; at strife with chastity (Phaedra and Hippolytus) : Anth. Gr. IX, 132; divinities and heroes yield to mortal loves (twelve named) : Eur. Hipp. 451-58; Anth. Gr. V, 100; 123; Prop. I, 18, 19 f.; II, 30, 29-31; Verg. Lyd. 25-74; Am. III, 10, 19-42; A. A. I, 527-64; III, 83-86; Sen. Phaed. 296-324; devotees of chase and hunt yield (Meleager, Cephalus, Adonis) : Her. IV, 93-100; idlers succumb (Aegisthus) : Rem. Am. 161-67; noble prize of love (Aegina) : Pind. Nem. VIII, 6-12; divine amours that shock (Ilia, Venus) : Trist. II, 2, 259-62; divinities who loved sisters (Saturn, Oceanus, Jupiter) : Theoc. XVII, 131-34; Her. IV, 133 f.; Met. IX, 498 f.; who loved rustics (Venus, Selene, Rhea, Zeus) : Theoc. XX, 34-41; who loved an aged mate (Aurora) : Prop. II, 18, 7-18; rustics successful in love (Hippomenes, Bias, Adonis, Endymion, Iasion) : Theoc. III, 40-51; heroes who loved maidservants (Achilles, Agamemnon, Ajax, Pyrrhus) : Anth. Gr. V, 18; Hor. Od. II, 4, 2-12; Am. II, 8, 11-14; love — devices for winning (Zeus, Acontius) : Anth. Gr. V, 125; A. A. I, 457 f.; unequals in (Ulysses-Calypso, Peleus-Thetis, Numa-Egeria, Vulcan-Venus) : Am. II, 17, 15-20; greater for adoptive parents (Achilles, Pallas, Perseus) : Stat. Silv. II, 1, 88-95; greater for foster nurses (Ino, Acca) : Stat. Silv. II, 1, 96-100; old replaced by new (seven instances) : Rem. Am. 453-82; eyes the leader in : Prop. II, 15, 13-16; strength for its service (Jupiter, Achilles, Hector) : Prop. II, 22, 25-34; made fonder by short absence (Phyllis, Penelope, Laodamia) : A. A. II, 353-56; wanes by long separation (Helen) : A. A. II, 357-72; favors the victor (Pelops) : Am. III, 2, 15-17; greater from desire to please : Prop. III, 8, 29-32; more alluring when forbidden (Danae, Io) : Am. II, 19, 27-30; increased by mutual misfortune (Mars-Venus) : A. A. II, 561-92; grief for when stolen (Achilles) : Prop. II, 8, 29-38; outlasts death (Protesilaus-Laodamia) : Prop. I, 19, 7-10.

Lovers — win by devoted service (Milanion) : Prop. I, 1, 9-16; A. A. II, 185-92; kindly treated by the gods (Amymone, Orithyia) : Prop. II, 26, 47-52; Bacchus a boon to (Ariadna) : Tib. III, 6, 39-42; Prop. III, 17, 7 f.; heavenly bodies stayed in course for (Zeus-Alcmena, Sun-Clymene, Luna-Endymion) :

Anth. Gr. V, 172; 223; Am. I, 13, 43-46; spurred on by rivals (Orestes, Menelaus, Achilles): Rem. Am. 771-84; not retained by magic (Jason, Ulysses): A. A. II, 103 f.; Rem. Am. 261-68; harmed by solitude (Phyllis): Rem. Am. 591-608; moved by pictures of beloved (Laodamia): Rem. Am. 724; reminded of loves of divinities by their temples: Trist. II, 2, 289-330; lovers meet adverse fate (Hercules-Hylas): Prop. I, 20, 15-50; are sacrosanct: Prop. III, 16, 12; are pale: A. A. I, 729-32; lamented after death: Prop. II, 13, 53-56; false lovers (eight named): Men. Samia 387-89; Prop. II, 24, 43-46; A. A. III, 33-40; 457-60; Her. XVI, 193-96; 229-32; Stat. Silv. V, 1, 57-59; lovers who carried off their prizes (Jason, Paris): Her. XVIII, 175-78.

Women—of uncontrollable impulses (Aerope, Aethra, Althaea, Byblis, Clytemnestra, Danaides, Idaea, Lemniades, Medea, Myrrha, Pasiphae, Phaedra, Phthia, Scylla): Aesch. Choeph. 602-37; Eur. Hec. 886 f.; Prop. III, 19, 11-24; Her. IV, 165 f.; A. A. I, 283-340; Sen. Phaed. 563 f.; a curse as stepmothers (Phaedra): Anth. Gr. IX, 68; 69; slayers of their children (Medea, Procne): Am. II, 14, 29-32; Mart. V, 67, 6; slain by son (Clytemnestra): Ovid, Nux 26; victims of the deceiver (Calypso, Helen, Hippodamia, Juno, Leda, Medea): Prop. II, 21, 11-14; Her. VIII, 67-74; A. A. I, 632-36; disloyal through husband's wrongs (Clytemnestra): A. A. II, 399-408; whose beauty captivated (Medea, Penthesilea): Prop. III, 11, 9-55; whose defects were ignored (Andromache, Andromeda): A. A. II, 643-46; won by force (Deidamia, Helen, Hilaira and Phoebe): A. A. I, 679-704; Her. XV, 221-24; cause of strife (Helen, Hippodamia (bride of Pirithous), Lavinia, Sabine maidens): Am. I, 4, 7 f.; II, 12, 17-26; Her. XVI, 247 f.; noted for their deeds (Dido, Hippolyte, Penthesilea): Claud. In Eutr. I, 332-36; praised for worth in adversity (Alcestis, Evadne, Laodamia, Penelope): Trist. V, 5, 51-58. Wives—prizes of contest (Atalanta, Deianira, Hippodamia): Her. XV, 159-62; Claud. Carm. Min. XXX, 166-76; faithful (Aegiale, Alcestis, Alphesiboea, Andromache, Briseis, Calypso, Evadne, Hypsipyle, Laodamia, Meliboea, Penelope): Prop. I, 15, 9-22; II, 6, 23 f.; III, 12, 23-38; Am. III, 4, 23 f.; Trist. V, 14, 35-40; Stat. Silv. III, 5, 44-49; avengers of their wrongs (Medea, Procne): A. A. II, 381-84; who did not

decline motherhood (*Ilia*, *Thetis*, *Venus*) : Am. II, 14, 13-18. Beauty — boast of punished (*Andromeda*) : Am. III, 3, 17 f.; pride in (*Latona*) : Juv. X, 292; praise for desired: A. A. I, 625 f.; best judged by day: A. A. I, 247 f.; artificial not that of early heroines: Prop. I, 2, 15-24; destroyed by time: Met. XV, 229-33.

Divinities — give valor and aid to heroes (*Hercules*, *Perseus*) : Pind. Olym. IX, 29-35; Pyth. X, 31-48; are faithful: Pind. Nem. X, 55-90; who were servants (*Adonis*, *Apollo*, *Hercules*, *Pan*) : Aesch. Ag. 1040 f.; Sen. H. F. 451; Stat. Silv. III, 3, 57 f.; Calp. Ecl. IX, 72; suffered in infancy (*Bacchus*, *Jupiter*) : Sen. H. F. 457-60; were merciful (*Jupiter*, *Leucothea*) : Pont. III, 6, 17-20; power of early manifest (*Bacchus*, *Hercules*) : A. A. I, 187-90. Friends — noted pairs (*Achilles*-*Patroclus*, *Nisus*-*Euryalus*, *Pylades*-*Orestes*, *Theseus*-*Pirithous*) : Prop. II, 1, 37 f.; A. A. I, 743-46; Trist. I, 5, 19-24; V, 6, 25-28; Pont. III, 2, 33 f.; of differing tastes (*Amphion*-*Zethus*) : Hor. Epist. I, 18, 41-44. Foes — granted forgiveness and mercy (nine named) : Hor. Epod. XVII, 8-18; 42-44; A. A. I, 441 f.; Trist. III, 5, 37-42; Pont. II, 2, 25 f.; Claud. Carm. Min. XXII, 13-19; loyal to the wretched: Trist. I, 9, 27-34; sacrificed on tomb of the dead (*Polyxena*) : Anth. Gr. VII, 205. Music and song — power of (*Amphion*, *Arion*, *Linus*, *Orpheus*, *Polyphemus*, *Sirens*) : Eur. Alc. 357-62; Prop. II, 13, 3-8; III, 2, 1-6; Hor. Od. II, 13, 33-40; III, 11, 13-24; A. A. III, 311-26; Sen. H. F. 569-89; Stat. Silv. III, 1, 16 f.; to whom a solace (*Achilles*, *Orpheus*) : Trist. IV, 1, 15-18. Wine — cause of strife (*Centaurs*-*Lapiths*) : Callim. Epigr. 62; Verg. Geor. II, 455-57; Hor. Od. I, 18, 7-11; A. A. I, 593; source of danger (*Icarus* (son of *Oebalus*), *Polyphemus*) : Prop. II, 33, 29-32.

Death — inevitable (fifteen instances) : Pind. Nem. VII, 24-48; Alcaeus 122; Hor. Od. I, 28, 7-11; II, 14, 5-20; 18, 34-40; Prop. III, 18, 27-30; Sen. H. O. 1036-89; whence none return: Aesch. Ag. 1022-24; Eur. Alc. 122-28; Hor. Od. IV, 7, 25-28; Ovid, Cons. ad Liv. 429-42; equality after: Prop. III, 5, 16 f.; apotheosis after: Hor. Epist. II, 1, 5-12; an escape from sorrow (*Nestor*, *Niobe*, *Phaethontiades*) : Prop. II, 13, 46-50; Pont. I, 2, 29-32; for a father's sake (*Antilochus*) : Pind. Pyth. VI, 28-42; bards claimed by: Am. III, 9, 21-27;

untimely grief for (by Andromache, Erigone): *Stat. Silv.* V, 3, 74-79; of sons mourned by goddesses (Achilles, Memnon): *Am. III*, 9, 1; early death of the great (Achilles, Orpheus): *Stat. Silv.* II, 7, 93-99. Fate—removes the best first, the worst last: *Am. II*, 6, 41 f.; not overcome by song or skill (Orpheus, Asclepius): *Eur. Alc.* 966-71; dooms to prison (Cleopatra (daughter of Boreas), Danae, Lycurgus): *Soph. Antig.* 944-87; punishes the innocent for sins of the guilty (Iphigenia): *Eur. Iph. T.* 186-97; *Iph. A.* 1284-1335. Good fortune—none wholly fortunate (Achilles, Hercules, Meleager, Tithonus): *Bacchyl.* 33 (V), 53-175; *Hor. Od. II*, 16, 29 f.; banishes earlier grief and pain: *Pind. Olym. II*, 22-45; of foundlings: *Men. Epit.* 108-16; reversal of: *Pind. Pyth. III*, 86-102; *Prop. II*, 8, 9 f.; *Incert. De Fortun. Viciss.* 55-58 [P. L. M. II, 302]; comes by chance (Andromeda): *A. A. III*, 429. Misfortune—changed for the better (Andromeda, Callisto, Ino): *Prop. II*, 28, 7-14; added to by time: *Trist. V*, 2, 13-16; made known by: *Pont. III*, 1, 51-54; honored despite of: *Trist. IV*, 3, 63-68; sorrow for alleviated: *Trist. V*, 1, 53-62; heavy when fall is from great heights (Elpenor, Icarus): *Trist. III*, 4, 19-22.

Crime—following inherited curse and as a warning against infidelity (Tantalidae): *Soph. Elec.* 472-515; 700-74; *Eur. Orest.* 812-18; 982-1012; 1548; *Sen. Thy.* 139-52; inhuman (Itys served to Tereus): *Sen. Thy.* 272-76; guilt for absolved by purification (Alcmaeon, Medea, Patroclus, Peleus): *Fast. II*, 39-44; origin in superstition (sacrifice of Iphigenia): *Lucr. I*, 84-100. Punishment—escape from by inventive skill: *A. A. II*, 21-96; for offending the gods (eleven instances): *Pind. Olym. I*, 54-64; *Pyth. II*, 25-48; *Eur. Bacch.* 337-40; *Bacchyl.* 38 (X), 40-112; *Tib. III*, 6, 23 f.; *Her. XIX*, 101-06; *A. A. II*, 605 f.; *Trist. II*, 1, 105 f.; *Fast. V*, 305-10; *Juv. VI*, 172-77; *Sen. Oed.* 712-63; for asking what is not meet for mortals (Asclepius, Coronis): *Pind. Pyth. III*, 8-58; for challenge to ocean (Argonauts): *Sen. Med.* 615-69; for insolence and violence (Porphyryion, Typhoeus): *Pind. Pyth. VIII*, 12-18; *Hor. Od. III*, 4, 42-80; of cruel rival (Dirce): *Prop. III*, 15, 11-30; of sinful king (Tereus): *Auson. Ecl. II*, 28; of contrivers of wicked devices (Thrasius): *A. A. I*, 647-54; *Claud. In Eutr. I*, 159-66; of betrayers of secrets (Argus, Midas

and servant, Tantalus) : Anth. Gr. V, 56; Am. II, 2, 43-50; of foe of Zeus (Typhoeus) : Pind. Pyth. I, 15-28; of the proud (Cadmus, Eteocles and Polynices, Niobe, Oedipus) : Sen. H. F. 386-94; everlasting punishment (Danaides, Prometheus, Sisyphus, Tantalus, Tityus) : Lucr. III, 978-1022; Hor. Epop. XVII, 65-69. Peril — the sea a source of (seven cases) : Anth. Gr. IX, 82; 215; of adventure (Phaethon) : Sen. Med. 599-602; peril in highest, safety in middle, course (Phaethon, Icarus, Daedalus) : Sen. Oed. 892-908; H. O. 677-90; of vaulting ambition (Bellerophon, Dolon, Phaethon) : Pind. Isth. VII, 45-47; Anth. Gr. VII, 683; Hor. Od. IV, 11, 25-31; Trist. III, 4, 27-30; Claud. De VI Cons. Hon. 186-92; loyalty in time of (Automedon, Palinurus, Podalirius) : Trist. V, 6, 7-12. Sorrow — less when shared: Sen. Tr. 1038-41; greater when unshared: Sen. Tr. 1034-38; wisely ended for the dead: Hor. Od. II, 9, 13-17; banished with wine and song: Hor. Od. I, 7, 21-32; Epop. XIII, 11-18; deeply stricken by (Niobe, Priam) : Trist. V, 12, 7 f. Healing — by the hand that wounded (Telephus) : Am. II, 9, 7 f.; Rem. Am. 47; Trist. I, 1, 99 f.; Claud. Carm. Min. XXII, 46-49; late but effectual (Philoctetes) : Rem. Am. 111-14; for all ailments save love: Prop. II, 1, 59-64.

Gold and gain — power of (Danae, Eriphyle, Polymestor) : Hor. Od. III, 16, 1-16; Prop. III, 13, 51-58; Am. I, 10, 49-52; III, 8, 29-34; Nux 109-12; Luper. De Cupid. 2-8 [P. L. M. II, 292]; Anth. Gr. V, 31; 33; 34; 217; XII, 239. Teachers — stern but loved (Atlas, Chiron) : Juv. VII, 210-12; Auson. Praef. I, 31-33; Epist. XXII, 20-23; softeners of character (Chiron) : A. A. I, 11-16. Eloquence — gift of (Nestor, Ulysses) : Tib. IV, 1, 48-81; goddesses charmed by (Calypso, Circe) : A. A. II, 123-42. Old age — sorrowful (Hecuba, Laertes, Nestor, Peleus, Priam) : Juv. X, 245-72. Piety — to parents (Aeneas, Dioscuri, Cleobis and Biton) : Claud. Carm. Min. XVII, 37-40; false (Orestes) : Claud. De VI Cons. Hon. 113-15. Chastity — its reward (Peleus) : Aristoph. Nub. 1063; its peril (Hippolytus, Bellerophon) : Juv. X, 324-29; Auson. Ecl. II, 24 f. Anger — origin and bane of (Prometheus, Thyestes) : Hor. Od. I, 16, 13-18. Envy — attacks the noble (Ajax), strives not against the base (Odysseus) : Pind. Nem. VIII, 23-34; assails the prosperous (four) : Pind. Pyth. XI,

17-37; spares men of high station if free from pride (Iolaus, Castor and Pollux): Pind. Pyth. XI, 59-64. Entreaty—yielded to (Meleager, Eumolpus, Erichthonius): Her. III, 92-97; Pont. II, 9, 19. Inhumanity—of kings (six): Her. XV, 101-06; Sen. Tr. 1106-09; of human sacrifices (Orestes and Pylades at Tauric altar): Trist. IV, 4, 63-82. Disaster—from distrust (Procris): A. A. III, 687-746; from hunting the boar (Adonis, Ancaeus): Grat. Cyn. 66-69; from overmastering forces (Phaethon, Deucalion): Lucr. V, 369-404. Daring—led on by hope (five instances): Incert. Eleg. de Spe 43-50 [P. L. M. II, 283]; a temptation of Providence (Prometheus, Daedalus, Hercules): Hor. Od. I, 3, 27-36. Valor and worth—tested by trial (Erginus): Pind. Olym. IV, 19-28; proved in adversity: Trist. IV, 3, 75-78; overthrown by craft (Ajax): Pind. Isth. IV, 35-42; of sires seen in the sons (Alcmaeon): Pind. Pyth. VIII, 45-55; praise due to valor (Peleus, Telamon): Pind. Nem. III, 32-39; valor involves suffering (Telamon): Pind. Nem. IV, 25-30; worth gives power (Achilles): Pind. Nem. III, 43-64; brings to abode of the blest (three instances): Pind. Olym. II, 78-83; wins immortality (four): Pind. Nem. I, 33-72; Bacchyl. XII, 100-174; Hor. Od. III, 3, 9-16.

Paradigms of miscellaneous character for which space allows a mere citation are found in Pind. Pyth. IX, 5-70; 79-88; 111-16; Nem. VIII, 18 f.; Anth. Gr. V, 132; VII, 206; 745; Tib. IV, 1, 8-13; Verg. Ecl. VIII, 70; Geor. III, 267 f.; 391-93; Prop. II, 16, 29 f.; III, 13, 61-64; Am. I, 7, 31-34; A. A. I, 363 f.; 509-12; Her. VIII, 19-22; XV, 93-98; 239-43; Trist. I, 2, 5-10; III, 3, 67 f.; 9, 7-32; Pont. III, 3, 41-44; Stat. Silv. I, 5, 20-22; III, 3, 80-82; Claud. De Cons. Stil. I, 97-99; Auson. Ecl. II, 19-23; Epist. XVIII, 13-20.

II. In this class (a large one) the paradigm takes the form of simile,¹⁰ comparison,¹¹ or contrast (these now formally, now

¹⁰ Especially frequent in Ovid; see Washietl, *De similitudinibus imaginibusque Ovidianis* (Diss. Vindobonae, 1883), pp. 178 f.; Eliza G. Wilkins "Classification of the Similes of Ovid" (Class. Weekly, XXV, pp. 85 f.). Owen, in an article entitled "Ovid's Use of the Simile" (Class. Rev. XLV, pp. 97-106), discusses mainly the poet's facility and fertility in using the figure, but in so doing includes not a few similes (drawn from divine or mythical characters) which are employed as paradigms.

¹¹ Comparisons used by Greek and Latin writers in which a mortal

informally introduced), in which a single myth or a number of myths are referred to. Here again the subject-matter is diverse, much more so than is suggested by the general headings that follow:

Beauty in men (twenty-two): Tyrt. 12, 5; Mosch. III, 68 f.; Anth. Gr. XII, 54; 55; 97; 194; Am. I, 14, 31-34; Stat. Silv. I, 2, 199; II, 1, 112 f.; 179-82; 6, 25-33; 6, 43; III, 4, 9 f.; 4, 40-43; 4, 84 f.; Sen. Phaed. 753-58; 800-04; Med. 82-87; Mart. III, 39, 1; X, 98, 2; Claud. Fescenn. I, 6-16; Auson. Epist. XIV. Beauty in women (thirty-six): Sappho 44; Herond. I, 32-35; Anth. Gr. V, 35; 48; 64; 73; 94; 95; 146; 148; 149; 222; 257; 260; 301; VII, 218; 219; XII, 207; Catull. I, 16-20; Tib. I, 5, 45 f.; Verg. Lyd. 24-27; Cata. IX, 25-34; Aem. Mag. Arb. ad Nymph. 51 f. [P. L. M. II, 275]; Prop. I, 3, 1-8; 4, 5-8; 13, 29-32; II, 2, 5-12; 2, 13 f.; 3, 17 f.; 3, 32-40; Am. I, 7, 13-18; 10, 1-8; 14, 34; III, 2, 29-32; A. A. II, 659; Her. XVI, 137 f.; XIX, 60; Sen. Oct. 201-12; 544-46; 769-77; Stat. Silv. I, 2, 43-45; 2, 131-33; III, 1, 161 f.; IV, 8, 28 f.; Auson. Epist. VII. Modest women: Stat. Silv. I, 2, 242-46; III, 5, 8-10; Claud. Carm. Min. XXX, 150-57. Loyal wives (seven): Plaut. Stich. 1-9; Trist. V, 5, 43 f.; Cons. ad Liv. 319-22; Stat. Silv. III, 5, 44-49; Claud. Carm. Min. XXX, 12-32. Deserted wives: Theoc. II, 45 f.; Anth. Gr. V, 265. Loyal mothers: Stat. Silv. III, 5, 57-59. Loyal friends (seven pairs): Am. II, 6, 15; Pont. I, 7, 31 f.; Stat. Silv. II, 6, 54-57; IV, 4, 102-05; 5, 27 f.; V, 2, 155-57; Claud. Carm. Min. XL, 18; Auson. Epist. XXVII. Ardent lovers (eleven): Theog. 1287-94; Catull. II, 11-13; LXVIII, 73-84; 134-40; Prop. I, 13, 21-24; A. A. II, 5-8; Trist. III, 10, 41 f.; Stat. Silv. I, 2, 85-89; 213-17; I, 3, 30; Claud. Epith. 16-19. Lovers separated: Prop. II, 28, 1-8. Tutors: Pind. Olym. X, 18-21; Stat. Silv. III, 2, 96-98; V, 3, 191-94; Claud. De III Cons. Hon. 60-62. Orators: Tyrt. 12, 8; Theog. 714; Stat. Silv. V, 5, 114 f.; Auson. Epist. XII. Hunters: Auson. Epist. XIV. Watcher: Anth. Gr. V, 262; A. A. III, 617 f.; Claud. De Cons. Stil. I, 309-12. Keen of vision:

is declared equal or superior to a god in prowess, beauty, etc. are treated by Helen H. Law, "Hyperbole in Mythological Comparisons" (A. J. P. XLVII, 361-72).

Aristoph. *Plut.* 210. Prize fruit: *Priap.* XVI; *P. L. M.* VII, 136. Wealth: *Tyrt.* 12, 6; *Callim.* *Aitia* III, 1, 47; *Plaut.* *Aul.* 701 f.; *Bacch.* 241 f.; *Stat. Silv.* II, 2, 121; *Claud. In Ruf.* I, 165-69; *De Cons. Stil.* III, 226-32.

Sad lament or song (twenty-three): *Aesch. Suppl.* 58-67; *Ag.* 1140-45; *Soph. Elec.* 147-52; *Eur. Hec.* 336-38; *Iph. T.* 1089-95; *Mosch.* III, 37-43; *Auct. Meg.* 81 f.; *Anth. Gr.* V, 237; IX, 262; *Catull.* LXV, 13 f.; *Am. II*, 6, 7-10; *Trist.* IV, 3, 29 f.; *Cons. ad Liv.* 105-12; *Sen. Ag.* 670-90; *H. O.* 185-200; *Oct.* 6-8; *Juv. III*, 278-80; *Stat. Silv.* III, 3, 173-76; 3, 179 f.; V, 1, 33-36; 202-04; 3, 80-88; 5, 53-56; *Claud. In Eutr.* II, 530; *Incert. P. L. M.* II, 265. Skilled in music and song (seven): *Anth. Gr.* IX, 517; *Verg. Ecl.* IV, 55-59; *Pont.* IV, 8, 75-78; *Stat. Silv.* II, 2, 60-62. Power of song: *Eur. Iph. A.* 1211-14; *Mosch.* III, 123-25; *Verg. Ecl.* II, 23 f.; VI, 29 f.; *Culex* 117-20; *Stat. Silv.* II, 7, 43 f. Sweet music: *Aleman* 1, 96-99; *Aesch. Ag.* 1629-32; *Eur. Med.* 544; *Anth. Gr.* V, 141; *Hor. Od. I*, 24, 13-18; *Juv. XIV*, 19; *Stat. Silv.* II, 1, 10-12; V, 1, 23-28; *Claud. De Cons. Stil.* II, 168-72. Old age: *Mimner.* 4; *Tib. IV*, 1, 110-12; *Pseud-Verg. Maec.* 137-40; *Cata. IX*, 15 f.; *Pont. I*, 4, 10; II, 8, 41 f.; *Sen. Tr.* 212; *Mart. VII*, 96, 7; IX, 29, 1-3; *Stat. Silv.* II, 3, 73; IV, 3, 147-52. Strategy and cunning: *Theog.* 701; *Soph. Philoc.* 624 f.; *Aristoph. Vesp.* 351; *Plaut. Pseud.* 1244; *Rem. Am.* 699. Craftsmen: *Eur. Hec.* 838-40; *Auson. Mosella* 298-302. Patriot: *Juv. XIV*, 239 f. Sumptuous feasts: *Auson. Epist. V*.

Heroic labors: *Pind. Isth.* IV, 49-55; *Aesch. Choeph.* 831-37; *Mosch.* III, 115-19; *Anth. Gr.* IX, 545; XI, 116; 184; *Plaut. Epid.* 178 f.; *Men.* 200 f.; *Persa* 1-5; *Lucret.* V, 22-36; *Catull. LV*, 13; *Verg. Geor.* III, 140-42; *Pont. I*, 4, 25-46; *Juv. X*, 360-62; *Stat. Silv.* I, 2, 38-42; *Claud. In Ruf.* I, 278-90; *Bell. Goth.* 1-35; *De Cons. Stil.* I, 143-47. Adventurous valor: *Stat. Silv.* III, 2, 64-66; *Claud. Bell. Goth.* 63-76. Adventures and wanderings: *Theog.* 1123-28; *Aristoph. Av.* 1560 f.; *Plut.* 299-301; *Herond.* VIII, 36-40; *Anth. Gr.* XI, 379; *Plaut. Bacch.* 21-24; *Trist.* IV, 1, 31 f.; *Pont. IV*, 10, 9-28; *Maxim. Eleg.* V, 19 f. Valiant and impetuous warriors (seven): *Pind. Nem.* II, 13-15; IX, 39-43; *Theoc. XVII*, 53-57; 116-20; *Plaut. Bacch.* 925-31; *Verg. Cata.* IX, 6;

Am. I, 9, 22 f.; Stat. *Silv.* V, 2, 48-50; Claud. *De VI Cons. Hon.* 470-80. Great strength and stature: Tyrt. 12, 3; Theoc. IV, 8; Sen. *Phaed.* 805-08; Stat. *Silv.* IV, 4, 35 f.; Rutil. I, 628. Cruel and inhuman beings, monsters, devastating pests, and wild forces of nature (twenty): Eur. *Hipp.* 976-80; Alc. 1118; Med. 1340-43; *Orest.* 1520; *Phoen.* 456; Anth. Gr. XI, 96; 143; Catull. LX, 2; LXIV, 154-57; Tib. III, 4, 85-91; Hor. *Od.* IV, 4, 61-64; Prop. II, 25, 11-14; *Trist.* III, 11, 39-52; Mart. I, 104; V, 49, 11; XI, 18; 69; Juv. V, 125 f.; Sen. *Phaed.* 1169-73; Med. 408-10; Thy. 153 f.; H. O. 235 f.; Claud. *In Ruf.* I, 251-55; 291-96; *De III Cons. Hon.* 158-62; Rutil. I, 382; 627. Mad and frenzied persons (six): *Anacreontea* 9; 12; Am. I, 7, 7-10; Claud. *In Eutr.* II, 522-26. Sorceresses: Aristoph. *Equ.* 1321; Theoc. II, 14-16; Plaut. *Pseud.* 867-72; Hor. *Epod.* III, 9-18; Rutil. I, 525. Infamous women: A. A. II, 309 f.; Sen. *Phaed.* 688-93. Persons guilty of murder (eight): Eur. *H. F.* 1017-25; Anth. Gr. IX, 345; *Trist.* I, 7, 17-20; Rem. Am. 719-22; Sen. *Phaed.* 697; H. O. 948-61; Stat. *Silv.* II, 1, 140-45; Juv. VIII, 215-21; Rutil. II, 52-54. Fratricides: Prop. II, 9, 49-52. Offenders of the gods: Pont. II, 2, 9-14; Claud. *In Ruf.* II, 513-17.

Punishment and suffering: Pind. *Isth.* VIII, 9-11; Soph. *Antig.* 824-31; *Philoc.* 676-716; Eur. *Orest.* 1-10; *Phoen.* 1182-86; Anth. Gr. V, 236; 246; VII, 743; IX, 377; XI, 107; Plaut. *Capt.* 998-1000; *Pseud.* 198-201; Prop. I, 9, 19-22; II, 17, 5-10; Pont. I, 2, 39 f.; Sen. *Phaed.* 1231-37; H. O. 942-47; Oct. 623-25; Maxim. *Eleg.* I, 183-86. Sufferers of mutilation: Plaut. *Merc.* 469 f.; Mart. *Lib. Spect.* VII, 1-4; *Epigr.* XI, 84, 9-12; Claud. *In Ruf.* II, 418-20; *De Cons. Stil.* II, 212 f. Under this heading may be noted Ovid's *Ibis*, a tour de force of its kind, perhaps unmatched in literature. This elaborate invective recites (verses 173-638) the most violent and cruel deaths, grievous sufferings, inhuman deeds, and infamous relationships recorded in mythology (158 examples) and semi-mythical history (43 examples), coupled in each case with a prayer that the same or a worse fate may befall the poet's treacherous friend, to whom the poem is addressed.

Persons and instruments of swift movement (ten): Theog. 715; Tyrt. 12, 4; Callim. *Aitia* III, 1, 44-48; Anth. Gr. XII, 202; Catull. LV, 23-28; Prop. II, 30, 3-6; Pont. IV, 7, 51 f.

Famous steeds: Verg. *Geor.* II, 89-94; Stat. *Silv.* I, 1, 52-54; Auson. *Epist.* XXVII. Skilled horseman (eight): Sen. *Phaed.* 809-11; Claud. *De IV Cons. Hon.* 554-640. Bowmen: Claud. *De IV Cons. Hon.* 532-38. Healers (five): Anth. Gr. V, 225; 291; Pont. I, 3, 5-8; Stat. *Silv.* I, 4, 112-14; P. L. M. II, 445. Just judges: *Theog.* 701-16; *Herond.* II, 90 f.; *Juv.* XIII, 196-98; Claud. *In Ruf.* I, 114. Principals in monstrous happenings (eleven): Claud. *In Eutr.* I, 287-96. Gifts and skills of heroes (six): A. A. II, 735-38. Qualities of divinities (six): Anth. Gr. V, 70. Persons restored to life: Claud. *Bell. Goth.* 436-49. Persons metamorphosed (five): *Anacreontea* 22; Anth. Gr. XI, 254; 255; *Her.* XVII, 159 f.; Auson. *Mosella* 276-82.

Finally, a bare citation may be made of paradigms which name mythical things (thirteen), or places where mythical happenings occurred (six), or else present some phase (sometimes an unimportant one) of a mythological event, or of a personage's function or acts (sixty-nine): Pind. *Olym.* VI, 12-18; *Pyth.* I, 50-55; Aesch. *Eum.* 339-41; Soph. *Elec.* 838 f.; *Anacreontea* 13; *Tyrt.* 12, 7; *Theog.* 541 f.; Aristoph. *Lys.* 794-96; *Herond.* VIII, 10; *Theoc.* VII, 148-50; Anth. Gr. V, 222; 263; 286; 288; IX, 267; XI, 19; 104; 124; 131; 184; 185; 239; 254; 256; 320; 329; 407; 411; Plaut. *Rud.* 508 f.; *Ter. And.* 194; *Eun.* 1027; *Heaut.* 1036; *Catull.* LXV, 19-24; *Tib.* IV, 1, 120; Verg. *Geor.* IV, 170-78; *Hor. Od.* I, 8, 13-16; III, 27, 25-66; IV, 4, 1-18; *Epod.* X, 11-14; XVII, 30-33; *Epist.* I, 7, 40-43; *Prop.* I, 9, 5 f.; II, 14, 1-9; *Am.* I, 2, 47 f.; A. A. I, 760-62; II, 741; *Rem. Am.* 355; 735-40; *Her.* XVII, 181; *Trist.* I, 3, 26; III, 11, 27 f.; 14, 13 f.; V, 3, 29 f.; 4, 11 f.; *Cons. ad Liv.* 257 f.; *Mart.* I, 90, 9; *Sen. Med.* 87; *Stat. Silv.* I, 1, 8-15; 2, 203-208; 5, 54-56; III, 1, 73-75; 115 f.; 130-33; IV, 2, 44-51; 6, 51-54; Claud. *In Eutr.* I, 80-83; *De Cons. Stil.* I, 318-24; *Carm. Min.* IV, 1-4; *Rutil.* I, 97; 261 f.; 291 f.; 449-52; Auson. *Epist.* XXIX, 70-72.

III. Here the paradigm embodies the figure of metonymy. The employment of the name of a mythological person or event is sufficient to indicate distinct types of persons or action:

Old age (Hecale, Hecuba, Iapetus, Nestor, Niobe, Priam, Sibyl, Tithonus): Callim. *Iamb.* 249; Aristoph. *Ach.* 688; *Nub.* 998; Anth. Gr. V, 31; VII, 157; IX, 112; XI, 67; 72;

408; XII, 191; Plaut. Men. 854; Pseud-Verg. Maec. 119 f.; Prop. II, 2, 16; 24, 33; 25, 10; Am. III, 7, 41 f.; Trist. V, 5, 62; Fast. 533 f.; Priap. XII; LVII; Juv. VI, 326; XII, 128; Mart. II, 64, 3; III, 32, 3; 76, 4; IV, 1, 3; V, 58, 5; VI, 70, 12; 71, 3; VIII, 2, 7; 6, 9; 6, 16; 64, 14; IX, 29, 3; X, 24, 11; 38, 4; XI, 56, 13; 60, 3; XIII, 117; Stat. Silv. I, 3, 110; 4, 125-28; II, 2, 107 f.; III, 4, 103 f.; V, 3, 255-57; Auson. Epigr. XL. Handsome youths or attendants (fourteen): Theog. 1345-48; Pind. Olym. X, 105; Anth. Gr. V, 113; XII, 191; Hor. Od. III, 20, 15 f.; Epop. XV, 22; A. A. II, 109 f.; Pont. IV, 13, 16; Juv. V, 59; VI, 110; X, 318; Mart. II, 14, 4; 43, 14; IV, 45, 8; V, 48, 5; VI, 68, 8; 77, 2; VII, 15, 2-5; 50, 4-8; VIII, 39, 4; IX, 16, 6; 22, 12; 73, 6; 103, 3; X, 66, 8; XI, 22, 2; XII, 15, 7; 82, 10; XIII, 108; Stat. Silv. I, 6, 34. Beautiful women (ten): Anth. Gr. V, 109; XI, 408; Plaut. Bacch. 217; Prop. II, 28, 51-56; Am. II, 4, 42; A. A. III, 251-54; Mart. III, 76, 4; IX, 103, 1-4; Juv. VI, 503. Wanton women (five): Aristoph. Ran. 1043; Thes. 497; 547; Men. Samia 125; Anth. Gr. IX, 166; XI, 278; Hor. Sat. I, 3, 107; Prop. II, 1, 49 f.; Sen. Ag. 795; Mart. I, 62, 6; Priap. LXVIII, 9-12; 29-38. Chaste women: Aristoph. Thes. 550; Anth. Gr. IX, 166; Catull. LXI, 230; Prop. IV, 5, 7 f.; A. A. I, 477; Mart. I, 62, 6; XI, 7, 5; 104, 16; Priap. XXXI. Sad, austere women: A. A. III, 517-24; Mart. II, 41, 14. Cruel, unnatural women (ten): Anth. Gr. IX, 95; Hor. Sat. I, 1, 100; Prop. IV, 7, 57 f.; A. A. III, 11-14; 672; Pont. III, 1, 119-24; Juv. VI, 643 f.; 655-60. Faithful, devoted wives (six): Eur. Orest. 588-90; Praxilla 3; Anth. Gr. VII, 691; Hor. Od. III, 10, 11; 11, 35-52; Prop. III, 13, 10; 13, 24; IV, 7, 63-68; A. A. III, 15-22; Pont. III, 1, 106-08; Mart. IV, 75, 5 f.; Claud. Carm. Min. XXX, 150-57. Workers of magic (five): Tib. I, 2, 51; Hor. Epop. V, 61-66; Prop. II, 1, 51-54; 4, 7 f.; Am. II, 15, 9 f.

Chaste men: Anth. Gr. IX, 305; Hor. Od. III, 7, 13-20; Prop. IV, 5, 5; Am. II, 4, 32; Mart. VIII, 46; XIV, 203; Priap. XIX. Disloyal husbands: Am. II, 14, 33 f. Parricides: Callim. Iamb. 139 f.; Trist. I, 1, 114. Cruel, inhuman beings and monsters (twelve): Eur. Bacch. 989-91; Aristoph. Ach. 1082; Hor. Od. II, 17, 13-15; Pont. I, 2, 119 f.; II, 2, 113 f.; 9, 41; Sen. Thy. 1050; Juv. XIV, 20; Rutil. I, 613. Loyal

friends (six pairs): Callim. Epigr. 60 [Anth. Gr. XI, 362]; Theoc. XXIX, 34; Bion VIII; Anth. Gr. XII, 217; Rem. Am. 589; Trist. I, 3, 66; IV, 5, 30; V, 4, 25 f.; Pont. II, 3, 41-45; 6, 25 f.; III, 2, 43-96; IV, 10, 78; Juv. XVI, 26; Mart. VI, 11; VII, 24, 3-6; 45, 8 f.; X, 11, 1-7; Claud. In Ruf. I, 106-108. Valiant warriors (five): Aristoph. Ran. 1039; Plaut. Epid. 35 f.; Mil. 61; 1054; Verg. Ecl. IV, 36; Hor. Sat. I, 7, 12; Od. IV, 9, 25; Juv. VIII, 269-71. Heroic labors and adventure: Theoc. XXIX, 37 f.; Hor. Od. IV, 2, 2 f.; Verg. Ecl. IV, 34; Prop. II, 23, 7; 24, 25 f.; 24, 34; Juv. III, 80; Auson. Epist. XXIII. Great strength and stature: Theoc. XXII, 94; Pont. IV, 13, 11; Mart. Lib. Spect. XV, 6; Juv. III, 89. Instruments of swift movement (six): Hor. Od. I, 27-24; Trist. III, 8, 1-6; Claud. In Ruf. I, 263; Auson. Epist. XXV. Punishment, suffering, and endless toil: Alcaeus 57; Archil. 53; Prop. II, 1, 65-70; 20, 29-32; IV, 3, 21 f. Subtlety: Eur. Orest. 1403; Aristoph. Ach. 391; Vesp. 181; Plaut. Men. 902; Pseud. 1063. Sadness and grief: Prop. III, 10, 8-10. Keenness of vision: Hor. Sat. I, 2, 90; Epist. I, 1, 28; Rutil. I, 611. Changeability: Hor. Sat. II, 3, 71; 7, 14; Epist. I, 1, 90. Madness: Aristoph. Ach. 1166; Plaut. Capt. 562; 615; Hor. Sat. II, 3, 133; 303; Pers. III, 118; Juv. XIV, 284-86. Greed, avarice, rapacity: Aristoph. Equ. 248; Hor. Od. I, 27, 18-24; Sat. I, 1, 68; Juv. VIII, 130; Rutil. I, 609-12; Auson. Domest. I. Courage, self-control: Hor. Epist. I, 2, 17-26. Wealth: Aristoph. Plut. 287; Theoc. VIII, 53 f.; Plaut. Bacch. 665; Pseud. 193; Catull. XXIV, 4; Rem. Am. 743-45; Mart. VI, 86, 4; Stat. Silv. I, 3, 105. Plenty: Anacr. 8; Phocyl. 7. Luxurious living: Hor. Epist. I, 2, 27 f.; 6, 56-64.

Hospitable host (Alcinous, Baucis, Evander, Hecale, Molorchus): Pers. IV, 21 f.; Rem. Am. 747; Pont. II, 9, 42; Juv. XI, 61; Mart. IV, 64, 29 f. Healer (five): Anth. Gr. V, 225; Verg. Geor. III, 550; A. A. II, 491; Rem. Am. 313; 546; Pont. III, 4, 7; Mart. II, 16, 5. Musician (Arion, Orpheus, Thamyras): Verg. Ecl. VIII, 56 f.; Prop. II, 22, 19; Am. III, 7, 61 f.; A. A. III, 399. Blind (Oedipus, Phineus, Tiresias): Juv. XIII, 249; Mart. IX, 25, 10. Seer (Calchas, Melampus, Tiresias): Plaut. Merc. 945; Claud. In Eutr. I, 315. Solver of riddles (Oedipus): Anth. Gr. VII, 429; Plaut. Poen. 443 f. Horseman (Bellerophon): Hor. Od. III, 12, 4. Char-

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ioteer (Automedon): A. A. I, 5; Juv. I, 61; Auson. Epist. X.
Craftsman (Daedalus): Hor. Od. IV, 2, 2. Helmsman (Palinurus, Tiphys): Verg. Ecl. IV, 34; A. A. I, 6; Rem. Am. 577.
Watcher (Argus, Cerberus): Aristoph. Equ. 1030; Pax 313-15; Anth. Gr. V, 50; Plaut. Aul. 555; Rutil. I, 611. Thief (Autolycus): Plaut. Bacch. 275; Mart. VIII, 59, 4. Demagogue (Thersites): Rem. Am. 482; Pont. IV, 13, 15; Juv. VIII, 269-72. Beggar (Irus): Anth. Gr. VIII, 676; XI, 209; Prop. III, 5, 17; Rem. Am. 747; Trist. III, 7, 42; Mart. V, 39, 9; VI, 77, 1; XII, 32, 9. Burden-bearer (Atlas): Pind. Pyth. IV, 289 f. Messenger (Talthybius): Plaut. Stich. 305. Prize boar (Calydonian): Juv. V, 115; Mart. Lib. Spect. XV, 1; Epigr. VII, 27; IX, 48, 6; XI, 69, 10; XIII, 41, 93. Prize fruit (of Alcinous, Hesperides): Verg. Geor. II, 87; Juv. V, 150-52; Mart. VII, 42, 6; X, 104; XIII, 37; Stat. Silv. I, 3, 81. Prize fruit, i. e. wealth (of Alcinous): Prop. I, 14, 24; III, 2, 13; Am. I, 10, 55 f.; Mart. VIII, 68; XII, 31, 9 f.; Priap. LX.

Falling into this class are certain miscellaneous examples: Aristoph. Eccl. 1039-42; Praxilla 3; Anth. Gr. V, 165; XI, 278; Plaut. Bacch. 155 f.; 810; Cas. 26; Epid. 604; Pseud. 25; Hor. Sat. I, 2, 126; 7, 16 f.; II, 1, 26 f.; 3, 14; Epist. I, 2, 6-16; Pers. I, 34; 121; Prop. II, 7, 16; 20, 10-12; 21, 3; 26, 37-40; IV, 5, 41; Am. II, 4, 32; A. A. II, 743; III, 2; Rem. Am. 676; 789; Pont. IV, 2, 9 f.; Mart. V, 53; 4; X, 39, 4; 67, 1-5; Juv. II, 20; III, 198; IV, 65; 133; V, 139; VII, 115; VIII, 126; X, 84; XI, 61-63; XII, 119; XIII, 112 f.; XIV, 19; Sen. Thy. 56.

This study will be concluded by noting a few details of usage. For the purpose it will be sufficient to consider only the examples of Class I, which seem fairly representative of the entire number:

1. Frequency of paradigm. The statement has already been made (n. 6 above) that consideration of the paradigm in ancient rhetoric is almost wholly limited to the historical type. Hence, to this kind such comment about details as is available from the sources necessarily refers. Doubtless, prescriptions governing prose should not be pressed too far as to their applicability to poetry, but in several particulars identity of usage is observable. However, no precept is at hand as to frequency of usage, this matter seemingly being left to the discretion of the user. In

keeping with the greater restraint of Greek writers generally in the use of rhetorical devices, the paradigm occurs slightly less than one-third as frequently in Greek poetry as in Latin, a ratio that probably would not be found to differ greatly even if exact relative computation were applied. As to departments and individual authors, it appears preponderatingly in the various forms of lyric, 71 per cent in Greek and over 85 per cent in Latin. Pindar and the Anthologia Graeca furnish 70 per cent of the Greek examples, while two elegists, Propertius and Ovid (Tibullus uses mythological references sparingly and these usually with noticeable restraint), account for over 60 per cent of the Latin. Lyric writers coming next in frequency of usage are Horace and Statius. The paradigm's use in comedy is stereotyped and almost negligible. In tragedy it is infrequent in Aeschylus and Sophocles, relatively frequent in Euripides, and, as we should expect, much in evidence in the rhetorical Seneca.

2. Extent of paradigm.¹² Its length is due for the most part to the fullness with which myths are told, particularly to the inclusion of descriptive details unessential to the understanding of the myth proper. Another factor making in general for extension, but not always a proportional one, is the greater number of members of the paradigm introduced as additional illustrations or proofs of the statement (for use of this term see under heading 5 below). In 30 per cent of the Greek instances and 25 per cent of the Latin the paradigm does not exceed two verses, the high proportion in both being due, partially at least, to the use of the distich, a measure admirably adapted to outlining a story or making a point within its compass. For paradigms extending 6-20 verses the figures for Greek are 40 per cent, for Latin 30; for those extending 21-50 verses or more the percentage for Greek is 20, for Latin about 9. It thus

¹² As to whether paradigms should be narrations at length or illustrations given in brief, no specific statements are found. We do find, however, the suggestion that, special considerations aside, they should not be too extended; cf. Apsines, *Rhet. Gr.* I, 373, 23-26: *χρὴ δὲ τὰ παραδείγματα . . . μὴ ἀπομηκύνεσθαι δγαν, εἰ μὴ ἀπὸ μεγάλων εἴη τὸ παράδειγμα.* Quint. V, 11, 15: "quaedam autem ex iis, quae gesta sunt, tota narrabimus . . . quaedam significare satis erit . . . haec ita dicentur, prout nota erunt vel utilitas causae aut decor postulabit."

appears that all paradigms except those falling in the class of least length are measurably more extended in Greek than in Latin poetry, a result partially explained by the expanded myths found in Pindar and Bacchylides, of which the former has nine instances, and the latter three.¹³ Other cases of myths told at length in Greek poetry appear in Aeschylus,¹⁴ Sophocles,¹⁵ Euripides,¹⁶ and Theocritus.¹⁷

Paradigms of notable length in Latin are: *Lucr.* II, 978-1022 (eternal punishments); *Tib.* IV, 1, 48-81 (gift of eloquence—an inept summary of the *Odyssey*, inserted to compare Messala and Ulysses as orators); *Hor. Od.* III, 4, 42-80 (unlawful power punished); *Prop.* III, 15, 11-42 (Dirce's punishment); *A. A.* I, 283-340 (women of unrestrained passion); *Rem. Am.* 453-82 (old loves replaced by new). Several of Ovid's paradigms approximate episodes and are narrated with epic dexterity and ease: *A. A.* I, 527-64 (Bacchus and Ariadna); 679-704

¹³ Cf. Jebb's edition of *Bacchylides* (1905), pp. 58 f.: "He [Bacchylides] gives a continuous narrative, sometimes of considerable length . . . Pindar selects from the myth a single episode or scene which he depicts with vivid power, but not, as a rule, at much length." The myth in Pindar is, however, sometimes very long, e. g. three-fifths of the poem in *Pyth.* IX. The governing principle is more correctly stated in Gildersleeve's *Pindar* (1905), n. on *Pyth.* IV: "If the poem was to be long the myth must needs be long." Other reasons than treatment of a single aspect governed Pindar at times in presenting the myth briefly; cf. Gildersleeve on *Pyth.* VIII: "It is evident that the circumstances are too absorbing for the free development of the mythic portion." In *Bacchylides* V, 56-175 the myth of Meleager (first member of the paradigm) is narrated beautifully and in detail, but in the second member (171-75) the mere mention of Deianira and Hercules' wish to wed her was sufficient to suggest the hero's doom. The simple style of the heroic epic appears also in X, 43-112 and XII, 100-74.

¹⁴ *Choeph.* 602-37. Of exceptional beauty. As an illustration of woman's ungovernable passion are cited Althaea, who caused the death of her son Meleager; Scylla of Megara, who betrayed her father; and the women of Lemnos, who murdered their husbands on their bridal night.

¹⁵ *Antig.* 944-87 (the power of destiny); *Trach.* 498-530 (love as a power ruling gods and men).

¹⁶ *Orest.* 982-1012 (inherited curse); *Elect.* 700-41 (infidelity and its sequel of horror); *Iph. A.* 1284-1335 (sins of the guilty visited upon the innocent).

¹⁷ *XIII*, 5-72 (heroes who yielded to love—myth of Hercules and Hylas).

(brides won by force); II, 21-96 (Daedalus and Icarus); 561-92 (love increased by mutual misfortune); III, 687-746 (disaster from distrust); Rem. Am. 261-88 (lovers unaided by magic); Trist. III, 9, 7-32 (murder of Absyrtus); IV, 4, 63-82 (Orestes and Pylades at the Tauric altar). Still other instances: Sen. H. F. 569-89 (power of song); Med. 615-69 (fate of the Argonauts); Oed. 712-63 (divine vengeance on Thebes); H. O. 1036-89 (inevitability of death); Phaed. 296-324 and Verg. Lyd. 25-74 (gods who yielded to mortal loves).

The Greek paradigm, as compared with the Latin, limits noticeably the number of its members; only 30 per cent of the former exceed one, while of the latter 64 per cent so exceed. Of paradigms numbering more than two members, Greek shows approximately 10 per cent, Latin more than 30 per cent. In Greek no example was noted having more than five members (and of these only three), whereas in Latin nearly 7 per cent have five or more. But that the paradigm is not always long when the members are numerous is clear from examples which contain lists of names suggesting myths rather than give myths in outline or in details; see the following which contain four to nine members but in length extend only 4-18 verses: Theoc. XX, 34-41; Prop. II, 1, 59-64; III, 19, 11-24; Am. II, 7, 15-20; Rem. Am. 55-58; Trist. II, 2, 289-300; V, 14, 35-41; Pont. I, 3, 63-80; III, 1, 51-54; Claud. Carm. Min. XXII, 13-19.

3. Anonymous paradigms. They are of two kinds, myths so well known to the poet's readers that the bare mention of a mythological character indicated distinct types of persons or action (see the large number of instances cited in Class III above), and those referring so unmistakably to the acts of particular persons that it was not necessary to use their names. Of the latter kind Greek shows 8 per cent, Latin 23 per cent of instances in which one or more of the members are introduced anonymously. The reasons for this indirect or allusive reference are doubtless several, the convenience of the poet, the avoidance of monotony, a more piquant appeal to the reader's knowledge, and (in some cases) the influence of Alexandrian precedent (see n. 7 above). One or two illustrations will suffice: for paradigms wholly anonymous, see Eur. Hipp. 337-39 (Pasiphae, Ariadna) and Her. XV, 101-06 (Atreus, Pelops, Tantalus); for those partially so, see Theoc. XX, 34-41 (Anchises, Attis,

Ganymede) and Sen. H. F. 386-94 (Oedipus, Eteocles and Polynices, Niobe).

4. Mixed paradigms. The designation is here given to paradigms which show a mixture of the mythological and historical types (see n. 6 above). Of these no instances were observed in Greek, but in Latin the number exceeds 9 per cent. Usually only one historical character is introduced (occasionally more), regardless of the number of members of the paradigm, and observance is paid to the rule that only important personages are admissible;¹⁸ see Stat. *Silv.* II, 7, 93-99 (Alex. the Great, Lucan); Prop. III, 11, 9-55 (Semiramis, Cleopatra); Juv. X, 245-72 (Croesus, Mithridates, Marius, Pompeius). Included here also are paradigms (8 per cent in Latin, none in Greek) which with the mythological members incorporate illustrations drawn from various spheres and phases of life and nature (cf. n. 4). More than half of the instances occur in Ovid, and the illustrations (more often following than preceding the mythological members) usually do not exceed one or two; see A. A. III, 429 f., where unexpected good fortune (Andromeda's rescue by Perseus) is further illustrated by that of fisher and hunter. Four illustrations each are found in Prop. III, 16, 15-17; Am. II, 6, 33-36; A. A. II, 181-84; Pont. I, 3, 37-42; five in Trist. IV, 1, 5-18. Exceptional is *Incert. Eleg. de Spe* 43-63, in which the citation of five mythical persons led on by hope is followed by that of seven from everyday life, ploughman, sailor, fisher, hunter, farmer, patient, and warrior.

5. Position of paradigm. Its logical position is that following the statement which it is intended to support, and, in keeping with rhetorical teaching,¹⁹ in 80 per cent of the cases

¹⁸ Cf. Apsines (note 6 above); Minuc. *Rhet. Gr.* I, 418, 11: *δει δε τὰ παραδειγματα γνώριμα είναι τοῖς ἀκούοντι καὶ προσεχῆ τῷ πράγματι.* Volkmann, op. cit., p. 236: "Auch dürfen sie [die Beispiele] nicht von unrühmlichem hergenommen werden, sondern müssen die Personen, oder die Sachen, oder beides berühmt sein."

¹⁹ Aristotle's precept (*Rhet.* II, 20, 9) follows from two objections raised by him against putting the paradigm before the statement. If the examples are put first they resemble an induction, which is rarely appropriate to rhetoric; but when they follow they are like evidence. An induction derived from one or two examples has little force, hence the examples must be numerous; whereas if they follow the statement even one, if well chosen, is enough.

it follows the statement (the term seems a fair equivalent of the Aristotelian *enthymeme*) as a *quod erat demonstrandum*. The paradigm's use preceding the statement is probably due in part to the poet's desire for variation, as well as convenience in developing his material. Increased emphasis is at times secured by employing two statements of practical identity, with the paradigm coming between, as in Her. III, 92-97, where, in illustration of submission to a wife's entreaty, we find a preceding statement, *coniugis Oenides versus in arma prece est*, and a following one, *sola virum coniunx flexit*. The same arrangement appears in Eur. Hipp. 541-64; Lucr. I, 82-101; Trist. III, 9, 5-34; Sen. Oed. 890-910; H. O. 675-91; 1035-99. In Rem. Am. 451-84 statements precede, divide, and follow the paradigm. A still different arrangement, in which one or more members of the paradigm precede the statement while the remainder follow, is seen in Soph. Antig. 944-87; Anth. Gr. VII, 745; Hor. Od. III, 4, 42-80; 16, 1-16; A. A. III, 311-26; Trist. V, 1, 53-62.

6. Insertion of paradigm. Paradigms are of course connected (albeit with varying degrees of closeness) by some word or phrase with the statements which they exemplify. Greater emphasis, however, is attained when they are formally introduced, e. g. by some form of the phrase *testis sum*, as Prop. III, 15, 11 *testis erit Dirce*; Prop. I, 18, 19; II, 13, 53; 26, 47; III, 19, 11; Am. III, 10, 19; Her. XVI, 193; XIX, 101; *exemplum esse (referre)*, as A. A. II, 686 *exemplum vobis non leve Procris erit*; Prop. IV, 1, 109; Her. VIII, 19 *sit sacer exemplo*; A. A. III, 87 *per exemplum dearum*; Pont. I, 3, 61 *veterum exempla virorum refer*; Juv. X, 246 *rex Pylius — exemplum vitae fuit*; *testor*, as Prop. III, 7, 21 *testantia litora curas*; II, 1, 37 *Theseus infernis, superis testatur Achilles*; III, 13, 51; 17, 7. Other verbs and verbal phrases used are: *monet* (Hor. Od. I, 18, 8); *aspice* (Prop. II, 16, 27); *traditur* (Am. II, 17, 15); *ferunt* (Prop. I, 20, 17); *λέγονται* (Bacchyl. V, 57); *ἴστω δ' ὅστις . . . δαείς* (Aesch. Choeph. 601); *fama est* (Prop. II, 6, 15); *fabula est* (Tib. III, 4, 68; A. A. I, 681); *fabula narratur* (A. A. II, 562).

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DIVINITY AND DELIBERATION.

[Isocrates raises the question whether the gods deliberate, with probable reference to a discussion of such a problem in a lost Sophistic treatise. From his time on through ancient literature the discussion of this problem becomes a commonplace of philosophic and near-philosophic literature, marked by increasing complexity. The study of the growth of this topic and its relation to Aristotle, frag. 58, tends to cast suspicion upon the ascription of this fragment to Aristotle. The history of this department of Greek thought is at once subsidiary and complementary to that of the theories of the ancients concerning the attributes of God and of the disembodied soul.]

My purpose in this paper is not to discuss ancient philosophic theories concerning the nature or attributes of God in their entirety. I find in ancient Greek literature a topic of mixed literary and philosophic character concerned with the question whether a supreme Deity or a number of gods are ever engaged in, or have the faculty of, deliberation. Because *εὐβούλια*, good deliberation, is a virtue, or, as Aristotle puts it, the special function of the virtue prudence (*φρόνησις*), this literature sometimes takes the form of a discussion of the attributes of God. With this larger question, however, I am concerned only in so far as it involves a consideration of the special topic, the deliberation or non-deliberation of God. It may be added that simple references to the plan of God, or the counsel of God, are generally not taken into account here.

Since, then, it is not my purpose to sketch the history of the refinement of the conception of Deity, there is no need to consider here the first evidences of such a refinement to be found in the antithesis of human and divine passion in Solon's expression of the doctrine of the late punishment of the wicked,¹ or Theognis' irreverent indictment of Zeus for dispensing the same fate to sinners and to just alike (vv. 373 ff.). Nor need I pause for the physical and non-physical predication or identities of God to be found in the Presocratics. Whether or not we may conjecture with some probability concerning the presence or absence of the deliberative faculty in God in the theological metaphysics of a Xenophanes, or the same philosopher's polemic

¹ Frag. 1, v. 17, Diehl.

against an anthropomorphic conception of divinity, or Heraclitus' designation of human wisdom as nothing other than the imitation of nature and of the Deity—is beside the point. The extant fragments of these philosophers reveal no preoccupation with such a problem.

In extant Greek literature the man who first indicates its presence was not a philosopher, but one who clung to conventional Greek ethics and traditional Greek religion, and yet followed in a fashion after the foremost thought of his day. That man is Isocrates, who, trained in the schools of the Sophists, turns upon his teachers, now become his rivals, somewhat the same type of eristic argument against which he seems to be protesting. His rivals, he says, promise more than they can accomplish. They, the teachers of eristic, promise their prospective students that they will, after consorting with themselves, always know what to do on any particular occasion, and that they will become happy by means of this knowledge. Against such a claim Isocrates calls Homer to witness (*Against the Sophists* § 2): *οἵμαι γὰρ ἄπασιν εἶναι φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ μέλλοντα προγνωσκειν οὐ τῆς ἡμετέρας φύσεως ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον ἀπέχομεν ταύτης τῆς φρονήσεως, ὡσθ' Ὁμηρος ὁ μεγίστην ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ δόξαν εἰληφὼς καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς πεποίηκεν ἔστιν ὅτε βουλευομένους ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν, οὐ τὴν ἔκεινων γνώμην εἰδὸς ἀλλ' ἡμῖν ἐνδείξασθαι βουλόμενος, ὅτι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐν τοῦτο τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἔστιν.*

This passage clearly implies that Isocrates himself does not believe that divinity deliberates, and suggests besides that perhaps Homer did not believe so, but meant simply to teach the lesson that *man* must deliberate since he has not foresight. And, though it is latent, we may find here the further thought that God, since He has foresight, does not deliberate. The warning may be added, however, that Isocrates is unconscious of the metaphysical implications with which the question is charged. Elsewhere, for example, he ascribes the virtues to God (xi. 41). He presses Homer into service after the uncritical fashion of the day against which Plato in the *Protagoras* (347 E) protested. His attention, however, is concentrated upon his favorite point that there can be no science of the contingent (cf., e. g., *On the Peace* § 8), and that the virtue of his own "philosophy" is that it does not pretend to offer such a science, but aims rather at

inculcating such a degree of intelligence in its devotees that they will be able by conjecture to arrive at sane judgments.²

Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, appearing within a year or two of Isocrates' *Against the Sophists*, contains two verbal suggestions of God's deliberation. At i. 4. 7 Socrates speaks of "One who planned that there be living creatures," *ἔσκε μηχανήμασί τινος ζῷα εἶναι βούλενσαμένον*, where the reference is entirely teleological. The other passage consists of a reference to the advice of the gods to be received from oracles (iv. 7. 10), and is indicative solely of Socrates' pious attachment to normal Greek religion.

Plato's interest in the nature of the Godhead is primarily directed to purging the conception of God of attributes, passions, and thaumaturgic faculties unworthy of a supreme and perfect Being. In his certainly genuine dialogues it is only in the *Timaeus* that he may even be thought to have made any inferences about the divine intelligence. Here (30B) he tells us that by a process of reasoning God, or the Good Artisan, found out that no senseless thing was better than one possessed of sense. The word for "reasoning" here, *λογισάμενος* (cf. *λογισμός* here and at 34A) is the nearest approach to a suggestion of deliberation in the passage. However, nothing can be inferred concerning Plato's notion of the mental processes of the divinity from the use of this word.

In the possibly Platonic *Epinomis* there is a paragraph which, like the passage in the *Timaeus*, approaches, but does not really touch, the problem. Of the two types of bodies in the universe, those possessed of fire, the stars, move in perfect order, and must therefore be intelligent and possessed of soul (982 AB). The plan or decision reached by pure soul when it takes the best counsel in accordance with the highest reason (982 B, *ὅταν ψυχὴ τὸ ἄριστον κατὰ τὸν ἄριστον βούλευσηται νοῦν*), is unalterable. "The three fates really take hold of this and watch to see that that which has been decided with the best deliberation by each of the gods is perfect (. . . τέλεον εἶναι τὸ βελτίστη βούλη βεβούλευμένον . . .)." The fact that the stars always do the same thing is not, as most men have supposed, evidence that they have not souls, but certain evidence that they have souls. They do the same things because they decided upon them a wondrously long time

² Cf. xv. 271, xii. 30, xiii. 7-8.

ago. They are not given to changing their minds (*οὐ μεταβούλευόμενον ἀνω καὶ κάτω*). The majority of mankind err in supposing that mutability is evidence of soul and that stability is evidence against the possession of soul.

In this passage only the language suggests deliberation as men know it. Pure soul decides faultlessly, and has but one course to consider and that the perfect course. Perfect deliberation is thus deliberation in a Pickwickian sense: all the steps are omitted save the last one, and there is only one last one. This passage of the *Epinomis* yields, therefore, no more than the *Timaeus* passage on the question whether God deliberates or not.

It is perhaps idle to conjecture whether Plato ever felt conscious of such a question. His works certainly do not reveal any such awareness of it, even if we suppose the *Epinomis* his. The Pickwickian deliberation of the stars in the *Epinomis* and the reflection of the Good Artisan in the *Timaeus* are both but ways of saying that the stars and the divinities are intelligent. They shed no light upon their author's conception of the nature of the divine intelligence. Yet the absence of such an expression of the problem in Plato's works is no evidence against its having been considered by his contemporaries. Plato's contemporaries, or immediate predecessors, as they appear in his dialogues, are idealized characters who, it has been pointed out,³ give perhaps better statements of their theories than their prototypes, the real Sophists and philosophers, could ever have given. If we suppose that the problem was discussed by one of the Sophists or Presocratics, if, for example, we can imagine its presence in such a treatise as Protagoras' *Περὶ Θεῶν*, it becomes easier to understand Isocrates' reference to it. Further, since in all probability, such a sophistic treatment of the deliberation of God would tend towards a sceptical conclusion and would rest in great part upon an anthropomorphic conception of God, Plato's silence upon this minor aspect of a tendency which he combatted as a whole would be expected.

If it is difficult to imagine that Isocrates, alone and unaided, might have come upon a problem involving so many metaphysical problems, it is not quite so necessary to suppose a previous interest in the question caused Aristotle to take it up seriously.

³ Cf. Shorey, *What Plato Said*, pp. 124, 141, 273, etc.

For Aristotle was preoccupied with the problems of deliberation *in toto* to a much greater extent than was Plato. *Εὐβούλια* is for Plato a virtue, but it is related loosely to *σοφία*, since, says Plato, the man who deliberates well upon any subject is the man who is wise or well-informed in that particular field.⁴ But Aristotle, classifying and lending technical significance to the virtues, finds *εὐβούλια* to be the special work of the virtue of practical wisdom, *φρόνησις*. And practical wisdom is itself inferior and subsidiary to theoretic wisdom, *σοφία*. Aristotle secures the contingency of particular future events by denying the applicability of the rule of excluded middle to propositions stated with the modality of the necessary concerning such future events (*De Interp.* 18 b 31 ff.). Such future events, then, constitute the field of imaginative action (*De Anima* 434 a 7) for the deliberator, who is concerned not with the end, says Aristotle, correcting Plato (*Laches* 185 D), for the end is the real or apparent good, but with the means to that end.⁵ The deliberator and the adviser are efficient causes in the field of contingent events, events which are in our power, *ἐφ' ἡμῖν* (*De Interp.* 19 a 7 f., *Phys.* 194 b 30, and *Met.* 1013 a 31). Again, in a passage in the *Physics* (199 b 26-33) of great importance for later Greek thought, Aristotle, arguing for a teleological purposiveness or final cause in nature, in opposition to Empedocles' doctrine to the effect that the equipment of existing species of animals is the result of natural selection, or the survival of the fittest, says: *ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ μὴ οἰεσθαι ἔνεκά του γίνεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ ἴδωσι τὸ κινοῦν βουλευσάμενον.* Aristotle proceeds to point out that art doesn't deliberate either. If the art of shipbuilding were innate in wood, it would create the ship in the manner in which nature works; so that, if a final cause is in art, it is also in nature. The example Aristotle chooses, of the physician who treats himself, to illustrate the manner in which nature works, probably suggested to Plotinus his somewhat better use of a similar figure from medicine (*infra*).

⁴ *Rep.* 428AB.

⁵ *Rhet.* 1362 a 18 f. and *EN* 1112 b 11 ff. *Contra Aristotle* cf. Stewart, *Notes on the NE* I, p. 262; H. Barker in Hastings' *Encycl. of Religion and Ethics*, s. v. "Act, Action," vol. I, p. 77 b; and James Sully, *Outlines of Psychology* (New York: 1886), pp. 643 ff.

Latent in this passage of the *Physics* is the point that deliberation is causative in an efficient manner, as are not art or nature. And elsewhere Aristotle carefully distinguishes deliberation from nature and art (cf. e.g., *EN* 1112 a 31 ff.). Barring the contrary evidence of a few passages⁶ Aristotle's teleology is the unconscious teleology of nature, not the purposive action of God. But whether Aristotle's God be conceived to be both a final cause and an efficient cause, or the former only, or neither, the causation of the Unmoved Mover is certainly not of a deliberative nature.

Aristotle might have availed himself of this line of argument to prove that God does not deliberate. His commentators do. But he himself touches upon the problem only indirectly, and in connection with his doctrine of virtue and happiness. Aristotle notes in passing (*EN* 1145 a 22 ff.) that as vice cannot be ascribed to a brute, so virtue cannot be ascribed to God. And at almost the very end of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, as proof of the proposition that the most complete happiness is not in the practical virtues, but in theoretic activity or contemplation, Aristotle offers the following argument (*EN* 1178 b 8 ff.): The gods are considered especially blessed and happy. But supposing actions (*πράξεις*) to be the most complete sort of happiness, what sort of actions may we assign to the gods? Not *just* actions, for the gods will appear ridiculous if they enter into contracts with each other or return deposits, etc. Not *brave* actions, as if the gods abode fearful things and ran risks. Not *liberal* actions, for the gods, having no currency or anything like that, have nought to give. Not *temperate* actions: it would be a low kind of praise, inasmuch as the gods have no base desires. So too with all the other kinds of actions—all would be found petty and unworthy of them. Yet all suppose that the gods do live and function—they don't sleep like Endymion. But the only function left a living being when moral actions and production are taken away, is contemplation.

Thus Aristotle denies *φρόνησις*, and with it *εὐθυνλία*, to the gods. The close relation of the thought here to that of a fragment of Cicero's dialogue *Hortensius* and that of a passage in

⁶ *De Gen. et Cor.* 336 b 31 and *De Caelo* 271 a 33. Cf. Ross, *Arist. Met.* I cli, and, for the "causation" of God, *ibid.*, p. cxxxiv.

Iamblichus' *Protrepticus* has been generally observed by scholars. The fragment of Cicero is preserved in Augustine's *De Trinitate* iv. 9, under the chapter-heading: An justitia et ceterae virtutes desinunt in futura vita. Briefly, it is to the effect that if there be an immortal life awaiting us in the Isles of the Blessed, we should there have no need of eloquence, since there would be no judicial proceedings, nor should we need even the virtues themselves. What follows is closely parallel to the passage in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (see Rose, *Arist. frag.* 58): nec enim fortitudine egeremus nullo proposito aut labore aut periculo, nec iustitia cum esset nihil quod adpeteretur alieni, nec temperantia quae regeret eas quae nullae essent libidines. ne prudentia quidem egeremus nullo delectu proposito bonorum et malorum. una igitur essemus beati cognitione naturae et scientia, qua sola etiam deorum est vita laudanda. On the statement of Trebellius Pollio,⁷ together with the parallelism in thought to *EN* X, Bernays⁸ was convinced that this was a fragment of Aristotle's early dialogue, the *Protrepticus*. Bywater⁹ presented in parallel columns the fragment and the passage from Iamblichus' *Protrepticus* (ch. 9), which I quote in part: . . . ἐκεῖ (in the Isles of the Blest) γὰρ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀλλων τινὸς ὄφελος ἀν γένοιτο, μόνον δὲ καταλείπεται τὸ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ θεωρεῖν, ὅνπερ καὶ νῦν ἐλεύθερὸν φαμεν βίον εἶναι. . . . Bywater, urging an Aristotelian source for much of Iamblichus' *Protrepticus*, finds in the greater fullness of Cicero's version evidence that the "rhetorical instinct of the Latin writer has led him to amplify the original, and in the process miss some portion of the sense." But Bywater's support of this line of argument is unconvincing. Rudolf Hirzel,¹⁰ objecting to Bywater's theory that Iamblichus made free use of Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, finds instead that a number of works of both Plato and Aristotle have been used in the *Protrepticus* of Iamblichus. Jaeger, interested as he is in discovering the content of the *Protrepticus* of Aristotle, and in establishing his series, *Philebus* - *Eudemian Ethics* - *Protrepticus* - *Nicomachean*

⁷ *Vita Salonini Gallieni*, 2, in *Script. Hist. Rom.* II, p. 384.

⁸ *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles* (Berlin: 1863), p. 121.

⁹ "On a Lost Dialogue of Aristotle," *Journal of Philology* II (1869)

62-3.

¹⁰ "Über den Protreptikos des Aristoteles," *Hermes* X (1876), 84 f.

Ethics, finds later influence in the *Protrepticus* of Iamblichus, but assigns somewhat more of it to Aristotle's *Protrepticus*.¹¹

Space does not permit a consideration here of the problem *in toto*.¹² But several uncertainties may be noted: (1) The evidence of Trebellius Pollio for the theory that Cicero's *Hortensius* was modelled after the *Protrepticus* of Aristotle is slender. Pollio's statement, ". . . M. Tullius in Hortensio, quem ad exemplum protreptici scripsit," may mean simply that it was cast in the form or after the model of a protreptic discourse.¹³ (2) Even if Pollio's reference be thought conclusive evidence in favor of the indebtedness of Cicero's *Hortensius* to Aristotle, it does not follow that this particular passage comes from Aristotle. (3) The similarity of the passage in Iamblichus' *Protrepticus* does not settle the question, inasmuch as both writers may be using a common source later than Aristotle.¹⁴ (4) The resemblance in thought between the deliberation-after-death passage and *NE X* is of such a nature as to indicate the precedence of the latter.

The passage immediately preceding our excerpt in Iamblichus' *Protrepticus* bears some resemblance to an argument to be found, among other places, in the first book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Iamblichus repeats Aristotle's reasoning to the effect that there is not an endless chain of "goods," but there must be an *ἀρχή*, a first "good" sought for itself.¹⁵ It is thus that Iamblichus introduces the Isles-of-the-Blest passage. It is true that Aristotle speaks of the life of those in the Isles of the Blessed in the *Politics* (1334 a 31); and he there assigns to them not only *φιλοσοφία*, but *σωφροσύνη* and *δικαιοσύνη*. But he is not there

¹¹ Jaeger, *Aristoteles*, pp. 60 ff.

¹² Besides the literature noted, cf. H. G. Gadamer, "Der aristotelische Protreptikos und die entwicklungsgeschichtliche Betrachtung der aristotelischen Ethik," *Hermes* LXIII (1928), 146 ff., and Mary C. Needler in *Class. Phil.* XXIII (1928) 280 ff.

¹³ For which see the Chicago dissertation of Burgess, "Epideictic Literature," *Studies in Classical Philology* III (1902), 229 ff.

¹⁴ Cf. Gerhäuser, *Der Protreptikos des Poseidonios*, p. 61; it is not, however, necessary to suppose that Poseidonius is Cicero's source here. Cf. R. M. Jones in *C. P.* XVIII (1923), 216 f.

¹⁵ Pistelli 52. 22-23, . . . ὅσα δὲ δί' αὐτά, καν̄ ἀποβαίνη μηδὲν ἔτερον, ἀγαθὰ κυρίως. Cf. Arist. *EN* 1094 a 18 ff.

thinking of the possible attributes of a disembodied soul, but of the virtues proper to leisure. Iamblichus, however, is endeavoring to be more exact. In the Isles of the Blest the only *useful* virtues will be *τὸ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ θεωρεῖν*. But by a strange misuse of the argument preceding this passage Iamblichus will have us continue to admire the virtue *φρόνησις*, the more so since in that world it will be useless—and therefore not desirable for the sake of something higher, but for itself. This involves a fallacy: The “uselessness” of the highest virtue in the hierarchy of virtues is confused with real uselessness. Through this confusion arises the usurping by *φρόνησις* of the place of *θεωρία*, or rather the utter confusion of them in the phrase, *ἡ θεωρητικὴ φρόνησις* (Pistelli 54. 11-12), a confusion which, however, is natural for Iamblichus because of the Neoplatonic sense in which he generally uses the word.¹⁶ Plato represents the soul of the sage and philosopher as spending its time gazing at abstract ideas, of which one, to be sure, would be *φρόνησις*, though, as it happens, *φρόνησις* is not in the list given (*Phaedrus* 247 C D). And the Neoplatonist, Iamblichus, may have this passage of Plato in mind. But to adduce the broader use of *φρόνησις* in Plato and Aristotle¹⁷ to support an Aristotelian source for the use of it in the context about the Isles-of-the-Blest passage would be to forget that the prudentia of the *Hortensius* fragment and the *φρόνησις* of Iamblichus which will not be “useful” after death are the technical *φρόνησις* of *EN* X, and that the confusion introduced by Iamblichus is a real confusion, dependent in part upon the Neoplatonic division of virtues into terrestrial and celestial, and in part upon the special sense which Iamblichus himself gives the word. If, then, the Isles-of-the-Blest passages of Cicero and of Iamblichus are to be traced to Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*, we must suppose that Aristotle had already given

¹⁶ For the meaning of *φρόνησις* in Iamblichus’ *Protrepticus* cf. Whittaker, *The Neoplatonists*, pp. 127 f. Iamblichus is not consistent in his use: cf. Dr. Needler, *loc. cit.*, p. 281 on Iamb. *Protrep.* 36. 9 (Pist.) and Arist. *EN* 1141 a 27. For the Neoplatonic division of *φρόνησις*, cf. Philo Jud., *Leg. Alleg.* I 78: *διττὸν γὰρ φρονήσεως γένος, τὸ μὲν καθόλου, τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ μέρους. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἐμοὶ φρόνησις ἐκ μέρους οὐσα οὐ καλή, φθαρέντος γάρ μου συμφθείρεται. ἡ δὲ καθόλου φρόνησις ἡ οἰκοῦσα τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ σοφίαν καὶ τὸν οἶκον αὐτοῦ καλή, etc.* Cf. also *infra* n. 35.

¹⁷ Cf. Dr. Needler’s lists, *loc. cit.*, pp. 280-281.

φρόνησις the technical meaning of *EN* VI. I do not mean to deny that possibility. But the striking similarity of the argument to that of *EN* X, the fact that, as I shall show in the course of this paper, the discussion of the virtues of God and of the disembodied soul constitute a philosophic topic that might appear at any time after Aristotle, or at latest, after Carneades; the possibility that both Cicero and Iamblichus may be using a common source, perhaps, but a late source; render the ascription of the Isles-of-the-Blest fragment to Aristotle's *Protrepticus* a conjecture deserving consideration, but by no means a certainty. If, however, the passages of Cicero and Iamblichus must be traced to Aristotle, then it is more reasonable, I believe, to find in them an attempt to treat as one the untechnical reference to the Isles of the Blest in the *Politics* (1334 a 31) and the technical study of the virtues of the gods in *EN* X.

It is not quite certain to what use Cicero put his Isles-of-the-Blest passage. Augustine's use of it is somewhat like that of Iamblichus, but suggests rather Thomas Aquinas' discussion of the attributes of God.¹⁸ Augustine says (*loc. cit.*): Fortassis et aliae tres virtutes, prudentia sine ullo jam periculo erroris, fortitudo sine molestia tolerandorum malorum, temperantia sine repugnatione libidinum, erunt in illa felicitate. Thus the souls may possess all the virtues, but in a Pickwickian sense.

To return to the main line of tradition, the Stoics took over from Aristotle the virtues of φρόνησις and εὐβούλια unchanged.¹⁹ But the details with respect to the place of deliberation in the Stoic system offer much difficulty. The faculties of deliberation and reflection are in the heart (Von Arnim II 228. 4 ff.); and the heart is the ἡγεμονικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς (Diels, *Dox.* p. 400). God is the ἡγεμονικόν or leading principle of the universe, and His functions correspond to those of the leading principle of man (Von Arnim II 186. 8 ff.). As the virtues are in the leading principle of man, so must they be in the leading principle of

¹⁸ Cf., e. g., *Summa Contra Gentiles* I xcii-xciv and Mayor's note on Cicero *ND* iii. 38.

¹⁹ Von Arnim, *Stoic. Vet. Frag.* III 73. 3-5: ... τὴν φρόνησιν περὶ τὰ ποιητέα καὶ μὴ καὶ οὐδέτερα . . . ἔπονται δὲ τῇ μὲν φρονήσει εὐβούλια καὶ σύνεσις. The Stoics abandoned Aristotle's hierarchy of virtues, however. Zeno is said to have referred all virtue to φρόνησις. Cf. Von Arnim I 49.

the universe, God. Cicero summarizes the Stoic position on this point as follows (*ND* ii 79 = Von Arnim II 327. 12 ff.): Cumque sint in nobis consilium, ratio, prudentia, necesse est deos haec ipsa habere maiora, nec habere solum, sed etiam iis uti in maxumis et optimis rebus. Thus the Stoics' God has all the virtues; He deliberates. But if the question be asked, how does God deliberate? the answer must be: as man deliberates, only more perfectly. And here lies one of the great Stoic paradoxes: How can there be *any* deliberation in a system which upholds a doctrine of necessity?

Chrysippus affirmed, contrary to Aristotle's denial (*De Interp.* 18 b 31 and *supra*), the applicability of the rule of excluded middle to statements concerning future events. All judgments, he said, are either true or false, whence it follows that judgments concerning future events are true only if the events must happen of necessity, or false only if they affirm the impossible (Zeller⁴ III i 164). This position alone should have made deliberation for man impossible, as Aristotle had argued in the *De Interpretatione*, and as the Peripatetic school never wearied of repeating.²⁰ It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider the Stoics' ingenious circumvention of this difficulty. Suffice it to observe that they did insist on the moral responsibility of man, who, they said, was free to obey or disobey his ruling principle.²¹

With reference to the deliberation of God, the difficulties are even greater. God, as the ruling principle of the world, takes counsel concerning all things, and at the same time foresees all things (Cic. *ND* ii 164). His perfection presumes His providential government. His counsel, said Chrysippus, putting to a new use Homer's *Διὸς . . . βούλη*,²² is necessity or fate.

It may be said in defense of this paradox of the Stoics that they did not in all probability see it clearly. When they spoke of the deliberation of God, they were not so much concerned with the possibility of God's possessing such a faculty, as they were primarily with the symmetry of their system, their demand for a complete correspondence in the relation of man and world

²⁰ Cf., e. g., Alex. Aphr. *De Fato, Suppl. Arist.* (Berlin) II ii 178.

²¹ See Hicks, *Stoic and Epicurean*, p. 104, and Zeller⁴ III i 169 ff.

²² Plut. *De Vita et Poesi Homeri*, 120.

or man and God, and, secondarily, with their polemic against the Epicurean position that the gods have no concern for mortal beings and their affairs. Against this position, they insisted that God did plan, deliberate, and care for mortals. They were much concerned with the question whether God's care was directed to the individual, or reached the individual only through His care for the universe. In this connection, a passage of Marcus Aurelius is instructive (vi. 44): *εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐβούλεύσαντο περὶ ἔμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἔμοὶ συμβῆναι ὀφειλόντων οἱ θεοί, καλῶς ἐβούλεύσαντο. ἀβούλον γὰρ θεὸν οὐδὲ ἐπινοῆσαι ῥάδιον. . . . εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐβούλεύσαντο κατ' ιδίαν περὶ ἔμοῦ, περί γε τῶν κοινῶν πάντων ἐβούλεύσαντο, οἷς κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν καὶ ταῦτα συμβαίνοντα ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ στέργειν ὀφείλω. εἰ δὲ ἄρα περὶ μηδενὸς βούλεύονται (πιστεύειν μὲν οὐχ ὅσιον . . .), εἰ δὲ ἄρα περὶ μηδενὸς τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς βούλεύονται, ἔμοὶ μὲν ἔξεστι περὶ ἔμαντοῦ βούλεύεσθαι.* In this passage are to be found two Stoic positions concerning the deliberation of God, the Peripatetic, and, finally, the Epicurean positions. But none of these is considered critically. Nor is there here any implication as to the nature of the deliberation or planning of the gods.

Although the question, "Do the gods deliberate?" is implied in Isocrates' use of it to prove that men must deliberate, in Aristotle's assignment of the contemplative virtues alone to the gods, and in Chrysippus' definition of God as *πανάρετος*, it is found explicit and considered on its own merits for the first time by the Sceptic, Carneades of Cyrene. Carneades, himself a student of Chrysippus through the latter's successor, Diogenes of Babylonia,²³ acknowledged his indebtedness to his master, but set himself to the task of overthrowing Stoic doctrine on a large scale. It is only with a detail in this larger attack that I am concerned here: one phase of the attack on the Stoic conception of God. This attack is directed against the Stoic ascription of the virtues to God. Carneades considers the virtues as a whole and singly. His attack in this particular has many points in common with the passage cited in Aristotle;²⁴ but Carneades treats the problem much more extensively. He has the point, for example, that virtue is above its possessor (Sext. Emp. *adv.*

²³ Cf. Hicks, *op. cit.*, pp. 322 f.

²⁴ EN 1178 b 7 ff. Cf. Sext. Emp. *adv. math.* ix. 152-177.

math. ix. 176), an argument in which Zeller feels the presence of sophistry.²⁵

Carneades considers the possibility of God's having each of the cardinal virtues. In the case of each virtue, Carneades arrives by a *sorites* at the conclusion that God cannot exist at all. Part of his study of φρόνησις in this connection may be quoted (*loc. cit.*, §§ 167-170): εἴπερ τε πανάρετόν ἐστι τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν ἔχει, καὶ τὴν εὐβουλίαν, παρόσον ἡ εὐβουλία φρόνησίς ἐστι πρὸς τὰ βουλεύετα.²⁶ εἰ δὲ τὴν εὐβουλίαν ἔχει, καὶ βουλεύεται. εἰ δὲ βουλεύεται, ἐστι τι ἄδηλον αὐτῷ.²⁸ εἰ γὰρ μηδέν ἐστιν ἄδηλον αὐτῷ, οὐδὲ βουλεύεται οὐδὲ τὴν εὐβουλίαν ἔχει τῷ τὴν βουλὴν ἄδηλον τινὸς ἔχεσθαι, ζῆτησιν οὖσαν περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἐν τοῖς παροῦσιν ὀρθῶς διεξάγομεν.²⁹ ἀποκον δέ γέ ἐστι τὸ μὴ βουλεύεσθαι μηδὲ εὐβουλίαν ἔχειν τὸν θεόν.³⁰ τοίνυν ἔχει ταύτην, καὶ ἐστι τι ἄδηλον αὐτῷ. εἰ δὲ ἐστι τι ἄδηλον θεῷ, οὐκ ἄλλο μέν τι ἐστιν ἄδηλον θεῷ, οὐχὶ δέ γε καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον οἷον εἰ ἐστι τινὰ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ ἀπειρίᾳ φθαρτικά. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο ἐστιν ἄδηλον αὐτῷ, πάντως κατὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν τῶν φθαρτικῶν αὐτοῦ τούτων, ἐξ ὧν ἐν συνθρόσῃ τινὶ καὶ κινήματι γενήσεται, κανὸν φοβοῖτο. εἰ δὲ ἐν κινήματι τοιούτῳ γίνεται, καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον μεταβολῆς ἐσται δεκτικός, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ φθαρτός. φὰρ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ μηδὲ ὅλως αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν.³¹

²⁵ Zeller, *loc. cit.*, p. 527, n. 2. Cf. Hicks, *op. cit.*, p. 339.

²⁶ Cf. Von Arnim iii. 58. 31 to iii. 59. 37.

²⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 63 ff.

²⁸ Cf., e. g., Arist. *EN* 1112 b 8-9: τὸ βουλεύεσθαι δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἄδηλοις δὲ πῶς ἀποβήσεται, κτλ.

²⁹ Cf. Arist. *EN* 1142 a 31 f.: τὸ ζῆτεῖν δὲ καὶ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι διαφέρει. τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι ζῆτεῖν τι ἐστίν.

³⁰ This step is perhaps superfluous. It may be taken as a repetition of the point that God is all-virtuous, and therefore must deliberate, or as an unctious remark similar to Marcus Aurelius' ἄβονλον γὰρ θεὸν οὐδὲ ἐπινοῆσαι βέβαιον (vi. 44 and *supra*); or it may anticipate the subsequent sections in which are given the Sceptic "proof" that God cannot be conceived to exist if he has *not* the virtues (S. E. math. ix 171 ff.).

³¹ The text is Mutschmann's. I translate: "Therefore He has 'good counsel,' and there is something obscure to Him. If that be the case, then surely, if anything, some such thing as this must be obscure to Him, whether in the infinitude of things there be not some that are destructive of Himself. But if this latter be obscure to Him, he will then be afraid, especially when He is looking forward to the arrival of forces destructive of Himself, a state of mind which will cast Him into perplexity and emotion. But if He admit the emotion of fright, He will then be capable of a change for the worse, and will, therefore, be destructible. Whence it follows that He doesn't exist at all."

This passage turns largely on the proposition that there can be no contingent for an all-knowing, all-foreseeing Being. If we admit that anything may be obscure or contingent for Him, our conception of His perfection and everlastingness breaks down, as everything becomes contingent for Him, including His own future. Aristotle's God, on the other hand, is unaffected by, and unconcerned with, the element of contingency pervading the universe.

Cicero in his *De Natura Deorum*, iii 38 ff., summarizes the more lengthy treatment to be found in Sextus Empiricus. The fact that Cicero was acquainted with the Academic argument against the ascription of the virtues to God, ought perhaps to be brought into relation with the fragment of the *Hortensius* discussed above. At any rate, the presence of an argument so similar in form in something less than a year later than the date of composition of the *Hortensius* may be thought to indicate Cicero's familiarity with it, and so to weaken the case for his having taken it directly from the *Protrepticus* of Aristotle.

We have seen how Marcus Aurelius treated the problem. Not much more penetrating is the discussion to be found in the Middle Platonist, Maximus of Tyre, in his essay: *τίνες ἄρειν περὶ θεῶν διέλαβον, ποιηταὶ ἡ φιλόσοφοι* (IV). The essay is an endeavor to reconcile the accounts of the gods given by poets and philosophers, and may in the main be representative of a type of rhetorical polemic against Epicurus, otherwise exemplified in the *θέσις θεωρητική* described and illustrated by the rhetorician, Theon of Alexandria,³² whose *θέσις, εἰ προνοοῦσι θεοὶ τοῦ κόσμου*, resembles Maximus' essay in several details. I am concerned here with only the last section of Maximus' essay, chapter ix (Hobein, pp. 50 f.). Having enumerated the Stoic interpretations of divine names,³³ by way of bringing into relation with each other the myths of poets and the doctrines of philosophers, Maximus breaks off suddenly with the question: "To what myth shall I liken the works of Epicurus?" Maximus then quotes with obvious contempt the first of Epicurus' *κύριαι δόξαι*

³² Cf. Hermann Throm, "Die Thesis" in *Rhetorische Studien*, 17. Heft (1932), pp. 78 f.

³³ Zeus = νοῦς; Athene = φρόνησις; Apollo = ἥλιος; Poseidon = πνεῦμα. Cf. Hobein's notes, p. 50.

(Usener, 71), and proceeds to declaim: "How can I imagine that Zeus? Doing what? Deliberating about what? Enjoying what sort of pleasure? Homer's Zeus drinks, but he also makes public speeches, and deliberates, etc." Finally, the inevitable Sardanapallus is adduced to illustrate the point that even the most licentious of mortal lords deliberates in behalf of his subjects.

But the eclectic, Maximus of Tyre, is out of the main line of tradition in many respects. In an essay entitled *εἰ μαντικῆς οὐσης, ἔστιν τι ἐφ' ἡμῖν*, he says (XIII. ii, Hobein, p. 159): Θεοῦ δὲ μαντεῖα καὶ ἀνθρώπων νοῦς . . . χρῆμα συγγενές, καὶ εἴπερ τι ἄλλο ἄλλῳ ὅμοιον, οὐδὲν ἀν εἴη ἐμφερέστερον ἀρετῆς ἀνθρωπίνης γνώμη θεοῦ. And again he says (XIII. ii. d): Οὔτε τὸ θεῖον πάντων εὐστοχον, οὔτε τὸ ἀνθρώπινον πάντων ἀστοχον. Thus by denying to God infallibility, Maximus escapes some of the logical difficulty involved in ascribing deliberation to Him.

Similarly directed against Epicurus is the much later discussion in the little treatise entitled *Περὶ θεῶν καὶ κόσμου*, now generally attributed to one Sallustius (c. 360 A. D.), and recently edited by A. D. Nock. Chapter Nine of this treatise, after an argument for design based on such minor details as that the eyes are transparent, proceeds: "We must suppose that the gods expend such care concerning the universe not with deliberation or toil, but just as bodies having a certain function do what they do merely by being, as, for example, the sun, which lights and warms by virtue solely of its being; so in much greater degree does the providence of the gods, without any effort on its part, work for the benefit of those on whom it is spent; so that the questions posed by the Epicureans are solved, etc."³⁴

A full discussion of the position in Neoplatonic or later Peripatetic philosophy of the problem of the presence or absence of deliberation in God, and an account of the influence of this philosophy upon scholastic thought, would carry the present study far beyond the limits set by space and its natural bounds. Let it suffice, then, to confine our observations in this instance to representative passages whose very content is indubitably concerned with the deliberation of God. For Plotinus, for exam-

³⁴ Mr. Nock in his notes here aptly compares pseudo-Arist. *De Mondo* 397 b 22.

ple, the attributes of God are a problem of major concern. Accepting Plato's *ὅμοιωσις θεῷ* (*Theaet.* 176B), Plotinus admits the further necessity of ascribing virtue to God (*Enn.* I ii 3). So too the disembodied soul, become like to God, will possess the virtues. But the details of this solution, the definition of the virtues as purificatory habits³⁵ imitative of the purity which is the nature of God, need not concern us here. Again, Plotinus is interested in the question whether God has free will or not,³⁶ but he does not here raise the question whether He may deliberate.

This latter question Plotinus raises only in the connection in which it is found in Aristotle's *Physics* (199 b 26 ff.; cf. *supra*), and in language that would indicate he had Aristotle's reference to the subject in mind. Plotinus is discussing the nature of the third of his "trinity," the Soul, which, itself created by Mind which was created by the One, produces all other existences. He then asks the question concerning the manner in which the Soul, the principle of life in the universe, operates (IV iv 10): *εἰ οὖν καὶ αὐτῇ μὴ ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι ἔχει τὸ ξῆν, μηδὲ ἐν τῷ ζητεῖν ὁ τι δεῖ ποιεῖν.* Going on to explain that no such process of calculation or seeking what ought to be done is involved in creative activity of Soul, Plotinus defines production by Soul as the act of an *ἔξηρτημένης μενούσης φρονήσεως*, *ἥς εἰκὼν ἡ ἐν αὐτῇ τάξις*. Here it is to be observed that *φρόνησις* is not prudence in the Aristotelian sense, but yet the nearest equivalent that Plotinus' Soul may have. It is operative with respect to *ὁ τι δεῖ ποιεῖν*, but not in a deliberative sense. It is the ever-abiding wisdom which dwells in Soul, and the order in Soul is the image of this wisdom. Soul, being a mirror for this wisdom, Plotinus tells us, cannot change any more than can the wisdom: it cannot doubt, nor hesitate. The chapter concludes with the sentence: *εἰ δὲ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο βουλεύοιτο, πόθεν τὸ ἄλλο; εἰθ' ὁ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν ἀπορήσει, καὶ ἀσθενήσει τὸ ἔργον αὐτῇ εἰς ἀμφίβολον τοῦ πράττειν ἐν λογισμοῖς ιούσῃ.* Thus, to suppose that Soul is capable of anything in the nature of a deliberative process would be to break down our conception of the perfection of its production.

³⁵ So Plato at *Phaedo* 69C. Cf. Plato, *Sophist* 226-7, and O. S. von Fleschenberg, *Marinos von Neapolis und die Neuplatonischen Tugendgrade*, with Shorey's review, *CP* XXIII (1928) 411-12.

³⁶ *Enn.* VI viii 1; cf. Whittaker, *The Neoplatonists*, pp. 59 f.

Here follows the passage so suggestive of Aristotle (ch. 11): *ἔστι γὰρ ὁσπερ ἐφ' ἐνὸς ζῷου ἡ διοίκησις, ἡ μέν τις ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν καὶ μερῶν, ἡ δέ τις ἀπὸ τῶν ἔνδον καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθάπερ ἰατρὸς μὲν ἔξωθεν ἀρχόμενος καὶ κατὰ μέρος ἀπορος πολλαχῆ καὶ βουλεύεται, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀπροσδέης βουλεύεται. καὶ δεῖ τοῦ παντὸς τὴν διοίκησιν καὶ τὸν διοικοῦντα ἐν τῷ ἥγεισθαι οὐ κατ' ἰατροῦ ἔξιν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ φύσις.* Besides the passage in the *Physics* in which Aristotle says that Nature, though seeming to deliberate, doesn't really do so (199 b 26 ff.)—where, however, Aristotle's illustration of the working of nature by the figure of the physician who heals himself is inferior to Plotinus' illustration—Plotinus may also recall here Aristotle's use of the physician to illustrate that it is the means, not the end, which is the subject of deliberation (*EN* 1112 b 12 ff.).

Of the Aristotelian commentators, Alexander of Aphrodisias and the much later Philoponus interest themselves in our problem. The former discusses it in the "Prooemium" to his *Commentary on the Analytica Priora* (*Comm. in Arist. Graec.* II i 5. 20 ff.). Alexander adds little to previous discussions, but his treatment is notable for the manner in which the several approaches to the subject are brought together. He begins with the point (*Arist. EN* X) that the only virtue which may be ascribed to the gods is *θεωρία*, or contemplative virtue. The other virtues cannot be predicated of the gods, he continues, because they are concerned with *πάθη*, being regulatory of passive experience, and controlling it, whereas the deity has no such experience.³⁷ Alexander's second approach avails itself of Aristotle's definition of choice or purpose as deliberative appetition (*EN* vi 1139 a 23). Deliberation, he proceeds, is concerned with matters in which we have free will, but whose issue is uncertain (*EN* iii 1113 a 10 f.). If then, the issue of nothing in the number of things that become through the agency of the

³⁷ Aristotle does not in *EN* X (1178 b 8 ff.) speak of the *πάθη* in connection with the virtues. But cf. *EN* 1105 b 20 ff., and *De Anima* 429 a 7 with Hicks's note. Cf. also Chalcidius, *Platonis Tim. Comm.*, ch. exxxv, ed. Wrobel, p. 197. 6 ff.: *Daemon est animal rationabile, inmortale, patibile . . . patibile vero, propterea quia consult. neque enim dilectus haberi potest sine affectus perpassione.* For Chalcidius' "daemon," cf. Roger M. Jones, "Chalcidius and Neo-Platonism," *Class. Phil.* XIII (1918) 200-01.

gods is uncertain to them, there would not be anything that could be the subject of deliberation for them (Alex. Aphr., *loc. cit.*, lines 30 f.). They have not therefore deliberation, nor choice, nor any virtue to correspond with choice.

There is nothing in this treatment foreign to Aristotle's thought, although, as we have seen, Aristotle does not in his extant works, approach the problem so explicitly.

Joannes Philoponus, writing some three centuries after Alexander of Aphrodisias, discusses the possibility of God's deliberating in two of his commentaries. Unlike that of Alexander, his discussion offers a peculiar mixture of traditions. His fuller treatment is to be found in his *Commentary on the Categories of Aristotle* (*Comm. in Arist. Graec.* XIII i. 145. 26 ff.). Philoponus has been discussing the relation of the will of God to the ability of God (*loc. cit.*, lines 14 ff.). God's power is on a parity with His will: *τὸ μέντοι θεῖον σύνδρομον ἔχει τῇ βουλήσει τὴν δύναμιν*. To suppose that God wills what He cannot do is to suppose God foolish, as is a man who wishes to fly or to be deathless.³⁸ To suppose God able to do what He does not will to do, is to suppose Him to possess power in vain.³⁹ Philoponus then, fearing his reader will confuse *βούλησις* with *βούλή*, says: *βούλησιν δὲ λέγομεν ἐνταῦθα τὸ θέλημα, οὐ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι ἢ τὴν βούλήν*. There follows the strange sentence: *οὐδὲ γάρ κυρίως ἐπὶ θεοῦ φέρεται ἡ βούλή, εἴ γε, ὡς φησιν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, οὐδὲν ἔτερόν ἔστιν ἡ βούλὴ ἢ*⁴⁰ *ἔνδεια φρονήσεως*. A few lines of pure Aristotelian doctrine follow, and again Philoponus writes (145. 31-146. 2): *βουλευόμεθα δὲ ἀγνοοῦντες, ἀγνοοῦμεν δὲ ἐνδεεῖς ὅντες φρονήσεως· φίλοι γάρ φρονησις πάρεστι, πάντα γνώριμα τὰ πρακτέα· τελειοτάτη γάρ ἔστιν ἀρετή. εἴ τοινν τὸ θεῖον αὐτοφρόνησίς ἔστιν, οὐ δεήσεται βούλης, εἴ γε αὐτῇ κατ' ἐνδειαν γίνεται φρονήσεως*. In a note on the words *ὡς φησιν ὁ Ἀριστ.* here, Busse says: *spectare videtur Eth. Nic. VI 10 p. 1142 a 31 sq.* But it just happens that this passage in the *Nicomachean Ethics* is part of a discussion whose purpose is to

³⁸ Cf. Arist. *EN* 1111 b 20 ff.

³⁹ This argument is a commonplace of Christian and later Greek thought, and in fact is to be found in Sextus Empiricus, where it is attributed by Pasquali to Epicurus. See *Sext. Emp. Hypotyp.* iii 10-11. Cf. also the Migne index to Augustine, vol. XLVI, p. 223.

⁴⁰ The Berlin text has the misprint *ἢ* here, 145. 27.

show the relation of *φρόνησις* to *εὐβούλια*, and to point out that good deliberation is the special work of *φρόνησις*. The sentence to which Busse refers distinguishes *βουλεύεσθαι* from *ζητεῖν*: to deliberate is to seek something. Now, in the sense that the deliberative process involves the finding out of something which we did not know, and in so far as *φρόνησις* is the virtue manifested in good deliberation, we may be said to require *φρόνησις*, to be in need of it in order to discover the right course of action in any particular instance. But since the virtue of *εὐβούλια*, and so of *φρόνησις*, is a habit, and not any particular instance of the habit (Arist. *EN* 1140 a 24 ff.), we will possess it before each particular deliberation as well as after. Certainly, then, Aristotle does not mean here, nor can I discover that he says anywhere, that deliberation is nothing other than a lack of *φρόνησις*. We have seen that the conception of *φρόνησις* did undergo great modifications from the time of Aristotle through Neoplatonism. And it has been conjectured that Philoponus depended largely upon other commentaries on Aristotle in the composition of his own.⁴¹ He was, moreover, a student of Neoplatonism.⁴² He may then easily have found such a use of *φρόνησις* in somewhat earlier commentaries, or he may himself in the endeavor to reconcile the use of the word which he found in Aristotle, and the use which we have seen in Plotinus and in Iamblichus' *Protrepticus*, have arrived at some such a definition of it as that he presents here. For in the context in which he uses it, *φρόνησις* can only mean universal and intuitive wisdom or foresight.

But that Philoponus is hopelessly confused in his understanding of Aristotle's special use of *φρόνησις* is made more evident by his commentary upon Arist. *Physics* 199 b 26 ff.⁴³ I translate: "Finally, he [Aristotle] sets down the reason why men are moved to suppose that nature has no final cause. It is probably, he says, because they do not see nature deliberating in its acts of creation that they deny to nature a final cause, as if indeed things that work with a final cause must always deliberate. But that, he says, would be ridiculous. For they ought to see at the

⁴¹ Cf. Kroll, Pauly-Wissowa, s. v. "Ioannes," no. 21, columns 1773-75.

⁴² *Ibid.*, col. 1789.

⁴³ Philop. in *Phys.*, in *Comm. in Arist. Graec.* XVI 320. 28 to 321. 20.

same time that the arts don't deliberate either." So far, Philoponus is following the passage in the *Physics* faithfully. He proceeds: "For deliberation is a lack of *φρόνησις*, and whenever the artisan deliberates, he deliberates not quâ artisan, but as one wanting somewhat with respect to his art (for it is ignorance that leads him to deliberate), but the artisan quâ artisan does not need deliberation."—Except for the repetition of the error in the definition of deliberation, Philoponus is here following Aristotelian doctrine, as given in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (cf. 1112 a 34 ff.). It may be observed again that the only ignorance which leads a man to deliberate is ignorance of ways and means by which to attain a desired end. Philoponus illustrates at length the idea that the artisan does not deliberate quâ artisan, and concludes (321. 11 ff.): "For we deliberate about the beginning (*ἀρχή*), the end (*τέλος*), and the way from the beginning to the end when these things are uncertain and indefinite." Here, unless he means by *ἀρχή* and *τέλος*, the first and last steps in the deliberative process, Philoponus is departing somewhat from Aristotelian doctrine. For Aristotle the *ἀρχή* of a deliberation is its first principle and is in the deliberator himself,⁴⁴ and the *τέλος* or end of a deliberation is not the subject of deliberation at all.⁴⁵ Philoponus continues: "Therefore if they are going to deny nature a final cause because it doesn't deliberate, let them deny it to art too. But if they don't deny to art a final cause for this reason, then it were logical, I suppose, that they did not deny it to nature.—And why do I speak of arts, when even the Deity in His work of creation does not deliberate, but by the very fact that He is, whenever He wishes, He guides all things without needing any deliberation, if deliberation, as I said, takes place owing to a want of prudence. Accordingly, a final cause must by no means be denied to nature because she doesn't deliberate, since it is not denied to art nor to the Deity for the same reason." Two points are of interest here: (1) Philoponus does not here ascribe his definition of deliberation to Aristotle. (2) The doctrine that God guides the universe aright simply by being is not Aristotelian. We have seen

⁴⁴ Cf. Arist. *EN* 1112 b 31: *ἔσικε δή, καθάπερ εἴρηται, ἀνθρωπος εἶναι ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων.*

⁴⁵ Cf., e. g., *EN* 1112 b 33, and *supra*.

this doctrine in Sallustius' *Περὶ θεῶν καὶ κόσμου*, ch. 9, and noted that it is to be traced with Mr. A. D. Nock to the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise, *De Mundo* 397 b 22. It may then be later Peripatetic doctrine, as it has been conjectured that the *De Mundo* is a product of the Peripatetic school.⁴⁶ We have, at any rate, further evidence that Philoponus does not confine himself to pure Aristotelian doctrine.

It may then be said in conclusion that the history of the discussion of God's deliberation or want of deliberation, is on the one hand a study of philosophic commonplace pointing towards such endless treatment and retreatment of this particular topic as to cast grave doubt upon the assignation of any particular source for any particular appearance of the topic, and is, on the other hand, a study in source-hunting designed to indicate the danger of fastening upon an entirely irretrievable work the first appearance of a commonplace, without making all due allowance for the history of the topic and the possible manner in which it may have fitted into the body of doctrine thus involved. The results of the present study may be summarized as follows: The sophistic type of "Homeric criticism," the tendency to base an argument upon a serious construction of a poet's words, probably gave birth to the topic, "Do the Gods Deliberate," in the latter part of the fifth century B. C., inasmuch as the first reference to the topic, in Isocrates' *Against the Sophists*, seems to imply that such a topic already existed. The first serious and philosophic approach to the problem is found, not direct but implied, in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. The early Stoics either did not know or ignored this treatment of Aristotle's.⁴⁷ The early Sceptics availed themselves of this flaw in the Stoic system, and perhaps also borrowed from the Peripatetic tradition of their day, to upset Stoic doctrine to the greater exercise of their penchant for ingenious dialectic, and with a view to establishing their own doctrine of "probability." After the explicit Sceptic treatment of the topic, the discussion of it becomes a commonplace of varying literary or philosophic character. The Neoplatonic treatment, while resting in the main upon Aristotle, is compelled by the Neoplatonic adherence

⁴⁶ So Zeller⁴ III i 659.

⁴⁷ I lean to the former alternative.

to the Platonic doctrines of the purificatory nature of virtue and the likeness of the virtuous man to God, to recognize in God a virtue corresponding to that virtue of man whose special work is good deliberation, but to rob this virtue of its Aristotelian content in order to predicate it of God. The presence of the Neoplatonic connotation in the use to which Iamblichus puts the word *φρόνησις* in his *Protrepticus*, together with the fact that the Isles-of-the-Blest passages of both Iamblichus and Cicero presume the technical meaning given the word in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, casts no little suspicion upon the assignment of this topic to Aristotle's early *Protrepticus*. Finally, in the late Aristotelian commentator, Philoponus, we see a hopeless confusion of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic thought in which deliberation is defined as the lack of that virtue with which it was almost identified by Aristotle, and that virtue now becomes identified with God in the phrase *τὸ θεῖον αὐτοφρόνησίς ἔστιν*.

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STATIUS' ADULATION OF DOMITIAN.

Throughout the *Silvae* of Publius Papinius Statius runs the thread of adulation characteristic of the court poets of the Roman Empire. Whatever the religious significance of emperor worship at Rome, it has left an indelible impress on most of the great literature of the golden and silver ages of Latin Literature as also on much of the art of the same periods. In the time of Domitian, under whom Statius wrote, absolutism was very pronounced and the cult of the ruler was apparently energetically advanced by the emperor and his court. There is to be found here and there some discussion of the imperial cult under the last of the Flavians,¹ but as far as I know there has been no detailed study of the important material in the writings of Statius.

The poet, an aspirant to imperial favor, is abandoned in his flattery, though no more so than Martial or Quintilian, and in the introduction to the first book of his *Silvae*, dedicated to his friend Stella, he sounds the keynote for the work as a whole: As a proof of the impromptu character of the composition of the poems there is a witness who is "sacrosanctus, for a beginning had to be had from Jove," and the first composition is on the great equestrian statue of the emperor to whom the poem had to be delivered on the day after the statue was dedicated.²

¹ See especially E. Beurlier, *Essai sur le culte rendu aux empereurs romains* (1890), *passim*; P. Riewald, *De Imperatorum Romanorum cum certis dis et comparatione et aequatione*, Halle Diss. (1912), *passim*; S. Gsell, *Essai sur le règne de l'Empereur Domitien* (1894), pp. 45-54 and *passim*; B. W. Henderson, *Five Roman Emperors* (1927), pp. 27-30; G. Herzog-Hauser, s. v. "Kaiserkult" in *P. W. Supplemenbd. IV* (1924), pp. 837-838; Weynand s. v. "Flavius" in *P. W. VI* (1909), p. 2582; O. Stange, *P. Papinii Statii carminum, quae ad imperatorem Domitianum spectant, interpretatio, Programm des Vitzthumschen Gymnasiums*, Dresden (1887), pp. 1-39; J. Jamssen, *C. Suetonii Tranquilli Vita Domitiani* (1919), pp. 61-65; Gephart, *C. Suetonii Tranquilli Vita Domitiani* (1922), esp. pp. 83-88. There are also discussions of the ruler cult under Domitian with especial reference to Martial in O. Weinreich, *Studien zu Martial* (1928), ch. II, and F. Dölger, "Die Kaiservergötterung bei Martial und die heiligen Fische Domitians," *Antike und Christentum I* (1929), pp. 163-173.

² I, i, introd. All references in the text are to the *Silvae* unless otherwise indicated.

Indeed Domitian is more than once identified or compared with Jove. At an entertainment given by the emperor during the Saturnalia sweetmeats rain down upon the crowd in such abundance that the poet bids Jove "send his storms throughout the world and threaten with rains the broad fields, provided these showers of our Jove (*nostri Iovis*) come down (I, vi, 25-27)." One would think the attendants so many cupbearers of Ida (I, vi, 34). In fact, Domitian is the god who "guides the reins of the world and nearer than Jove (*propior Iove*) directs the doings of men (V, i, 37-38).³ So bountiful is the prince that Antiquity is challenged to compare with the present times the centuries of ancient Jove (*antiqui Iovis*) and the golden age (I, vi, 39-40). So he writes that Ida gave Ganymede to be cupbearer of Jove and hated of Juno, but that now Pergamum has sent to Latium Flavius Earinus, Domitian's cupbearer, held in favor and approved by the Ausonian Jupiter and the Roman Juno [Domitian and Domitia] (III, iv, 16 ff.). When Statius dines with the emperor, his enthusiasm knows no bounds: it seems to him that he "reclines among the stars with Jupiter" and receives the immortal wine from the hand of the Trojan Ganymede (IV, ii, 10-12) who sips first the hallowed nectar (III, iv, 60) or *immortale merum*, as it is elsewhere called (IV, ii, 12). The palace itself is so vast that the abode of the Thunderer views it with awe and the divinities rejoice that the emperor has an abode equal to that of Jove (IV, ii, 18 ff.); in fact, Jupiter is such as Domitian (IV, ii, 53 ff.), and the prince is worshipped before even the king of the gods (IV, iv, 58). Like the father of the gods the prince is given the attribute of the thunderbolt (IV, vii, 50).

The prince, moreover, is sacred,⁴ and he is called *sacer Germanicus* (V, ii, 177), *sacratissimus imperator* (II, introd. and

³ On the conception of the ruler as one closer to mankind and able to hear their prayers while the other gods are far removed or indifferent, cf. the ithyphallic hymn sung to Demetrius Poliorcetes by the Athenians. It is discussed by Weinreich, "Antikes Gottmenschentum," *Neue Jahrbücher* (1926), pp. 646-7; Scott, "The Deification of Demetrius Poliorcetes," *A. J. P.*, xlix (1928), pp. 228 ff.; V. Ehrenberg, "Athenischer Hymnus auf Demetrius Poliorcetes," *Die Antike* VII (1929), pp. 279-297.

⁴ Cf. Vollmer's edition of the *Silvae* (1898), p. 211.

III, introd.) and referred to by the words *sacra imperia* (V, i, 207 f.). Priscilla is represented as bidding her husband love the sacred presence (*sacrum latus*) of the prince (V, i, 187); his features are *sacri* (V, i, 190); his feet are *sancti* (V, i, 3); his home is sacred (V, i, 85-6), divine (V, introd.); the day on which Domitian gives an entertainment is *sacer* (I, vi, 99); the minister Claudius Etruscus shared the secrets of the gods [i. e., the emperor's] (III, iii, 65-6) and was in charge of Domitian's "sacred treasures" (III, iii, 87); the banquet of the emperor is "most sacred" (IV, ii, 15 and 64), and the gold put on by the poet when he won the prize at the Alban contest is *sanctum* (III, v, 29).

Jupiter, indeed, bids Domitian rule for him the happy world (IV, iii, 128-9).⁵ The emperor, like the ruler of the gods, is a father (*pater*) (V, i, 167): Venus is made to refer to him as *parens Latius* (I, 2, 178), and Apollo speaks of the *Latiae pater inclitus urbis* (I, iv, 95); he is the *dux* of Latium whom Victorius Marcellus is said to worship before the Thunderer (IV, iv, 57 ff.); as *Ausoniae pater augustissimus urbis* he bestows the *ius trium liberorum* upon Julius Menecrates (IV, viii, 20); he is named *Romanus parens* (IV, iii, 108), *dux hominum et parens deorum* (IV, iii, 139),⁶ *pater inclitus orbis* (III, iv, 48); Janus addresses him as *magne parens mundi* (IV, i, 17). Crispinus is asked to which world of Caesar (*quem Caesaris . . . in orbem*) he will go (V, ii, 132). Domitian holds the reins of men and is ruler of waves and earth (*Thebaid*, I, 31); he is hailed as *regnator terrarum, orbis subacti magnus parens* and as *spes hominum cura deorum* (IV, ii, 14-5).

Another title of similar import is that of *potens terrarum dominus* (III, iv, 1920). But *dominus* was a title of peculiar nature, a title from which preceding emperors had shrunk⁷ and which Domitian once forbade when the people acclaimed him at a banquet⁸ (I, vi, 82-3). This moderation was, however, of short duration, and before long the emperor rejoiced to hear himself so greeted by the crowd⁹ and used himself the expres-

⁵ Cf. I, iv, 92, where Domitian is referred to as *rector*.

⁶ *Deorum* is a reference to the Flavian *gens*.

⁷ Cf. Suetonius *Aug.*, 53, 1; *Tib.* 27; Dio, lvii, 8.

⁸ Cf. Vollmer, *op. cit.*, p. 6, n. 4.

⁹ Suet. *Domit.* 13, 2.

sion *deus et dominus* in letters of his procurators and was thereafter so addressed in speech and written documents.¹⁰ Sometimes the use of *dominus* is ambiguous in meaning: thus Domitian is referred to as the *dominus* of the horse of his equestrian statue (I, i, 54); thus Venus promises to find for Earinus a *dominus* worthy of his beauty (III, iv, 34-5); thus Claudius Etruscus is quick to reckon how much gold gleams on the lofty beams of the ceiling of the *dominus* (Is the meaning "his master" or "our master"?) (III, iii, 103) and he begets faithful clients for the *dominus* (III, iii, 110); again, the ruler's palace is only smaller than the *dominus* (IV, 2, 25).

In the cases cited above the use of the word *dominus* is perhaps ambiguous, since in each instance it can have the quite proper meaning of "master." There are, however, other cases where the reference is probably to the title, divine in character, by which Domitian came to be regularly addressed and which is found so often in Martial. So in the description of a banquet in the palace *domina mensa* may well mean the table of "our Lord" (IV, ii, 6); the significance of the word is the same when Priscilla is represented as placating the lords of the world below that her husband may upon his death leave behind Domitian (*dominum*) giving peace to the lands (V, i, 258-262); she also worshipped the gentle genius of the present lord (*domini praesentis* V, i, 74), again the use of *dominus* as a title. Finally the same meaning is found once more when Statius informs his friend Marcellus that he had before publication given many of the verses of the fourth book of the *Silvae* to the *dominus* (introd.).

Worship of the *genius* or *numen* of an emperor was a phenomenon of emperor worship from the time of Augustus, and it appears that the terms are synonymous.¹¹ As we have just seen (V, i, 74), Priscilla is said to have worshipped the genius of the *praesens dominus*. So soil upon which rests the great equestrian statue of the prince is said to pant beneath not the iron or the bronze, but beneath his genius (I, i, 57-8). The

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 13, 2.

¹¹ Cf. M. Pippidi, "Le Numen Augusti," *Revue des Études Latines*, IX (1931), pp. 83-112 and L. R. Taylor, *The Divinity of the Roman Emperor* (1931), p. 182.

being of the emperor fills the vast palace and makes it glad with his mighty genius (IV, ii, 25-6). On her deathbed Priscilla advises her husband to unfailingly love the genius of the prince (V, i, 187-8).

Even more frequently Statius mentions the *numen* of Domitian: Curtius hails the prince as *auditum longe numen mihi* (I, i, 75). Claudio Etruscus, servant of so many rulers, ever walked near divinities (*numina*) (III, iii, 64) and he is made to refer to the divinity (*numina*) of the great ruler (III, iii, 183-4). The poet himself has opened no work without invoking the godhead (*numen*) of the greatest emperor (IV, introd.); the Sibyl of Cumae salutes Domitian as *provisum mihi conditumque numen* (IV, iii, 140); again, Statius refers to the *numina* of the Latin leader in his letter to Vitorius Marcellus (IV, iv, 57), and in his poem to Julius Menecrates he says that Menecrates' sons may enter the senate if they are favored by the *numina* of invincible Caesar (IV, viii, 61-2); the husband of Priscilla calls upon all the gods and the *exorabile numen* of great Caesar (V, i, 164-5). Optatus, the friend of the youthful Crispinus, may wear a sword, *sic numina principis adsint* (V, ii, 154).

It is possible that in Statius' poem on "The Tame Lion" we have a reference to the divine power which it was believed that the emperor exerted over dumb beasts. The tame lion had been wont to give up its prey and let go the hands inserted in the mouth (II, iv, 5-6). This sort of miracle in a savage beast was elsewhere attributed to the emperor's *numen*¹² and such a miracle may be hinted at here.

Domitian was indeed treated by his flatterers as a very god on earth. Thus Statius says that the present beauty of the god (*deus*) makes pleasant the toil of erecting the colossal equestrian statue of the emperor (I, i, 61-2). When Domitian gives a banquet and partakes thereof in person, the poet cries in pretended wonder: *quis hoc vocare, quis promittere possit hoc deorum* (I, vi, 46-7). The god (*deus*) who guides the reins of the world notes the grief of Abascantus mourning his wife (V, i, 37-38); Claudio Etruscus as a minister shared in the secrets of the

¹² Cf. Weinreich, *Studien zu Martial*, ch. II, and Dölger, *op. cit.*, for similar animal wonders.

gods (*dei*), a reference to Domitian and his predecessors (III, iii, 64-5). The emperor is a god (*hic est deus*), who rules at Jove's command (IV, iii, 128-9). In writing to Abascantus the poet says that he ever strives to deserve well of all adherents of the sacred home, since "he who with good faith worships the gods (*dei*), also loves their priests" (V, introd.). In singing the praises of Crispinus he writes of "that nearest god" (*proximus ille deus*) with reference to the emperor (V, ii, 170). Once, in a poem to Rutilius Gallicus, Domitian is addressed as *divus Germanicus* (I, iv, 4), and here the word *divus* is used with the meaning "divine" and without the connotation of a man who was dead and consecrated.¹³

The description of the person and traits of the ruler is appropriate for a god.¹⁴ Statius assures his reader that the truth is not surpassed in the marvellous equestrian statue, for equal are the ruler's beauty (*forma*), splendor, and dignity (I, i, 17-18).¹⁵ The present beauty (*forma*) of the god makes pleasant the toil of the workmen who erect the likeness (I, i, 61-3). Though Earinus surpasses in beauty Endymion, Attis, Narcissus, and Hylas, he is in turn outshone by his master Domitian (III, iv, 34-45). The prince's eyes are heavenly (*oculi caelestes*) (III, iv, 53), orbs which imitate the sidereal flames (I, ii, 103). The countenance of the ruler is "calm," and with majesty serene he tempers his rays (*radii*)¹⁶ and he modestly lowers the standards of his fortune; yet the glory concealed shines forth in his countenance" (IV, ii, 41-44).¹⁷

This conception of the radiate glory and effulgence of the prince and of his association with the sun or stars became a feature of the ancient ruler cult centuries before Domitian.¹⁸ Statius makes much of this idea, for on the occasion of the emperor's

¹³ Cf. Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-70.

¹⁴ Cf. the excellent article of Weinreich, "Antikes Gottmenschentum," *Neue Jahrbücher* (1926), p. 64: "Schönheit und Lächeln sind typische Merkmale ungezählter Epiphanien von Göttern oder Engeln."

¹⁵ The great weight of Domitian's statue is to be noted, for great weight was generally ascribed to the gods: cf. Vollmer, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

¹⁶ Cf. Beurlier, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-50 on the importance of the radiate crown in the emperor cult and its symbolism for the sun.

¹⁷ Cf. Vollmer, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-218.

¹⁸ Cf. for example, Weinreich, *Neue Jahrbücher* (1926), p. 647.

seventeenth consulship in 95 A. D. he writes: "Germanicus arises with the new sun, with the great constellations, himself shining more clearly and greater than the early Morning Star" (IV, i, 2-4). Again, at a banquet in the palace, the poet "seems to recline with Jove amid the stars" (*mediis . . . in astris*) (IV, ii, 10-11), and of the great steed of the equestrian statue he exclaims: "He will serve one star" (I, i, 55); Curtius, to whom it is granted to behold the statue, beholds the ruler's immortal refulgence (*immortale iubar*) (I, i, 77). Rutilius Gallicus, restored to health, *dubitata sidera cernit* (I, iv, 3) and the word *sidera* apparently refers to Domitian. Janus addresses the ruler in these words: "Do you see how the temples have a new gleam, how the flame is higher on the altars, and the very constellations of my mid-winter's cold grow warm for you? how the squadrons and the tribes and the purple-clad fathers rejoice in your ways and how every rank derives its *light* from the consul?" (IV, i, 23-27).

As we have seen above, Priscilla is represented as placating the rulers of Avernus that her husband, Abascantus, may leave behind the emperor still giving peace to the world (V, i, 261); in other words, Domitian is depicted as *εἰρηνοῦσ*, a peacemaker, and the ancients' exalted rulers who were peacemakers to the gods for the blessing of peace.¹⁹ He is a friend to peace (*paci bonus*) (IV, iii, 134), and the peacefulness of his reign is alluded to when mention is made of the "closed doors" (*clausus postis*) of Janus (IV, i, 44); the emperor has bound Janus with peace (IV, i, 13 and IV, iii, 9-10) and has bidden him put an end to all warfare (IV, i, 14).

The emperor who is both better and more powerful than Nature (IV, iii, 135), is also a bringer of joy, *χαριδότης*. The lands are happy (*beatae*) under his sway (IV, iii, 128-9), his beauty makes glad the workmen who toil at the construction of his statue (I, i, 61-2), Curtius is *laetus* at the sight of the statue (I, i, 73), and Janus bids Domitian give joys perpetual to the annals (IV, i, 20-1).

Comparison or association of the monarch with the gods or demigods, a feature of adulation,²⁰ is not wanting in Statius:

¹⁹ H. Windisch, "Friedensbringer-Gottessöhne," *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* (1925), pp. 240-260.

²⁰ Cf. Riewald, *op. cit.*

Apollo and Caesar together aid him in his song (V, i, 13-15); the emperor is compared with Mars Gradius,²¹ Pollux, Bacchus, Hercules, but as yet no rival can be found to his countenance; with Jove alone he may be truly compared (IV, ii, 45-56). The steed of the equestrian statue of Julius Caesar, the deified (II, vii, 67), must yield to that of Domitian, as ruler must yield to ruler (I, i, 84 ff.); the seventeenth consulship of Domitian is compared to the thirteenth of the *deified* Augustus (IV, i, 33 ff.).

Other phases of the imperial cult are reflected in the lines of the *Silvae*: Minerva, who was the emperor's favorite goddess and whom he is reported to have claimed as a mother,²² is said to have woven for him a robe with her own hands (IV, i, 21-22). Janus is made to say that the whole year does not as yet have glory, and that ten months still desire names of the prince (IV, i, 42-3), a reference to the changing of September to Germanicus and October to Domitianus;²³ Priscilla bids her husband set up in the temple on the Capitoline an everlasting²⁴ portrait statue of the prince in gold of one hundred pounds in weight²⁵ and thus show the love of his own votary (V, i, 189-91).

The poet has much to say of the consecration which came to many emperors after death. It was Julius Caesar, "who, wearied of wars, by the gift of his adopted son first showed to our *divi* the path to heaven" (I, i, 22, 24). Claudius, too, in his old age "was sent to the starry vault (*stelligerum demissus in axem*)" (III, iii, 77-78).

The deification of Domitian's father and brother and the establishment of the cult of the Flavian *gens* naturally are reflected in the verses of the court poet. The emperor is called *magnorum proles genitorque deum* (I, i, 74), as son of the deified Vespasian and agent in the deification of his brother and sister, and presumably of future members of his house, an

²¹ Another comparison with Mars is found in I, i, 18.

²² Cf. Gsell, *op. cit.*, p. 76, and Vollmer, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

²³ Cf. Scott, "Greek and Roman Honorific Months," *Yale Classical Studies* II (1931), esp. pp. 232-236.

²⁴ On the *aeternitas* of the emperor, see Beurlier, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

²⁵ A statue in gold was a divine honor; the statues of the *divi* were in gold (III, iii, 103-105). Cf. Scott, "The Significance of Statues in Precious Metal in Emperor Worship," *T. A. P. A.*, lxii (1931), pp. 118-9.

idea probably repeated when he is called *parens deorum* (IV, iii, 139). Vespasian is spoken of as one "who by his nod now sways the citadels of heaven and has given glorious offspring to the lands [Domitian] and to the stars [Titus and his sister]" (III, iii, 140-141).

At time of night the throng of his family will "glide down from heaven and exchange kisses and join in close embrace, son and brother and father and sister; about his neck will cling all the constellations (I, i, 94-98)." ²⁶ The poet prays that the emperor "may give to the stars appointed divinities and grant them temples (IV, ii, 59-60)." He "consecrates to the family of his father constellations which will last forever and a Flavian heaven (IV, iii, 18-19)"; Abascantus is "the minister of him who recently founded a shrine for his eternal family and placed his own stars in another heaven (V, i, 239-241)." And in the opening lines of the *Thebaid* Statius prays that the ruler remain content with the earth and give constellations to the sky (*Thebaid*, I, 30-31).²⁷

The emperor is an epiphany, a *deus praesens*; ²⁸ further, he is ushering in a new golden age, as is shown in the lines:

i nunc saecula compara, Vetustas,
antiqui Iovis aureumque tempus. (I, vi, 39-40)

A new period is coming in (*aevum rediens*) (I, iv, 15), a new age (*nova saecula*) is being founded (I, iv, 17), and Janus prophesies that with himself the prince will found another age (*altera saecula condes*) (IV, i, 37). In one way these references are to Domitian's celebration of the *ludi saeculares* in 88 A. D.,²⁹ but there is also expressed in these passages the idea common in the ruler cult that the monarch is a *κτίστης*, a founder.³⁰ To found

²⁶ Cf. Vollmer, *op. cit.*, pp. 229-230.

²⁷ On the *divi* of the Flavian family and the temple of the *gens*, cf. Gsell, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51.

²⁸ *Silvae*, I, i, 62: *forma dei praesens*; the *praesens* almost certainly describes the god as well as his beauty. V, i, 74: *genium domini praesentis adores*. Cf. Vollmer, *op. cit.*, p. 501 and Pfister, "Epi-phanie" in *P. W. Supplementbd.*, IV (1924), esp. pp. 306-314.

²⁹ Cf. Vollmer, *op. cit.*, pp. 285 and 445.

³⁰ Cf. J. Kaerst, *Geschichte des Hellenismus*, on the importance of the *ἥρως κτίστης* in the ruler cult; cf. also E. Norden, *P. Vergilius Maro Aeneis Buch VI* (1916), p. 324.

cities or states, or to refound them, was to exalt man to the gods.³¹

One further feature of the ruler cult is most marked in the verses of Statius, namely the prayer for, or prophecy of, a vastly long life for the emperor, a hope that he may prefer to remain on earth instead of going to an abode in heaven.³² In singing of the equestrian statue of Domitian the poet, after bidding him enjoy forever (*perpetuum*) the gift of the senate and people (I, i, 99), closes with these lines:

"certus ames terras et quae tibi tempa dicamus,
ipse colas; nec te caeli iuvet aula, tuosque
laetus huic dono videoas dare tura nepotes." (I, i, 105-7)

Similar is the prayer of Flavius Earinus when he dedicates his locks to Asclepius at Pergamum:

"his mihi pro donis, hominum mitissime custos,
si merui, longa dominum renovare iuventa
atque orbi servare velis! hoc sidera mecum,
hoc undae terraeque rogant. eat, oro, per annos
Iliacos Pyliosque simul, propriosque penates
gaudeat et secum Tarpeia senescere tempa." ³³

In the poem on the seventeenth consulship of Domitian Janus says that Rome would like ever to see the emperor in his month (January). He begs the prince to give *perpetual* joys to the *fasti* (IV, i, 17 ff.). Then he continues (l. 34)

" . . . flectere tamen precibusque senatus
promittet hunc saepe diem. manet insuper ordo
longior, et totidem felix tibi Roma curules
terque quaterque dabit. mecum altera saecula condes
et tibi longaevi renovabitur ara parentis;
mille tropaea feres."

³¹ Cicero, *De re pub.*, I, 12: neque enim est ulla res in qua propius ad deorum numen virtus accedat humana, quam civitatis aut condere novas aut conservare iam conditas; cf. Velleius, II, 60, 1-2.

³² Cf. my article "On Seneca's *Apocolocyntosis IV*," in *A. J. P.*, lii (1931), pp. 66-68. I plan to publish a treatment of the history of this phase of the ruler cult in the Roman Empire.

³³ *Silvae*, III, iv, 100-105; on the idea expressed in lines 102-103 that the heavens, seas, and lands join in requesting that the emperor remain on earth, cf. G. Hirst, "A Discussion of Some Passages in the Prologue to the *Georgics*," *T. A. P. A.*, lix (1928), pp. 28 f. In Virgil's *Georgics* it is asked which group of the gods Augustus will join, those of earth, sea, or sky.

The poem closes with the statement that all the gods approved Janus' prayer and that Jove granted "a long youth" and "his own years" (IV, i, 45-7). Then in the poem of thanks to Domitian who had invited him to a banquet, Statius begs his imperial master "not to hasten to ascend to the great heaven (IV, ii, 22)," and adds the prayer that the gods may grant that the emperor surpass twice and thrice the bounds of his sire's old age and send divinities to the stars and give them temples and himself inhabit his home and often bring in the new year as consul (IV, ii, 57 ff.).

Next we find the Cumæan Sibyl thus prophesying a long life to the prince :

"vidi quam seriem merentis aevi
pronectant tibi candidae sorores,
magnus te manet ordo saeculorum,
natis longior abnepotibusque
annos perpetua geres iuventa,
quos fertur placidos adisse Nestor,
quos Tithonia computat senectus
et quantos ego Delium poposci. (IV, iii, 145-152)

.
donec Troicus ignis et renatae
Tarpeius pater intonabit aulae,
haec donec via [new Domitian road] te regente terras
annosa magis Appia senescat." (IV, iii, 160-163)

And now for the last time in the *Silvae* a long life is wished the prince, this time by Priscilla, whose prayer is that her husband first in ripe old age may leave behind Domitian on earth and still youthful, and the fates grant her prayer (V, i, 258 ff.).

Finally in the *Thebaid* (I, 22 ff.) the poet, in making his excuses for not singing of Rome and Domitian in his epic, says that "Rome desires the ruler for herself *forever*," and adds (ll. 24 ff.):

"licet artior omnis
limes agat stellas et te plaga lucida caeli,
Pleiadum Boreaeque et hilic fulminis expers,
sollicitet, licet ignipedum frenator equorum
ipse tuis alte radiantem crinibus arcum
imprimat aut magni cedat tibi Iuppiter aequa
parte poli, *maneas hominum contentus habenis*
undarum terraeque potens, et sidera dones."

It is interesting to note that this particular form of adulation, peculiar to the imperial cult, is thrice used by the poet with reference to others than the emperors. Thus Amphiaraus in speaking of the dead Archemorus uses these words:

“ne fletu violate sacrum, ne plangite divos:
nam deus iste, deus, Pyliae nec fata senectae
maluerit, Phrygiis aut degere longius annis.”

(*Thebaid*, V, 750-752)

Again in lamenting the death of his own father, Statius cries:

“... sed me pietas numerare dolorque
non sinit, O Pylias aevi transcendere metas
et Teucros aequare senes, o digne videre
me similem.”

(*Silvae*, V, iii, 254-257)

And in similar fashion Hercules, in gratitude for the shrine erected to himself, is represented as making this promise of long old age to Pollius, the builder of the shrine:

“Quae tibi nunc meritorum praemia solvam?
quas referam grates? Parcarum fila tenebo
extendamque colus—duram scio vincere mortem—
avertam luctus et tristia damna vetabo
teque nihil laesum viridi renovabo senecta
concedamque diu iuvenes spectare nepotes,
donec et hic sponsae maturus et illa marito,
rursus et ex illis suboles nova grexque protervus
nunc umeris inreptet avi, nunc agmine blando
certatim placidae concurrat ad oscula Pollae.

(III, i, 169-179)

Thus we find in Statius—and the same is in general true of the court poets of the Early Roman Empire—a special sort of formula for wishing the emperor long life. The earth wishes to keep him and hopes that he will not be tempted by an abode in heaven. The Fates give him a life-thread of unusual length. He is to surpass the age of his father and outlive his descendants. He is to have a longer life span than Nestor, Priam, the Sibyl of Cumae, or Tithonus; he shall have the years of Jove himself. He will live as long as the Trojan fire shall burn, as long as the temple of Jupiter of the Capitoline shall last, while the Domitian road grows old with greater tale of years than the Via Appia. Unlike Tithonus he is to remain youthful.

This type of wish comes to mean merely "Long live the King," but it is interesting to see the language of the Roman court poets closely imitated in the verses of William Gager under Queen Elizabeth. The British poet closes a poem with these significant lines:

"Vive tibi, laudique satis, patriaeque tuisque.
Heu quod non semper dicere, vive, licet."

"May you live abundantly for yourself and your fame, your country and your subjects. Alas that I may not say, Live Forever!"³⁴

Thus we have found in Statius many of the striking features of adulation couched in the language of the ruler cult. Domitian is compared to and identified with Jove, while his wife Domitia is associated with Juno. The emperor and his possessions are sacred, and he is father and ruler of Rome and of the world. He is *dominus* and *deus*, and his *numen* and *genius* are worshipped, while the former tames wild beasts. He is an epiphany with the beauty, splendor, dignity, and massive bulk of a god. His glance is flame-like and his countenance radiates effulgence. He is compared to a constellation. He gives peace and joy to mankind. He is compared with gods and demigods, and his patron Minerva weaves a robe for him. Months take his name, and sacred statues in precious metals are set up in his honor.

The Flavian family is divine and its deceased members have been sent to join the constellations, like many of the rulers of the Julio-Claudian dynasty. Domitian is the founder of a new golden age, and it is prophesied that he will live and perpetuate it beyond the years of the fabulously-aged characters of the storied past. In short, the poetry of Statius, particularly the *Silvae*, is a veritable repertoire of the forms and characteristic ideas of the Roman imperial cult.

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³⁴ Tucker Brooke, "William Gaber to Queen Elizabeth," *Studies in Philology*, xxix (April, 1932), p. 173.

SOLOMON AND ASHMODAI.

[Ever since the appearance of Varnhagen's book (1882), the Indian origin of the legend of *Solomon and Ashmodai* has been taken for granted. This view seems erroneous: the story is of Persian-Mesopotamian provenance, having developed out of the ancient Sacaea or New Year's ritual. The chief *dromenon* of this was the election of a temporary king taking the place of the lawful monarch and expelled or put to death at the end of the feast.]

In the Talmud of Jerusalem, composed, probably, about the year 350 of our era, and in a considerable number of texts derived from it more or less directly, we find the well-known episode of the demon Ashmodai, who assumes the shape and appearance of King Solomon and mounts the latter's throne, while the true king lives miserably in exile, a poor beggar.¹ True to the custom of Oriental monarchs, Ashmodai with the royal power seizes the deposed king's harem, which is so large that he requires three full years to cohabit with every one of its members. When, one day, he wished to approach a woman during her uncleanness, he received the indignant answer: "Truly, thou art not Solomon!" At last he even wanted to cohabit with Bathseba, Solomon's mother; but she refused, saying: "Thou art not my son Solomon!" And she communicated her secret to Benajahu; the truth came out; the true Solomon was found and reinstated in his royal splendour.

The Babylonian Talmud, from about 550 of our era, offers a somewhat different version. There the Sanhedrin conceive a suspicion and induce the ladies of the harem to examine closely the feet of the supposed king. They reply that he always appears with his feet covered. Some time later the wise men learn the story of the false Solomon's having wanted to cohabit with unclean women and with Bathseba. Thus the truth is discovered.

The point most interesting to the student of manners is the rôle played by the ladies of Solomon's harem in this discovery of the impostor. Now it is doubtless a noteworthy fact that there

¹ Moser Gaster, *The Exempla of the Rabbis*, London-Leipzig, 1924, p. 80; John D. Seymour, *Tales of King Solomon*, Oxford, 1924, p. 174; Fromer Schnitzer, *Legenden aus dem Talmud*, Berlin, s. d., p. 87; M. Grünbaum, *Neue Beiträge zur semitischen Sagenkunde*, Leiden, 1893, pp. 223 and 272.

exists another Oriental story, reported to be history and, in part at least, doubtless historical, a story which, to my knowledge, has never been compared with the Jewish legend. I refer to the unmasking of the false Smerdis as related in the third Book of Herodotus' great work.²

The false Smerdis has usurped the Persian throne and has been reigning for seven months.

But in the eighth month it was revealed who he was, and this is how it was done:—There was one Otanes, son of Pharnaspes, as well-born and rich a man as any Persian. This Otanes was

² Herodotus, III. 68-69: . . . δγδδψ δὲ μηνὶ ἐγένετο κατάδηλος τρόπω τουφδε. Ὁτάνης ην Φαρνάσπεω μὲν παῖς, γένει δὲ καὶ χρήμασι δμοιος τῷ πρώτῳ Περσέων, οὗτος δὲ Ὁτάνης πρώτος ὑπώπτευσε τὸν Μάγον ὡς οὐκ εἴη δὲ Κύρου Σμέρδιος ἀλλ' ὅς περ ἦν, τῇδε συμβαλόμενος, ὅτι τε οὐκ ἔξεφολτα ἐκ τῆς ἀκροπόλιος καὶ οὐκ ἐκάλεε ἐς δψιν ἐωτῷ οὐδένα τῶν λογίμων Περσέων· ὑποπτεύσας δέ μιν ἐποιες τάδε. ἔσχε αὐτοῦ Καμβύσης θυγατέρα, τῇδε οὖνομα ἦν Φαιδύμη· τὴν αὐτὴν δὴ ταῦτην είχε τότε δὲ Μάγος καὶ ταῦτη τε συνοίκεε καὶ τῇσος ἀλληγοι πάσησι τῇσι τοῦ Καμβύσεω γυναῖξι. πέμτων δὴ ὧν ὁ Ὁτάνης παρὰ ταῦτην τὴν θυγατέρα ἐπυνθάνετο παρ' ὅτεω ἀνθρώπων κοιμώτο, εἴτε μετὰ Σμέρδιος τοῦ Κύρου εἴτε μετὰ ἀλλού τεν. ή δέ οι ἀντέπεμπε φαμένη οὐ γινώσκειν· οὔτε γὰρ τὸν Κύρου Σμέρδιον ιδέσθαι οὐδαμὰ οὔτε δστις εἴη δὲ συνοικέων αὐτῇ εἰδέναι. ἐπειπε δεύτερα δὲ Ὁτάνης λέγων "Εἰ μὴ αὐτὴ Σμέρδιον τὸν Κύρου γινώσκεις, σὺ δὲ παρὰ Ἀτέσσης πύθει δτεω τούτῳ συνοικέει αὐτῇ τε ἐκείνῃ καὶ σύ· πάντως γὰρ δὴ κου τὸν γε ἐωτῆς ἀδελφεδν γινώσκει."

"Αντιπέμπει πρὸς ταῦτα ἡ θυγάτηρ "Ούτε Ἀτέσση δύναμαι ἐς λόγους ἔλθειν οὔτε ἀλλην οὐδεμίαν ιδέσθαι τῶν συγκατημενέων γυναικῶν. ἐπείτε γὰρ τάχιστα οὗτος ἀνθρωπος, δστις κοτέ ἐστι, παρέλαβε τὴν βασιληίην, διέσπειρε ἡμέας ἀλλην ἀλλη τάξας." ἀκούοντι δὲ ταῦτα τῷ Ὁτάνη μᾶλλον κατεφαίνετο τὸ πρῆγμα· τρίτην δὲ ἀγγελίην ἐσπέμπει παρ' αὐτὴν λέγουσαν ταῦτα. "Ω θύγατερ, δεῖ σε γεγονοῦν εν κίνδυνον ἀναλαβέσθαι τὸν ἀν δὲ πατήρος ὑποδύνειν κελεύη. εἰ γὰρ δὴ μή ἐστι δὲ Κύρου Σμέρδιος ἀλλὰ τὸν καταδοκέω ἐγώ, οὗτοι μιν σοι τε συγκομώμενον καὶ τὸ Περσέων κράτος ἔχοντα δεῖ χαίροντα ἀπαλλάσσειν, ἀλλὰ δοῦναι δίκην. νῦν δὲ ποιησον τάδε· ἐπεάν σοι συνεδή καὶ μάθης αὐτὸν κατυπνωμένον, ἀφασον αὐτοῦ τὰ ὀντα· καὶ ήν μὲν φαίνηται ἔχων ὀντα, οὐδεὶς σεωντὴν Σμέρδιον τῷ Κύρου συνοικέειν, ήν δὲ μὴ ἔχων, σὺ δὲ τῷ Μάγῳ Σμέρδιον." ἀντιπέμπει πρὸς ταῦτα ἡ Φαιδύμη φαμένη κινδυνεύσειν μεγάλως. ήν ποιέη ταῦτα· εἰ γὰρ δὴ μή τυγχάνει τὰ ὀντα ἔχων, ἐπίλαμπτος δὲ ἀφάσσοντα ἔσται εν εἰδέναι ὡς ἀιστώσει μιν. δμως μέντοι ποιήσειν ταῦτα. ή μὲν δὴ ὑπεδέξατο ταῦτα τῷ πατρὶ κατεργάσσονται. τοῦ δὲ Μάγου τούτου τοῦ Σμέρδιος Κύρου δὲ Καμβύσεω δρχων τὰ ὀντα ἀπέταμε ἐπ' αἰτίῃ δὴ τινι οὐ σμικρῇ. ή δὲ δὴ Φαιδύμη αὐτῇ, ή τοῦ Ὁτάνεω θυγάτηρ, πάντα ἐπιτελέουσα τὰ ὑπεδέξατο τῷ πατρὶ, ἐπείτε αὐτῆς μέρος ἐγίνετο τῆς ἀπίξιος παρὰ τὸν Μάγον (ἐν περιτροπῇ γὰρ δὴ αἱ γυναικες φοιτέουσι τοῖσι Πέρσησι), ἀλθοῦσα παρ' αὐτὸν ηδε, ὑπνωμένου δὲ καρτερῶς τοῦ Μάγου ἥφαστε τὰ ὀντα. μαθοῦσα δὲ οὐ χαλεπῶς ἀλλ' εὐπετέως οὐκ ἔχοντα τὸν δινδρα ὀντα, ὡς ἡμέρη τάχιστα ἐγεγόνεε, πέμψασα ἐσῆμην τῷ πατρὶ τὰ γενύμενα.

the first to suspect that the Magian was not Cyrus' son Smerdis but his true self; the reason was, that he never left the citadel nor summoned any notable Persian into his presence; and in his suspicion—Cambyses having married Otanes' daughter, Phaedyme, whom the Magian had now wedded, with all the rest of Cambyses' wives—Otanes sent to this daughter, asking with whom she lay, Smerdis, Cyrus' son, or another. She sent back a message that she did not know; for (said she) she had never seen Cyrus' son Smerdis, nor knew who was her bedfellow. Then Otanes sent a second message, to this effect: "If you do not yourself know Cyrus' son Smerdis, then ask Atossa who is this that is her lord and yours; for surely she knows her own brother."

To this his daughter replied: 'I cannot get speech with Atossa, nor can I see any other of the women of the household; for no sooner had this man, whoever he is, made himself king, than he sent us to live apart, each in her appointed place.' When Otanes heard that, he saw more clearly how the matter stood; and he sent her this third message: 'Daughter, it is due to your noble birth that you should run any risk that your father bids you face. If this man be not Smerdis son of Cyrus, but another whom I think him to be, then he must not go unscathed, but be punished for sharing your bed and sitting on the throne of Persia. Now, therefore, when he lies with you and you see that he is asleep, do as I bid you and uncover his ears; if you see that he has ears, then you may think that he is Smerdis son of Cyrus who is your lord; but if he has none, it is Smerdis the Magian.' Phaedyme answered by messenger that she would run very great risk by so doing; for if it should turn out that he had no ears, and she were caught uncovering him, he would surely make an end of her; nevertheless she would do it. So she promised to achieve her father's bidding. It is known that Cyrus son of Cambyses had in his reign cut off the ears of this Magian, Smerdis, for some grave reason—I know not what. So Phaedyme, daughter of Otanes, performed her promise to her father. When it was her turn to visit the Magian (as a Persian's wives come in regular order to their lord), she came to his bed, and uncovered the Magian's ears while he slumbered deeply; and having with much care assured herself that he had no ears, she sent and told this to her father as soon as it was morning.

I may pass over, no doubt, the remainder of the tale, since it will be familiar to my readers. The discovery leads to the slaying of the impostor and the election of Dareios, a member of the legitimate dynasty. Herodotus and many later authors add that the killing of the false Smerdis was celebrated, annually, by the Persians, the feast being called *Magophonia*. During that

time no member of the Magi caste was allowed to show himself in the streets; all Magi had to conceal themselves carefully in the interior of their houses. According to these accounts, we are dealing with a sort of national holiday, comparable to the American 4th of July or the French 14th of July.³ True, there have not been wanting objections to such an interpretation of the ancient texts.⁴ Yet it must be admitted that from a nationalistic angle it is difficult to find fault with the narrative of the Father of History. Incredible and romanesque as it sounds in places, universal history can show many a close parallel. In particular, Oriental palace revolutions have brought on strange things. To quote an obvious example: in the stirring times of the Califate of Cordoba practically every king-maker, planning to promote some pretender of his own choice, began by invoking the testimony of the ladies of the royal harem, and they never failed to respond to the emergency call and to state, most solemnly and emphatically, that the pretender was indeed the true calif, quite wrongly thought dead long since. It is only by the comparative method that one may hope to approach the solution of the problem, and from this point of view the legend of Solomon and Ashmodai, from which we started, throws a peculiar light upon the account of Herodotus.

Nor is this all. One of the most incredible facts reported there is the mass murder of the Magi:⁵

The Persians, when they heard from the seven what had been done and how the Magians had tricked them, resolved to follow the example set, and drew their daggers and slew all the Magians they could find; and if nightfall had not stayed them they would

³ F. Spiegel, *Erânische Altertumskunde*, Leipzig, 1871-78, II, 310; III, 586-708; *Encyclopædia Britannica*, XXV, 23 (E. Meyer).

⁴ J. Marquart, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte von Eran*, Göttingen, 1896-1905, I, 64; II, 132 and 135; Prášek, *Geschichte der Meder und Perser*, Gotha, 1906-10, II, 140; Christiansen, *L'Empire des Sassanides*, Copenhagen, 1907, pp. 15 f.

⁵ Herodotus, III. 79: οἱ δὲ Πέρσαι μαθόντες τὸ γεγονός ἐκ τῶν ἐπτὰ καὶ τῶν Μάγων τὴν ἀπάτην, ἐδικαίευν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔτερα τοιαῦτα ποιέειν, σπασάμενοι δὲ τὰ ἐγχειρίδια ἔκτεινον ὅκου τινὰ Μάγον εὑρισκούντες εἰ δὲ μὴ νῦξ ἐπελθοῦσα ἔσχε, ἔλιπον δὲ οὐδένα Μάγον. ταῦτην τὴν ἡμέρην θεραπεύοντες Πέρσαι κοινῇ μάλιστα τῶν ἡμερέων, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ὅρτὴν μεγάλην ἀνάγουσι, ἢ κέκληται ὑπὸ Περσέων μαγοφόνια· ἐν τῷ Μάγον οὐδένα ἔχεστι φανῆναι ἐς τὸ φῶς, ἀλλὰ κατ' οἶκους ἐωντούς οἱ Μάγοι ἔχουσι τὴν ἡμέρην ταῦτην.

not have left one Magian alive. This day is the greatest holiday that all Persians alike keep; they celebrate a great festival on it, which they call the Massacre of the Magians; while the festival lasts no Magian may come abroad, but during this day they remain in their houses.

As will be seen, it is a piquant story of horrors but—since the Magi were the priestly caste of Persia—too good to be true. It reminds us, however, of another, quite similar one, hailing from the same general region, namely Mesopotamia, to wit, the story of the beautiful Esther. The resemblance between the two is indeed striking: in both it is a question of a mass murder. To begin with, Haman, as a true Anti-Semite, would like to have all Jews in the Persian Empire slain. Then all of a sudden the tables are turned, and King Xerxes now permits all Jews to kill their enemies, his own subjects, a permission of which they avail themselves with the greatest glee. This glorious feat is celebrated, year after year, in the so-called feast of Purim, which thus corresponds to the Magophonia. And back of it all there lurks again a typically Oriental harem story.

The historicity of the *Book of Esther* is no longer believed in by any one, if one excepts the American Fundamentalists. On the contrary, scholars have recognised, in this curious narrative, an ancient cult legend, developed, in the course of centuries, out of the Mesopotamian ritual of the Sacaea, the Babylonian New Year's celebration. According to all appearances, there was a custom of appointing two kings of the Saturnalia, or rather of the Sacaea, Haman and Mordecai, of whom the one was put to death at the end of the holiday season, whilst the other, dressed in royal garments, was paraded through the city, perhaps only to share, in the following year, the fate of his companion. Each of these two mock-kings had a female companion, a queen (Vashti and Esther), of whom again the one was rejected, while the other was proclaimed queen of the Sacaea. Whatever may be thought about the details of this ritual, it is certain that the *Book of Esther* owes its origin to the ancient and widespread custom of the Saturnalia kingship. The murder of the Persian Anti-Semites has no historical foundation whatever, but is to be explained by the ritual of a gay carnival or New Year's Eve celebration, when mannequins and masks, the representatives of the Old Year, were killed wholesale, while blood, in the form

of sweet wine and other anti-prohibition drinks, was flowing in torrents. This is the real meaning of the Jewish Purim, a child of the Babylonian Sacaea.⁶ The story of Esther is a cult legend, grown out of an ancient feast, the true meaning of which had been forgotten, and is designed, aetiological, to explain some of its δρώμενα.

Let us now return to the magophonia and the legend of Solomon and Ashmodai. In both narratives mention is made of a king who has usurped the place of the legitimate monarch (Cambyses and Solomon). In both the fraud is discovered by the ladies of the harem (or one of their number). The impostor is thereupon slain or driven out by the 'conspirators', and his companions and associates, the members of his caste, are slain, at least in the Persian story, since in the Jewish one Ashmodai, as a supernatural being, needs no helpers and is, of course, invulnerable. Finally, the rightful monarch (or his legitimate successor) is reinstated.

There is no need, in this connexion, to discuss anew the historicity of the Persian tale: the solution proposed by Prof. Gray,⁷ namely, that the false Smerdis was slain on the occasion of a tumultuous New Year's celebration, is indeed most plausible. Such festivities have always furthered conspiracies because of their democratic and popular character, to which even Oriental despots had to submit, and because the free use of masks would naturally throw down the barriers between king and aristocracy. I might only add, since Prof. Gray has not discussed the matter, that the rôle of the ladies in the false Smerdis' harem most probably belongs to the cult legend and not to history. For apart from the unlikelihood that a common offender, one who had lost his ears by the knife of the hangman, should have had the courage and an opportunity of mounting the throne (since his followers would thereby have exposed themselves quite unnecessarily to great dangers, thanks to the relatively easy discovery of the fraud), it is altogether significant that in Herodotus' narrative the impostor is indeed such a common offender. The reason is, obviously, that the king of the Saturnalia-Sacaea was as a rule a criminal, put to death at the close of the festival. The discovery of the fraud by a lady of the harem was therefore very probably

⁶ Cf. Sir James G. Frazer, *The Scapegoat*, London, 1913, pp. 354 ff.

⁷ Hastings' *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, V, 874 f.

one of the *δρώμενα* of the ritual, the more so because we definitely know that during the Saturnalia-Sacaea the royal harem was turned over to the temporary or mock-king. Thus the episode entered the account relating the historical conspiracy of Dareios. This conclusion is certainly confirmed by the Jewish parallel, the 'conspiracy' against the impostor Ashmodai, a conspiracy that no one would be tempted to regard as in any way historical.

One more objection must be removed. It is, of course, possible, on the strength of the chronology, to see in the Jewish legend but a weak copy of the Persian palace revolution as related by Herodotus. For throughout Hellenistic times Persians and Jews lived peacefully together, in the plains of Mesopotamia, and Zoroastrian influences have repeatedly been detected in post-exilic Judaism. Nonetheless I believe such a theory quite untenable, for the following reasons. Even a superficial comparison of the Jewish and Persian legends creates an impression that the former is more original, more archaic. The demon who assumes Solomon's shape to enter Solomon's palace and harem and to mount Solomon's throne, is in every respect more colourful, more genuine, more true to type than the miserable Magian who passes himself off for the dead Smerdis. The devil's foot of the rabbinical texts, which Ashmodai carefully conceals, is more purely legendary than the missing ears of the poor wretch in Herodotus' account. Let us add, finally, the vital motive of the demon's attempted incest, a trait that would have no sense whatever in the Persian, since according to the Zoroastrian religion marriages among the closest relatives not only were not regarded as reprehensible but on the contrary were considered highly meritorious. Herodotus himself relates, for example, and as a matter of course, how Smerdis cohabited with his own sister Atossa. If one wanted to derive the legend of Solomon and Ashmodai from the Persian story, one would be driven to conclude that a genuine, old demon legend was developed out of a strictly rational and rationalistic historical narrative. Such a development would be unique in the realm of folk-lore, since ordinarily it is precisely the reverse that takes place; it may therefore be regarded as rather unlikely.

The parallels quoted in this study have, I believe, put in our hands the true key of the story of Solomon and Ashmodai. There is indeed no reason whatever to suppose with H. Varn-

hagen⁸ an Indian tale to be responsible for it. That great German scholar, in the last century, thought of the well-known tale of the soul-shifter, the hunchback who puts his own soul into the body of his king and then assumes the royal rôle, until unmasked by the queen, who is not slow in discovering that in her husband's royal body dwells the soul of a plebeian! I need not here refute in detail this ingenious hypothesis. After all, the only thing the Indian story has in common with the Jewish legend of Solomon and Ashmodai is the fact that an impostor has taken the place of an exiled king and that the queen discovers the fraud, resemblances that can hardly be called particularly far-reaching. True enough, the Jewish Solomon Cycle has indeed absorbed a certain number of elements clearly of Indian origin.⁹ Yet the central theme, our story of Solomon and Ashmodai, hails from the Near East and is but a Jewish variant derived from an ancient Mesopotamian cult legend, explaining, aetiologically, a New Year's ritual.

Since in studies of this nature it is always useful, whenever possible, to check up on the results obtained, it may not be amiss to do so in this case. Supposing that our key is the right one, one would naturally conclude that the Solomon Cycle, preserved in nearly a hundred Slavonic and Occidental texts, all going back to the Middle Ages, should still contain some traces clearly indicative of its origin and development as outlined in the preceding pages. Such is indeed the case.

As is well known, the legend of Solomon and Ashmodai was carried from its Oriental home to Byzantium and thence to Yugoslavs and Russians. The Slavs, strangely enough, rendered the name of the demon, Ashmodai, by *Kitovras*. This name has been shown, by no less a man than the great Russian scholar Alexander Veselofsky,¹⁰ to be but the Slavonic transcription of the Greek *Kérvavpos*, a fact admitting only of one conclusion, namely, that it was the Byzantines who replaced the Persian demon Ashmodai, little known to them, by the infinitely more

⁸ *Ein indisches Märchen auf seiner Wanderung durch die asiatischen und europäischen Literaturen*, Berlin, 1882.

⁹ Cf. *Mitteilungen der Schlesischen Gesellschaft für Volkskunde*, XXXI, 148-50.

¹⁰ *Solomon and Kentauros* (in Russian), Petersburg, 1872; cf. André Mazon, *Revue des études slaves*, VII (1927), pp. 42-62.

familiar centaur. But why by a centaur? Modern Greek folklore furnishes an easy answer to this query. The Ancient Greek centaurs are not dead but as alive as ever in the Greek countryside, though under the name of *Καλλικάντζαροι*, as was shown by J. C. Lawson in an excellent book.¹¹ These *Καλλικάντζαροι* are New Year's demons, that is, they appear exclusively during the time of the year that corresponds to the famous 'Twelve Nights' of Central and Northern Europe. This means that at the time when the Solomon legend was taken over by the Byzantines, its ritual and purely cultic origin had not yet been forgotten; otherwise expressed, Ashmodai still had about him the features and general nature of a New Year's demon, the character of the old king of the *Sacaea*.

This result had been reached when I got hold of the valuable book of M. Georges Dumézil on the Centaurs.¹² To his discussion of the Old Persian New Year,¹³ entirely in harmony with the view-point of Prof. Gray, must be added an extremely important quotation from the Arabic chronicler Albîrunî, apt to remove the last doubt concerning the origin of the legend of Solomon and Ashmodai:¹⁴

A philosopher of the Ḥashwiyya school relates that when Solomon the son of David had lost his seal and his empire, but was reinstated after 40 days, he at once regained his former majesty, the princes came before him, and the birds were busy in his service. Then the Persians said, 'Naurôz āmadh,' i. e. the new day has come. Therefore that day was called Naurôz.

'Naurôz' is the Persian 'New Year'!

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¹¹ *Modern Greek Folklore and Ancient Greek Religion*, Cambridge, 1910.

¹² *Le Problème des Centaures*, Paris, 1929.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 55 ff.

¹⁴ *The Chronology of Ancient Nations*, transl. Sachau, 1879, p. 199; cf. Dumézil, p. 272. It is of interest to note that in the last century James Darmesteter considered possible a Persian origin of the legend of Solomon (cf. his work *Le Zend-Avesta*, II (Paris, 1892), p. 624). Yet he did not draw on the obvious parallel contained in the work of Herodotus but only on the Persian Yima legend.

ON SUETONIUS' LIFE OF TERENCE.

[The generally accepted view that Terence was a Numidian is due to an error regarding the early meaning of *Afer*.]

Publius Terentius Afer Carthagine natus seruuiuit Romae Terentio Lucano senatori, a quo ob ingenium et formam non institutus modo liberaliter, sed et mature manu missus est. quidam captum esse existimant; quod fieri nullo modo potuisse Fenestella docet, cum inter finem secundi Punici belli et initium tertii <et> natus sit et mortuus, nec, si a Numidis uel Gaetulis captus sit, ad ducem Romanum peruenire potuisse, nullo commercio inter Italicos et Afros nisi post deletam Carthaginem coepito.

This passage, found in the *Vita Terentii* of Donatus,¹ who explicitly attributes it to Suetonius, shows that there was some discussion in the Augustan age about the origin and provenience of Terence. Baehrens, who did not carefully study the semantic history of the word *Afer*, wrote a plausible article about the *Vita* in *Neue Jahrb.*, 1881, p. 401, reaching the erroneous conclusion that Terence's cognomen proved him a non-Punic Libyan; and Baehrens has been followed by Schanz,² Leo, Hauler, Ussani, Terzaghi, Duff, and many others. This incorrect, though orthodox, view is found most conveniently stated in Schanz-Hosius, fourth ed., p. 103: "Mit *Afri* werden die den Puniern gegenüberstehenden libyschen Stämme bezeichnet (he quotes Livy, 30, 33, 5; 28, 14, 4; 28, 14, 19, all from the time of Augustus). Terenz war also kein Punier, sondern gehörte, trotz seiner Geburt in Karthago, einer der abhängigen Völkerschaften an."

Now to disentangle the snarled threads of that paragraph in Suetonius we need first to point out that in the days of Terence

¹ Wessner's edition of Donatus, I; Suetonius, ed. Roth, p. 292.

² See Schanz-Hosius, *Röm. Lit.*, I, 103; Leo, *Gesch. röm. Lit.*, p. 233: "libyscher Sklave"; Hauler, *Phormio*, p. 12: "gehörte einer der den Karthagern unterworfenen . . . Völkerschaften an"; Ussani, *Storia della Letteratura Latina*, 1929, p. 143: "da famiglia non punica già ma libica"; Terzaghi, *Prolegomeni a Terenzio*, p. 28: "un africano libico"; Duff, *A Lit. Hist. of Rome*, p. 203: "His cognomen 'Afer' . . . suggests that he belonged to some native tribe conquered by the Carthaginians."

the word *Afer* meant any one from the Libyan corner of Africa *including Carthage*. Naturally, after Carthage was destroyed in 146, the word *perforce* came to be restricted to those who were left in that region, i. e. to Numidians and Gaetulians. In the days of Cicero and Livy this restricted meaning had become so generally accepted that Roman writers now carefully distinguished between *Poeni* and *Afri* even when narrating events of Hannibal's day. It was the failure to notice this semantic change that led to confusion in Fenestella's day and which has led our scholars astray ever since Baehrens wrote his essay.

The proof of the fact that Carthaginians were called *Afri* before 146 B. C. must rest on a few references because the literature of the period is slight; but these few references are decisive. Scipio *Africanus* took his honorary cognomen from his victory over Hannibal and the Carthaginians; the Romans designated their province *Africa* when it covered only Punic territory; Plautus (*Poen.*, 1304) calls a Punic woman *hanc amatricem Africam*; and in a fragment of the *Caecus*, where he says *Afer est*, he must mean *Poenus*, for we can hardly suppose that a Numidian would have a part in a Greek or Roman play of his time. Horace, in *Carm.*, 4, 4, 42, where he is using old sources, refers to Hannibal as the *dirus Afer* (cf. also *Sil. Ital.*, 4, 722) and in *Carm.*, 2, 1, 25, alluding to Juno's love for Carthage, he says: *Juno et deorum quisquis amicior Afris*. Finally Cicero, in *de Rep.*, frag. inc. 7 (ed. B-K), speaks of the *foedifragos Afros*,³ where the traditional adjective shows that he refers to Carthage. Suetonius gives without any hesitation the fact that Terence was born at Carthage. And that is of course the reason why he later bore the cognomen *Afer*.

³This phrase comes from the tenth-century scholia (Pseudo-Acorn) on Horace, *Carm.*, 4, 8, 17: *etiam Cicero in dialogis foedifragos dixit Afros*. It was customary in older editions to include it among the fragments of the *de Republica*, but Müller and Ziegler preferred to omit it. However it seems to me especially apposite to the *de Republica* not only because it fits the theme of the discussion, but also because it has the archaic tone that would suit a conversation cast in the year 129 B. C. with Scipio Aemilianus as the chief speaker. I should therefore suggest that we restore the fragment to that dialogue. It is quite significant that when writing the *de Officiis* (1, 38) Cicero uses the phraseology of his own day and says *foedifragos Poenos*.

Now let us examine the rest of the Suetonian passage to see how the Augustan writers floundered over this error. Suetonius says: "Some think he was captured" (i. e. stolen from Carthage by "Afri"), "but Fenestella shows us that this could not be, because Terence was born and died between the Second and the Third Punic War; nor could he, if captured by Numidians or Gaetulians, have come to a Roman master, since there was no *commercium* between Italici and Afri until after the destruction of Carthage." In the first place it is clear that some writers (quidam), aware only of the later use of the word *Afer*, invented a hypothesis that Terence had been captured by Numidians or Gaetulians. They invented it in order to explain his cognomen. This "capture" was a mere hypothesis which neither Fenestella nor Suetonius believed. Apparently no early source had it, and, as we know from Suetonius, several men had written on Terence fairly early (i. e. Porcius Licinus and Volcatius, not to mention Varro, Santra, and Nepos). We need therefore pay no attention to this guess.

Then what of Fenestella? Like most of his Augustan contemporaries he also fell into the error of supposing the word *Afer* always had the restricted connotation of his late day. But he undertook to refute the guess about a "capture by Numidians," and in doing this recorded an interesting fact. Erroneously supposing that the *Afri* were necessarily non-Punic, he investigated the sources to find out when these "Afri" (i. e. Massinissa and his people, as he assumed) had a trading treaty with Rome. He found that they had none until after 146. That is to say, Rome had given Massinissa a political treaty without any clause granting *commercium*. The trading clause was not inserted in the Numidian treaty till Carthage fell, that is, it was given to Micipsa after Massinissa died. Now this is wholly plausible, and it is an important fact. But of course it has far less to do with Terence than Fenestella supposed; for Terence, as we have seen, was born at Carthage and came by his cognomen by virtue of that fact. There is no proof—except in the erroneous late interpretation of his name—that he ever was in Numidian hands.

How Terence was brought to Italy from Carthage we are not told. We do not know much about trade relations⁴ between

⁴ See Gsell, *Hist. anc. de l'Afrique du Nord*, IV, 150.

Italy and Carthage from 201 to 146. The treaty signed in 201 is briefly summarized in Polybius, 15, 18, and is probably incomplete. We do not hear of a commercial clause in it, but that is not conclusive. Archaeology also tells us little. Trebius Loisius, a South Italian or Sicilian, who had dealings in Delos about 162, traded very widely. Jars marked with his name have been found at Drepanum, Syracuse, and several other Sicilian sites, also at Tarentum, and *one* has been discovered at Carthage.⁵ Of course that Carthaginian jar may have supplied wine to a ship's crew; it does not actually prove trade. But whether or not Italians traded at Carthage at this time, it is not likely that Rome forbade her allies to trade there. Rome had little interest in commerce in those days, but her Ambracian treaty shows that she was ready to help rather than hinder her allies.⁶ At any rate Greek traders had the right to put in at Carthage and they may well have carried slaves from Carthage to Italian ports.⁷ There is actually no reason for doubting that a slave boy could have been brought to Italy from Carthage.

We must then hold to the statement of Suetonius that Terence was born at Carthage; and he had his cognomen from Carthage. We may then jettison the statements usually made since the days of Baehrens that Terence was a Numidian. Perhaps it matters little to what race Terence belonged. If we care to consider probabilities, however, we may say this. If Terence was born at Carthage about 195 B. C.⁸ as a slave (i. e. the son of a slave woman), it is not improbable that his mother was one of Hannibal's Italian captives, for Italy was the chief source of Carthaginian slaves during the Second Punic War.⁹ She may

⁵ *C. I. L.*, I², 425.

⁶ Polybius, 22, 13.

⁷ We know nothing about the senator Terentius Lucanus, who bought Terence and manumitted him. His cognomen suggests that he may have spent much of his time on estates in Lucania. Hence he may well have bought the slave at some southern port.

⁸ Since Fenestella says that Terence was older than Scipio and Laelius, it is now usual to follow the manuscripts of Suetonius that give Terence's age at death as thirty-five.

⁹ Hannibal took an immense number of captives in Italy between 218 and 204 and had free access to the Carthaginian market after 213. There had been little warfare between Carthage and Numidians since 238; hence the probabilities are very much in favor of Italy as a source for Punic slaves at this time.

have been an Italic Greek, a Lucanian, a Campanian, or of some other Italic tribe. Since Terence knew his Greek well, we might the more readily assume an Italiote Greek mother. It is even possible that he was born of free Punic parents and kidnapped for the market. There are, in fact, several possibilities; but the least likely hypothesis of them all is that he was of Berber stock. That guess is due simply to a failure to trace the semantics of the word *Afer*.

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THE OSCAN INSCRIPTIONS OF TRICARICO AND ANZI.

The inscription on the front of an altar found near Tricarico in Lucania is given as follows by Buck (no. 64^a, p. 369; earlier discussions by F. Ribezzo, *Neapolis* i [1913], 389-394 [with photograph], 397-398, and *Rivista indo-greca-italica* viii [1924], 89-92; G. Herbig, *Philologus* lxxiii [1916], 449-461; Bursian's *Jahresbericht* clxxvi [1918], 43, clxxxiv [1921], 172-173, ccv [1925], 68-69) :

| | |
|-------------------------|--|
| Κλοφατς Γαυκιες | Clovatus Gaucius [sacellum] <aediculam> |
| Οφιοι μετσεδ πεhε- | Ovio <patri> ex meddicio pio |
| δ Φλουσοι ο αφακετ | Floro dedicat <instituit (facere)> |
| αυτι οφατοφε Κλο- | at <extruit Ovius> |
| φατης πλαμετοδ | Clovati <(filius) quam (ipse) meddix dicat> ¹ |

The translation of *μετσεδ πεhεδ* (2) by 'ex meddicio pio' seems somewhat doubtful. I would see here, rather, two verbs. *μετσεδ* looks like an aorist-perfect in *-s-* (despite § 222), comparable, for the determinant *-t-*, with Latin *mēto* 'measure'. The vocalism, however, is difficult. One would expect *μειτσεδ = *mítsed (cf. μεδδειξ = meddiss, § 24) unless the vowel here is the same as in Greek *μέ-τρον* 'measure' from the identical Indo-European base *mē- (cf., for material, Walde-Pokorny, *VWIS* i, 237, Berlin, 1930-32). Since *η* and *ε* are not used to indicate quantity in Oscan inscriptions written in Greek letters (§ 24), it is just possible that *ε* here represents *ē*, an older period in Oscan than the change of *ē* to *í*, *íí*, and still on the Latin-Umbrian stage of *e*. *πεhεδ* is apparently a simple non-reduuplicated perfect (§ 224), comparable in vocalism with Marrucinian *peai* 'piae'.

With *αφακετ* (3) one compares *ανασακετ* (no. 66) = *anfaked

¹ The words in < > are supplied by Ribezzo, who reads σακ<ρακλα_m> after Γαυκιες in 1, and παα<μ> μετ.δ. in 5. References to §§ here are to C. D. Buck, *A Grammar of Oscan and Umbrian*, new ed., Boston [1928]. Herbig translates: 'Clovatus Caucius Pl. (filius) caulam (templum, aediculam) Jovio (Divo) ex *meddicio pio Floro (Caucio) O. (filio) dedicat (consecrat, instituit); apud sacellum autem Clovati (Cauci) Pl. (fili) ambito (ambiunto)'.

(§§ 80. 2, 224), except that the former is probably for **ad-fakēd* (for *ε ~ ε* cf. above on *μετσεδ*), and corresponds to Latin *affēcit* (for the writing of *d-f* as *f*, cf. Oscan *aflukad*, *aflakus*, §§ 139, 299).

ofatōfē (4), if explicable as **ofatov-ē*, would seem to be a noun of the fourth declension in the locative (add, accordingly, to § 184?) corresponding to Latin *affātus*, but with *a > o* before the labial (cf. § 86). On this hypothesis, *ē = ex* would be a postposition (though no parallel instance is recorded in Italic), and the locative would be used instead of the ablative (for the reverse phenomenon of the 'ablative of place where' cf. Oscan *Búvaiānūd* 'at Bovianum' [§ 298]).

πλαμετόδ (5) is almost certainly an imperative, **p(a)lamētōd*, and may be borrowed from Greek *παλαμάομαι* 'manage, work, bring about'.

The following translation may, accordingly, be suggested for the inscription: 'Clovatus Gaucius [sacellum] Ovio mensus est (et) piavit, Floro affecit, at ex affatu Clovati efficito.'

The 'titulus Anxianus' (von Planta, no. 16, Conway, no. 22), with Ribezzo's latest rendering, runs thus (discussions by R. von Planta, *Grammatik der oskisch-umbrischen Dialekte*, ii, 598-599, Strasbourg, 1892-97; Ribezzo, *Neapolis* i, 385-389, 394-397 [with photograph], and *RIGI* viii, 92-95; T. Grienberger, *Glotta* xiii [1924], 65-71, and *KZ* lvi [1929], 35-36; J. B. Hofmann, *Stand und Aufgaben der Sprachwissenschaft*, 389, Heidelberg, 1924; Bursian, clxxvi, 43, ccv, 69-70):

| | |
|---|---|
| <i>πωτ</i> <i>φολ-</i> | Quando tu voglia entrare |
| <i>λοήωμ</i> <i>σορο-</i> | in questo sepulcro a camera, |
| <i>ρωμ</i> <i>ειν</i> <i>καπιδιτ-</i> | agl' Inferi splenderà (lux |
| <i>ωμ</i> <i>καήας</i> <i>λεικειτ</i> <i>κω<μ></i> | lucebit), si tu istud gratum |
| .. <i>αχερηι</i> <i>λιοκακειτ</i> <i>σφα<i></i> | meae (uxori, animae?) dicaveris. ² |
| .. <i>μ</i> <i>εσοτ</i> <i>βρατωμ</i> <i>μειαι</i> <i>ανα..</i> | |

πωτ (1) apparently introduces the clause which depends on *λεικειτ* (4) = **líkit* (for *ε = i* cf. above on *μετσεδ*) as in Early Latin (e. g. Lucilius 835: 'quod te intro misi, gratiam referat mihi'; cf. Stolz-Schmalz, *Lateinische Grammatik*⁵, 720, Munich,

² Grienberger translates: 'quod [est] volvum (volutum), sorvum (sertum) et capiditum (capide conditum) capias licet ? sic eo gratum (fit) meae animae'.

1928). *φολλοῖωμ* (scarcely to be read *φολλοφωμ*) would seem to be from **υολ-νο-ḡo-m* or **υολ-νo-ḡo-m*, i. e. **υo/el- + -no-* (cf. Greek *εῖλω*, *εἰλέω* 'roll' <**fελ-ν(ε)ω*, *εἰλεός* 'intestinal obstruction, kind of vine' <**fελ-ν-εφος* [Boisacq, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque*, 223, Paris, 1916], Sanskrit *vāṇá* 'arrow, reed', and, with another grade of the base, Sanskrit *valana-* 'act of turning'; cf. Walde-Pokorny, i, 298-304)³ + *-ḡo-* or *-gho-* (cf. the denominatives Anglo-Saxon *á-wielgan*, Old High German *wal(a)gōn* 'roll' [H. Falk and A. Torp, *Norwegisch-dänisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*, 1345, Heidelberg, 1910-11]). The meaning of the Oscan word would seem to be 'fornicatus, vaulted'.

σοροφωμ (2) looks like a loan-word from a Greek **σοροφον* <*σορός* 'cinerary urn'; *καπιδιωμ* may be a formation from **καπίδ-* = Latin *capid-* 'bowl'. In *εν . . . κahas* (3-4) and *κω<μ> . . . λιοκακειτ* (4-5) I incline to see tmeses of the type of Latin *ob vos sacro, circum dea fudit* (cf. A. Meillet and J. Vendryes, *Traité de grammaire comparée des langues classiques*, 521-522, Paris, 1924). *λιοκακειτ* is obscure in formation and meaning alike. On the whole, it would seem to be a perfect in *-nki-* (hitherto recorded only in Umbrian; cf. § 229), with *n* omitted (cf. § 108. 2), with *ιo* = *o* (cf. *Διονφει* = *Iōvi*; cf. § 24; and for the glide-*i*, § 56), and with *-ειτ* = *-id* for *τ* = *d*, cf. *πωτ* above, and for *i*, Old Latin *posedeit, fuueit, redieit*, Stolz-Schmalz, 337-338). The only detailed discussion of the word is by von Planta (i, 10, 127, 129-130, 479-480; ii, 275, 350-351, 353, 366, 599); on the whole, it appears to correspond to Latin *locavit*, despite the difficulty caused by Old Latin *stlocus* (one would expect *st* to be retained; cf. § 114). I would, accordingly, translate the two verbs by 'incipias, collocavit' (but what is the subject of the latter?).

. . . *αχερηι* (5) is apparently the mutilated name of the person for whom the tomb was constructed; all that can safely be said of it seems to be that it is a dative singular of the third declension. The lacunae . . *μ* and *ανα* . . . (6) I suggest filling with *συλω>μ* = *sulúm* (cf. the Oscan spellings *sulum*, *suluh*) and

³ Latin *vallus* 'stake, pale', Greek *ἢλος* 'nail', *γάλλοι·ἢλοι* (Hesychios), *οὐλος* 'curly' are ambiguous, since their formative may be *-so-* rather than *-no-* (Boisacq, 321-322, 727; A. Ernout and A. Meillet, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine*, 1030, Paris, 1932).

ava<μαι (for *a* cf. *anamúm*, Buck, no. 40², 5; and for the meaning 'beloved, darling', Horace, *Odes* III, ix, 12; Cicero, *ad Famil.* xiv, 14); and the spelling *εοτ* is to be compared with *εεί* instead of *εεί* (Cippus Abellanus 49).

The inscription may, accordingly, be translated: 'quod forniciatum cinerarium ollarium incipias, licet; . . . acheri collocavit [quis?] si omne id gratum (erit) [=ut omne id gratum sit?] meae animae [=carissimae?]'.

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REPORTS.

PHILOLOGUS, LXXXVII (N. F. XLI), 1932.

Pp. 1-17. Friedrich Solmsen, *Zur Gestaltung des Intriguenmotivs in den Tragödien des Sophokles und Euripides*. By intrigues the author means plots devised by the characters. In Euripides these plots involve the use of deceit; they are designed to further the personal ambitions of the plotter, and outwit his opponents. Plots of this kind were a novelty in the Euripidean tragedy. In the early plays of Sophocles such plots do not appear, in the later plays such intrigues are shown to be inconsistent with a truly noble soul. The difference between the two dramatists involves no polemic purpose.

Pp. 18-39. A. D. Knox, *The Early Iambus*. An elaborate examination of the evidence shows that the technique of the early writers of iambic differed from that of the dramatists. It is perhaps well to keep the ancient division into comic, tragic, and iambic, although the Attic tragedians may have been influenced by the early iambic to some extent. It is pointed out that all early Ionian iambists avoid verses in which there are at the end of the verse exactly three word breaks, and that where there is a true second caesura, the ending 2:3 does not occur. The exceptions to this all follow a pause. From this emerges a general rule that such a pause (a) annihilates the effect of an ensuing minor pause, (b) that such annihilation extends over monosyllables and dissyllables at least to five syllables.

Pp. 40-62. Kurt v. Fritz, *Platon, Theaetet und die antike Mathematik*. A series of objections to the conclusions reached by F. Solmsen. An analysis of the principles of early Greek mathematics shows that Solmsen's theories are inexact. The article is continued on a later page.

Pp. 63-79. Karl Barwick, *Zur Kompositionstechnik und Erklärung Martials*. Some of Martial's longer epigrams may be divided into parts, each of which has a unity of its own, although the parts, when taken together, form a higher unity. The interpretation of the epigrams may be facilitated by observing the relative positions which they occupy in the text.

Pp. 80-113. Jos. Schnetz, *Neue Beiträge zur Erklärung und Kritik des Textes der Ravennatischen Kosmographie*. The so-called Geographer of Ravenna composed, some time after 700 A. D., a cosmography which exists in two manuscripts. The present article considers the physical appearance of the map used in this treatise, and attempts to elucidate several vexed questions of interpretation and text.

Pp. 114-120. Miszellen. Pp. 114-117. Bernhard Bischoff, *Zu Plautus und Festus*. An anonymous letter preserved in the Bamberg Chalcidius Codex makes several allusions to Plautus

which can have come only from Festus. Pp. 117-120. Eduard Fraenkel, *Das Original der Cistellaria des Plautus*. The evidence of the Bamberg Codex proves that the original of the Cistellaria was Menander's *Συναριστῶσαι*.

Pp. 121-135. Karl Praechter, *Platon und Euthydemos*. Euthydemus was a historical personage who wrote a book of sophistic subtleties. This book was used by Plato for his dialogue, although the arrangement of the arguments is due entirely to the literary skill of Plato.

Pp. 136-178. Kurt v. Fritz, *Platon, Theaetet, und die antike Mathematik*. Conclusion of the preceding article, pp. 40-62. It is here contended that Plato must have known the demonstration which proves that there are only five regular figures. His mathematics cannot, then, as Solmsen thinks, have rejected demonstrational proof. There is good reason to believe that Theaetetus himself discovered the demonstration regarding the five figures. An analysis of Plato's thought is given in order to show the error in Solmsen's statement that mathematics at the time when the sixth book of the Republic was composed had not yet learned to define its fundamental terms. In general it is also shown that Solmsen's views regarding the specific contributions of Theaetetus and Plato need correction.

Pp. 179-228. Rudolf Pfeiffer, *ΒΕΠΕΝΙΚΗΣ ΠΛΟΚΑΜΟΣ*. The recently discovered fragment of Callimachus' poem is analyzed, and with this as a guide, many suggestions are made regarding the text and the interpretation of Catullus' version of it. Catullus is shown to have followed the original very closely; whenever he introduced variations it was because of the exigencies of the verse. The original is a work of literary art, the translation a sort of technical study. The article closes with some general observations about Callimachus' work.

Pp. 229-241. Werner Peek, *Zu griechischen Epigrammen*. Textual criticism and reconstruction of several recently published epigrams.

Pp. 242-248. Eduard Fraenkel, *Vergil und die Aithiopis*. Vergil may well have drawn material from the Aethiopis, either directly or through the medium of extracts.

Pp. 249-260. Gustav Meyer, *Prudentiana*. It is not enough to construct the text of Prudentius on the basis of the older manuscripts, since the more recent ones sometimes offer better readings. This can be demonstrated by the prosody and by the characteristic style of the author. The article is continued on a later page.

Pp. 261-264. Miszellen. Pp. 261-263. Eduard Schwartz, *Noch einmal über Assyrien und Syrien*. Correction of certain views expressed in *Philologus*, 86, pp. 373, ff. Comparison of

Herodotus with Persian inscriptions shows that Babylon and northern Mesopotamia were united in a satrapy which was counted as the ninth. The separation of the two mentioned by Xenophon represents a later change. Pp. 263-264. Werner Keil, *Sosylos aus Elis?* A slight change in the text of Diodorus makes it probable that Sosylus, author of the life of Hannibal, came from Elis. P. 264. Hans Bogner, *Zu Sophokles, König Ödipus 876 ff.* Read ἀκροτάταν εἰσανθάσ' ἀπότομον ὥρωντεν εἰς ἀνάκαν, and interpret: "the tyrant, who has climbed to the highest peak, rushes upward, and plunges himself into steep difficulty", i. e. he climbs so high that he can no longer find a place for his feet.

Pp. 265-276. Kurt Latte, *Randbemerkungen*. 1. In the closing as well as in the opening chapter of his *Germania*, Tacitus has followed the conventional pattern of the geographical essay. 2. The passage in Petronius 57, 4 is to be compared with Tacitus, *Annals*, 12, 53. The passages show the scorn with which the Roman aristocracy regarded the freedmen. 3. In Vergil, *Catalepton* 10, 20, for *proximumque* read *buximumque*. 4. The date of the seventh poem of Calpurnius is to be set at the end of Nero's reign. 5. In the Prophecy of Vegoia (Lachmann-Rudorff, *Schriften d. röm. Feldmesser I* 350) for *scias mare ex aethera remotum* read *scias mare e terra remotum*. The date is about 88. 6. The first part of the Law of Numa as given in Festus 190, 8 L. has a parallel in the *lex Rothari* of the Lombards, although no literary connection is to be assumed between the two. 7. The word *dióva* in Bacchylides 16, 112 appears also in manuscripts of the Christian era. It means a kind of linen garment, and the word as well as the garment may have been borrowed from Egypt. 8. Observations on the text of Julian's letters. 9. The source of Hippolytus' attack on the magicians may have been Celsus.

Pp. 277-299. Elias Bickermann, *Rom und Lampsakos*. This discussion is based on the Hegesias inscription. The technical terminology of the inscription is explained, and so is the Roman practice in making treaties. The Lampsacans were mistaken in supposing themselves included in the treaty with Rome; the mistake arose from their faulty knowledge of Roman law and Roman practice in international affairs.

Pp. 300-331. Annelise Modrzejewski, *Zur Ethik und Psychologie des Poseidonios*. An analysis is given of the doctrines of Poseidonius with reference to Seneca's ninety-second letter, the views of the modern authorities are discussed, and the following conclusions are reached. Seneca proposes to show the self-sufficiency of virtue for happiness in Chrysippus' sense of the word. He bases this on Poseidonius' doctrine of the soul. The letter in question allows valid conclusions to be drawn regarding

Poseidonius' ethical rigorouslyness, as well as his differences with theories of the schools. Poseidonius was a dualist in the sense that he made a sharp distinction between divine and mortal in microcosm and macrocosm, but gave it a place inside not outside the world.

Pp. 332-357. Gustav Meyer, Prudentiana. Conclusion of the preceding article, pp. 249-260. More attempts to mend the text, not based on the metre. At the end of the article is an index of the passages considered.

Pp. 358-368. Erich Köstermann, *statio principis*. The principate of Augustus might be better understood if we examine the exact meaning of *statio* as applied to him. A list is given of the passages which bear on the question, and the point is made that the word was taken over into the political field from the military vocabulary. It was probably Augustus himself who gave the idea of *statio* a place in his newly founded political system. The article is continued on a later page.

Pp. 369-375. Erich Sander, Die Hauptquellen der Bücher I-III der epitoma rei militaris des Vegetius. Cato was the principal source for Book I, Frontinus for Book II, Paternus for Book III. Traces of Cato and Paternus are also to be seen in Book II.

Pp. 376-388. Miszellen. Pp. 376-382. Th. Birt. Über *ομηρος* und den Namen Homer. The word belongs to the stem which appears in *ἀραρίσκω*, and such words. Thus *ομηρος* meant "one who is led about", hence a blind man or hostage. Thus the Iliad and the Odyssey were the poems of "the blind man", and only later did Homer become a proper name. The name cannot, then, be considered historic. Pp. 382-387. L. Radermacher, Kalenden-Masken und Komödien-Masken. A discussion of folk festivities in relation to comedy. Even though the comedy has its origin in a Dionysus festival, other elements must have been early introduced which influenced the masquerade. P. 388. Josef Maennle, *Γνοκόρος*. In Hesiod, Works and Days, 66, this word is to be retained. It is to be related to *κείρειν*.

Pp. 389-420. Leo Weber, Asklepios, älteste Zeugnisse aus Thessalien und der Peloponnes. The cult of Asclepius began in Thessaly and spread to the Peloponnesus as the result of tribal wanderings. This spread of the cult took place some time before the Dorian invasion; this, then, would furnish the terminus post quem for it. At the end of the article is an excursus on the Achilles cult.

Pp. 421-429. Rudolf Chr. W. Zimmermann, Zum Proömium der hesiodischen Theogonie. Verses 1-103 of the proem to the Theogony are a separate poem by Hesiod, a hymn to the Muses.

When the works of Hesiod were collected, this hymn became the proem to all of Hesiod. Inasmuch as the collection began with the Theogony, the hymn was erroneously attached to it, together with the interpolated verses 104-115. The recension in which the hymn to the Muses was combined with the Theogony existed as early as the second century after Christ.

Pp. 430-444. Erich Köstermann, *statio principis*. Conclusion of the preceding article, pp. 358-368. It was a commonplace among the philosophers, especially among the Stoics who loved military metaphors, that a man should perform well his duties in whatever rank of life he had been placed by fate. Augustus is shown to have been influenced by this in his conception of his *statio*.

Pp. 445-466. Robert Philippson, *Das "Erste Naturgemäße"*. The concept of *τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν* is a development of Stoic philosophy; it may have been introduced by Zeno himself. The development of the idea is here elaborately studied, together with its possible sources and its relations to other aspects of ancient thought.

Pp. 467-482. Miszellen. Pp. 467-469. Otto Schroeder, *Zum Zeushymnus in der Parodos des Agamemnon*. A note to Fraenkel's article, *Philologus*, 86, pp. 1-17. The whole parodos refers to Zeus. Pp. 469-470. Hans Bogner, *Die Stellung des Zeus im ΠΡΟΜΗΘΕΥΣ ΔΕΣΜΩΤΗΣ*. In the Prometheus Zeus takes part in the dramatic conflict as Prometheus' opponent. This shows that the Greek gods did not always have fixed characters assigned to them. Pp. 470-473. Eduard Fraenkel, *Selbstmordwege*. The disputed verses 118-135 in Aristophanes' Frogs may be allowed to stand. Such discussions of methods of suicide were common in the ancient writers as the examples here collected show. Pp. 473-476. Franz Dornseiff, *Horaz und Properz*. Various instances are quoted of similarity of thought and expression in the two poets. This resulted from the fact that they belonged to the circle of Maecenas. Pp. 476-477. Hermann Fränkel, *Baθὺ ἥθος*. A note on Latte's article, p. 272. The special meaning of the word is to be found first in the philosophers. A comparable passage is cited from Bacchylides. Pp. 477-480. Alfons Kalb, *Bemerkungen zum Text der 'Civitas Dei' Augustins*. Attempts to improve the text by a new collation of Ms. V. P. 480. Fritz Walter, *Zum Itinerarium Alexandri*. Corrections in the text. Pp. 480-481. Hans Bogner, *Eine Analogie zum Putsch des Kylon*. In the Annals of Lambert of Hersfeld is described an insurrection against Bishop Anno of Cologne in 1074. The underlying causes seem to resemble those in the Cylon affair. Pp. 481-482. Hans Bogner, *Eine unbekannte Entlehnung Goethes*. A passage in Act 5 of the Natural Daughter is borrowed from Vergil, Ecl. 6, 39 ff.

REVUE DE PHILOLOGIE, Troisième Série (1931).

Pp. 1-18. Maurice Holleaux, Notes sur Tite Live. A critical examination of the observations by Klotz on the additions from the Annalists made by Livy (XXXIII, 30, 15) to his translation from Polybius (XVIII, 44, 2-7) of the treaty that closed the Second Macedonian War. The implied justification of Klotz for the indemnity figures of Claudius as applicable to a certain stage of the negotiations, is shown to be untenable; they rest rather on the popular Roman comparison of the Carthaginian and Macedonian perils. In short the Annalists knowingly confounded the preliminaries of the peace of 196 and the peace itself and the attendant circumstances. In the clause: "Attalo absenti . . . elephantesque dono datos," the equation of Klotz, "Attalus absens = Attalus mortuus = Eumenes," is set aside. Antias did *not* know that the peremptory reason for the absence of Attalus was "il avait quitté non seulement la Grèce, mais ce bas monde." The elephants seem to come from the event noted by Livy (XXXVIII, 39, 5), being those received from Antiochus by Manlius, who gave them to Eumenes. Lastly the question as to the Annalist drawn on for 30, 6, is discussed and the theory of Klotz that he was Claudius, is rejected.

Pp. 19-77. Jean Humbert. Le pamphlet de Polycrates et le Gorgias de Platon. One might say that the object of this important paper is to bring together and interpret the little that we can know of the life and work of Plato from 394 to 384 and to compare the character of Callicles in the Gorgias with the 'very real Polycrates.' The paper has these divisions: I. The Man; II. His Work (the *κατηγορία Σωκράτους*); III. Solutions already proposed; IV. Attempt at a solution, further subdivided: 1. Gorgias 484 B, 2. Callicles, 3. The Gorgias in the work of Plato. M. Humbert shows that alongside of the unfolding of the thought of Plato, the passions and hatreds of the men of the fifth century must be taken into consideration. Under the touch of M. Humbert the great philosopher ceases to be an abstraction and becomes a living figure of the turbulent times. If we add to this that our esteem of the philosopher is enhanced by the picture, we also hope M. Humbert will continue his brilliant Platonic studies.

Pp. 78-85. A. Ernout. Notes et Discussions. Jérôme Carcopino, Virgile et le mystère de la IV^e églogue. A sympathetic review showing that the author, while avoiding both the interpretation of the poem by far-fetched and subsequent events and the reactionary interpretation that strips the poem of all mysticism, gives a perfect solution, the mystical element springing from a Pythagorean source, the rest from actual historical facts and events, such as the final fixing of the Peace of Brundisium

on October 5 and 6, 40 B. C. Briefly: "si les hommes étaient raisonnables, il n'y aurait plus de mystère de la quatrième églogue.

Pp. 86-94. Bulletin bibliographique.

Pp. 95-96. Derniers ouvrages reçus.

Pp. 97-103. Georges Méautis. Sur une phrase de Platon. A la mémoire de P. E. Humbert. A brief but brilliant article that defends the authenticity of the Seventh Epistle, by showing that the famous passage of the Republic (496 C-D) has its replica in 334 E of this epistle. In short, the faith that it is better to suffer than to do injustice constitutes the unity of Plato's thought and is the key-note of this epistle. Therefore the attempt to establish its authenticity must now give way to studying it for a deeper understanding of Plato and his times. To vary the saying of Goethe about Kant, one might add that to re-read the Seventh Epistle after reading this paper of M. Méautis, is like going into a lighted room.

Pp. 104-115. P. Wuilleumier. Les transpositions du Cato Maior. Readers of the *Revue* will recall the author's study, *Les manuscrits principaux du Cato Maior* (Vol. III, 1929, pp. 43-63). The present article is a minute study of certain transpositions suggested by M. Havet on the theory that certain groups of words forming one or two lines in the archetype, were omitted in copying and finally restored out of place. For example, the twofold ambiguity in the passage (15, 51): "Dein tepefactum (semen) vapore et compressu suo diffundit [terra] et elicit herbescensem ex eo viriditatem," where M. Havet would read, "Dein tepefactum diffundit et vapore et compressu suo elicit . . .", where M. Wuilleumier's gentle and efficient remedy would be to omit the first *et*. While sympathetic and appreciative of M. Havet's study, the author deems that the Cato Maior should be judged by other standards, remembering that it is the effort of a statesman, downed by circumstances, to convince others that his fall is not merited and himself that it is not mournful. Add that the style varies from familiar to playful, and that it is at times lyrical or props the weakness of the thought by the vigor of the phrase.

Pp. 116-121. Bohumil Ryba. L'adjectif *ῖτυς*. The word occurs in a late funeral inscription from Cappadocia:

Κράσσον θυγατέρα ἶτυν, εὔνομον, εὐπατέρειαν.

Citing Hesychius for a definition of *ῖτυλος* and assuming the equation *Ἴτυλος* = *Ἴτυς*, M. Ryba assumes the existence of an adjective *ῖτυς* with the same meanings as *ῖτυλος*, that is, *μόνος*, *όρφανός* and *νέος*, *ἀπαλός*, this inscription being its sole but sufficient example. Then follows an explication of a possible forma-

tion of this adjective, which the author puts forward as purely hypothetical, but considers the existence of the adjective established.

Pp. 122-127. P. Chantraine. Notes homériques. An etymological discussion of certain Homeric words. These are: I. *προθέονται*, A 291. II. A propos de *ἔσσαι*, Δ 42. III. *πτωσκαζέμεν*, Δ 372. IV. Homérique *κέονται*.

Pp. 128-131. N. Deratani. Virgile et l'âge d'or. The author shows that during the Civil Wars the poet sought his idea of the golden age in contemporary Italy and the life of the rustic, but under the rule of Augustus indulged the conviction that his ideals were beginning to realize themselves completely in this life. This is one of those delightful essays that appear from time to time in the *Revue* when scholarship takes to the woods and fields and brings home to us a broader and deeper feeling for classic life.

Pp. 132-139. Fernand Robert. Le *Plutus* d'Aristophane et l'Asclépiéion du Pirée. The location of the sanctuary of Asclepius, whether at Athens or the Piraeus, turns on the interpretation of *θάλαττα* in verse 656, whether it means the actual sea or is merely a reservoir like the *θάλαττα Ἐρεχθῆσ*. M. Robert shows that the word can only mean the sea and that this interpretation furnishes an example of the rite of purification in the sea. Lastly he considers the question why Aristophanes placed the miraculous curing of the blind god at the Piraeus rather than at Athens.

Pp. 140-188. Bulletin bibliographique.

Pp. 189-192. Derniers ouvrages reçus.

Pp. 193-208. Maurice Holleaux. Notes sur Tite Live. In this second instalment, M. Holleaux treats of the herald sent by Philip to Flamininus. He quotes in full the passage in Livy (33, 11, 3-4) and the corresponding section of Polybius (XVIII, 33, 8), where the herald mentioned by the former does not appear in the present text of the latter and the embassy enlarged on by Polybius is lacking in Livy. As there is a lacuna in the Greek text, it is naturally here that the episode of the herald would be found. As to why Livy sacrificed the principal to the accessory event, the author suggests two possible explanations; perhaps the Roman writer's idea was to abridge Polybius, perhaps "il serait possible qu'il lui eût déplu de montrer, comme le faisait Polybe, T. Quinctius accueillant les ouvertures des mandataires de Philippe et prenant envers eux les plus graves engagements dans une conférence à huis clos."

Pp. 209-221. Ch. Picard. Parrhasios (?) et les peintures du Dionysion neuf d'Athènes. We have first a brief account of

the two temples of the god, which were southeast of the Acropolis. In the newer temple Alcamenes had placed a great chryselephantine statue of the cult, comparable to the statue of Athena by Phidias. Of the paintings on the walls we have a description by Pausanias (Attica, I, 20, 3) who neither names the artist nor describes their emplacement. M. Picard quotes the description and examines it in reference to these two points, and concludes, "on ne suppléera jamais par des conjectures au silence de ce texte, et d'autres," but he would place the paintings of the divine life of Dionysus and of the spread of his mystic faith, inside the temple itself where stood the precious statue of Alcamenes.

Pp. 222-250. L.-A. Constans. *Observations critiques sur quelques lettres de Cicéron.* The passages considered are Att. I, 1, 2; I, 1, 5; I, 13, 6; II, 3, 2; II, 5, 3; II, 14, 2; II, 16, 4; II, 22, 1; II, 22, 7; II, 24, 2; II, 24, 2 and 3; III, 12, 3; III, 17, 1; and Fam. XIII, 43, 44, 73, 74, 45, 46. In the discussion of the Atticus letters we have textual emendations and a brilliant commentary. In the discussion of the Familiares letters, the author notes them as a group of six letters chronologically standing together belonging to the final period of Cicero's life, that is between April or May 45 and the Ides of March 44. Tyrrell has said that the editor of Plautus writes in sand. This might also be said of the editor of Cicero's Letters, with the reservation that under the hand of M. Constans the sand seems to become firm and lucid glass.

Pp. 251-266. Scarlat Lambrino. *Observations sur un nouveau diplôme militaire de l'empereur Claude.* This inscription was found in the district of Durostor in Rumania in the summer of 1929. It is a bronze plaque which bears graven on its two faces 'un diplôme militaire.' The article has a cut of the lettering on the exterior and interior faces and also a transcription with corrections. Its main value is that it is one of the most ancient of its kind dating from the reign of the emperor Claudius or precisely 54 A. D. Equally valuable is the information it furnishes in regard to military and ethnical matters, giving certain Thracian names hitherto unknown and data for estimating the racial make-up of military units.

Pp. 268-286. *Bulletin bibliographique.*

Pp. 287-288. *Derniers ouvrages reçus.*

Pp. 289-307. A. I. Trannoy. *Essais critiques sur les Pensées de Marc-Aurèle.* A very interesting paper from one who is quite at home with his author with whom he wishes to make others better acquainted. The chapters are as follows: I. L'obscurité de Marc-Aurèle. II. Les citations de Marc-Aurèle (au sens actif et au sens passif). III. Les citations de Marc-Aurèle

chez Suidas. IV. Les interpolations et les locutions "couplées" dans les Pensées. V. Hypothèses et discussions critiques. VI. La critique expectante. For example under I, c), M. Trannoy considers obscurities where, while the separate words are clear, the thought seems beside the point. Thus in X, 15, the clause, "therefore live as on a mountain" does not chime with the context, because the negation has been left out. "Ne vis pas comme à la montagne," remedies it. In short: the alteration of the text is at times the real cause for the obscurity which enfolds the thought. Under IV are cited as cases of interpolation examples in which the reasoning is interrupted by an expression alien to the subject matter, with which however it has a vague connection. Thus in II, 17: ὁ δὲ βίος . . . ἐπιδημία, we have interwoven with other moral verities two pessimistic moral aphorisms, due to a Christian hand, but bearing no other real relation to the context.

Pp. 308-326. Louis Gernet. Notes sur Andocide. This article comprises two essays, I. Le décret de Patrocleïdes. II. Le discours *Contre Alcibiade*. The first is a careful examination of the measure moved by Patrocleïdes (*de Mysteriis* 77, 78, 79) showing that it had many precedents from the time of Solon to the Persian Wars. There follows an examination of the several categories of the capite deminuti, showing who might and who might not enjoy the amnesty of the measure and that the author of the decree had drawn from juristic practice and tradition and "c'est chose remarquable que sa docilité à reproduire des textes périmés et sans object." In the essay on the *Contre Alcibiade* du Pseudo Andocide we have a discussion and analysis of the special literary genre, dating from the fourth century, of which Alcibiades became at an early date a favorite subject. An analysis of the resultant tradition leads to the thought that one essential theme, that of the *ὑβρίς* of Alcibiades, was established by the writing of the author in question, and that "on a ajouté après lui, on a contredit, on a corrigé; mais il est probablement au point de départ."

Pp. 327-342. Jean Bayet. Le style indirect libre en latin (1^{er} article). Students of style will find much of more than passing interest in this brilliant paper. Without at first giving any precise definition, the author quotes passages in French illustrative of this "style indirect libre" in that language and then proceeds to Latin. His quotation from Cicero, ad Att., IX, 2 A, 3, will perhaps briefly indicate his position: "Vixdum epistulam tuam legeram cum ad me currens ad illum Postumus Curtius venit nihil nisi classes loquens et exercitus: *Eripiebat Hispanias, tenebat Asiam, Siciliam, Africam, Sardiniam, confestim in Graeciam persequebatur*. Eundum igitur est, nec tam ut belli quam ut fugae socii simus." Here there is no question

of epistolatory style; the Greek and Latin illustrative examples of Tyrrell and Purser are beside the point. This example not only proves the existence of this style but shows what an effective instrument it could be in the hands of an "écrivain de race," like Cicero. The infinitives of the pure indirect discourse would deprive the words of their color and finesse and fix under abstract forms information for which Cicero had no wish to assume the responsibility. M. Bayet draws principally on Livy and Cicero for illustrative material in analyzing more deeply certain aspects of this style, Livy XLIV being a telling example. The author is certainly convincing.

Pp. 343-347. Pierre de Labriolle. *Juvénal, Satire XI, 179-182.* A criticism of M. Salomon Reinach's interpretation of ll. 180-181: "On récitera des vers d'Homère *et des vers (de Stace)*, qui disputent la palme au pompeux Virgile." After considering carefully the several reasons for Mr. Reinach's interpretation, the author finds himself unable to agree and concludes that, while in the first century of our era Vergil has his detractors, Juvenal is not among them and that this passage of the eleventh Satire should be explained in accord with the traditional exegesis.

Pp. 348-417. *Bulletin bibliographique.*

Pp. 418-421. *Derniers ouvrages reçus.*

Pp. 422-426. *Table des matières.*

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REVIEWS.

Wielands Gesammelte Schriften. Herausgegeben von der Deutschen Kommission der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Erste Abteilung: Werke. Vierzehnter und Fünfzehnter Band. Herausgegeben von WILHELM KURRELMAYER. Berlin, Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1928, 1930. Pp. VI, 460, A1-A210; VII, 817, A1-A247. 42 and 68 Marks.

Of the great writers of German Classicism Wieland is the last to appear in a definitive edition. That is perhaps natural since in the modern world he is also the least actual. His imaginative work seems lacking in creative power and from the purely intellectual side his writings fall short of the sweep and the fundamental character of the productions of a Lessing.

And yet Wieland richly deserves the present recognition. Of all the eighteenth century German authors he was the most widely read, and through this popularity was able to perform effectively his task as liberator of the German mind. Incidentally, he won over to the cause of German literature that upper class which had until then looked across the Rhine for its literary pabulum.

Of the present edition, sponsored by the Prussian Academy, a number of volumes have appeared since 1909. Owing doubtless to the economic situation, the progress has of late been extremely slow. Moreover, of the volumes belonging to the Erste Abteilung, which contains the works proper, none have appeared with either a critical apparatus or a commentary. The present American editor is, accordingly, the first to undertake these two tasks in the volumes¹ now under review.

So far as the establishment of a critical text was concerned, that task was for the two volumes in question beset with greater difficulties than for any other part of the edition, since these volumes consist of a large number of individual essays, each requiring a separate consideration in the critical apparatus. This situation was further aggravated by the fact that these essays appear in no less than eight different volumes of the "Ausgabe letzter Hand," thus necessitating the fixing of a critical norm for each of these volumes before a definitive text

¹ The ninth volume, containing, chiefly, *Der goldne Spiegel* and likewise edited by Professor Kurrelmeyer appeared in 1931. Since the variants and commentary have not as yet been published, the volume is not here considered.

for volumes 14 and 15 of the present edition could be established.

The variants are chronologically arranged and restricted to differences that the editor deemed important. For Volume 14 they are given in greater detail than for Volume 15. To render possible orthographic studies, a number of pieces of Volume 14 are reproduced in the "Schreibweise" of the *Merkur*. These comprise 63 pages, are distributed over various parts of the volume, and fall, therefore, in different years. Critical apparatus and Commentary have a paging, designated as A1, etc., which is separate from that of the text, and begin also with a new signature, so that this part of a volume can be conveniently detached and used alongside the text.

Volume 14 contains the *Prosaische Schriften I*, 1773-1783, Volume 15, *Prosaische Schriften II*, 1783-1794. With the exception of two shorter pieces, all these essays appeared in the *Merkur*. Of Volume 15 the bulk is devoted to discourses on the French Revolution.

For his Commentary the editor found practically no "Vorarbeiten" (15, A171). The labor thus imposed in clearing up allusions, verifying quotations, and tracing sources, was stupendous, involving, for example, in the case of the *Aufsätze über die Französische Revolution*, an examination, for the years in question, of the complete files of the *Journal de Paris* and the *Moniteur*. With a candor that is refreshing, the editor unhesitatingly points out each instance in which his search proved fruitless, in the hope of thus directing the attention of other scholars to matters still obscure.

If, in view of so rich an offering, a general criticism is still in order, it would be that that Seuffert's principle, "die Bildung, die Wieland seinen zeitgenössischen Lesern angesonnen hat, soll auch den Lesern der Gesamtwerke im allgemeinen zugetraut bleiben," has not everywhere been observed. That would seem to be the case with the notes on 15, 371, 20 ("Stentor") and 15, 465, 23 ("ad Graecas Calendas"). Here and there, also, the editor is inclined to go too far afield. Thus it hardly seems incumbent upon him to inquire into the origin of "spiritus familiares" (14, A160) or of "Modefilosofie" (14, A176); and the observation in connection with 14, 103, 18 f ("Bauerngangs") overlooks the fact that Wieland himself explains the term in a footnote. Again, it seems futile to attempt the identification of a locality "N" (14, 115, 10), or to argue that a "T." in a "Kanton" may be Tübingen. On the other hand, the C † M † B † of 14, 338, 2, perhaps deserved elucidation, and a note was certainly to be expected on the mnemonic hexameter of the *χρέα* (quis, quid, ubi, etc.), 15, 375, 25 f. The passage 14, 124, 12 is, I take it, an allusion to the maieutic

art of Socrates. On "Desorganisierung," 15, 78, 35, a booklet in my own possession, "Briefe von Johann Caspar Lavater . . ." (Bremen und Leipzig, 1787), p. 151 f, is informing.

The entire text has been treated with such scrupulous care that misprints are extremely rare. The following additions to the list of 15, A247 will perhaps be welcomed for the "Berichtigungen" of a subsequent volume: 14, A6, the reference to the page of *Patriotischer Beytrag* is wrong.—14, A97, the final *r* of "Verfasser" has fallen out.—15, 621, 4, read "als" instead of "als als."—15, 701, 30, read "ihre"; 15, A153, 41, a comma has fallen out.

A "Register" of seventy-four pages for both volumes concludes Volume 15. It covers text, variants, and notes and seems to be absolutely trustworthy. It gives evidence of the same grandiose disregard of laborious toil that characterizes the remainder of the work.

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The Cambridge Ancient History, edited by S. A. COOK, F. E. ADCOCK, and M. P. CHARLESWORTH. Volume IX: The Roman Republic 133-44 B. C. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1933. Price \$9.00.

The biographical sketches of the Gracchi, Marius, and Sulla are written by HUGH LAST. The complexity of the economic situation which called forth the legislation of the Gracchi is rightly emphasized, but in analyzing the factors which led to the growth of *latifundia* in Italy and of unemployment at Rome, LAST has failed to consider the economic revolution in Mediterranean trade and in accustomed trade channels caused by the development of Roman imperialism. In the second century before Christ Rome had in fact become the great creditor nation of the ancient world. Her armies and her officials had transferred vast accumulations of wealth by plunder or by confiscation to Italy, and the annual stream of tithe and tribute from the provinces to the imperial city not only dislocated the ancient trade routes but also created a balance of trade constantly in favor of Rome. The Italians also shared in the new wealth, for part of the spoils of war went to the allies, public works and private villas were lavishly constructed, and Italian bankers and traders had profitable investments overseas. The balance in favor of Italy was offset partly by the purchase of luxuries from the provinces, but chiefly by loans and investments made by both Romans and Italians to provincials. There is plenty of evidence to show that the Italian financial interests not only followed the flag,

but also preceded it. Their investments in the provinces, however, only tended to aggravate the general indebtedness of the provincials to Italy, and it is safe to assume that their purchasing power in the Italian markets was steadily reduced. Though direct evidence is lacking, it is equally certain that they were compelled to sell where money was still plentiful—in Italy itself—whatever commodities they could in order to meet their international obligations. Thus the standard of living and the cost of production in the provinces gradually declined, and they were able to flood the markets of Central and Southern Italy with cheap grain along with the tithe which went to Rome as a free gift. Thus we may explain the decline of cereal culture in Italy. Grazing on large estates took its place, not because meat was an important element in the Italian diet, but because the only products which the farmer could raise profitably were wool and hides which were still in demand either to supply local needs and military requisitions or to be exported abroad where the raw material was worked up for resale at higher prices. We do not know whether Italian wine and oil competed with provincial products. Italy enjoyed a profitable trade in these commodities with Gaul until the latter was reduced to provincial status. Thereafter this market declined also. In fact as Rome extended her empire the acquisition of each tributary province closed another avenue to Italian trade. Under the Empire the establishment of standing armies on the boundaries, the construction of public works in the provinces by the emperors, and the general reform in provincial administration brought about greater equilibrium in the circulation of wealth, and the position of the provincials in meeting their annual obligations to Rome was greatly improved.

Economic laws were as inexorable in the Gracchan age as now. Under the conditions we have described it was impossible to restore cereal culture in Italy or even to develop a sound and vigorous industrial activity. A certain amount of industry to take care of local consumption was necessary, and undoubtedly always existed, but under existing conditions this could not develop for profitable export trade. The reviewer therefore cannot agree with LAST in his statement that the economic legislation of the Gracchi was eminently sane and successful. It is true enough that the unemployed at Rome wanted land, especially when his allotment came as a free gift from the state. But the days of house-economy had long since passed, and it was no longer possible for him to make a living by cereal culture on a small farm. Witness the grants to veterans made by Sulla, Pompey, Caesar, and Augustus. Yet the elder Pliny could affirm in the middle of the first century after Christ that the *latifundia* were the damnation of Italy. The veterans succumbed to the same economic forces that operated in the Grac-

chan age. Likewise the plan to found commercial colonies in Southern Italy was foredoomed to failure. On the other hand since unemployment in Italy could only be relieved by emigration, the foundation of a Roman colony on the site of Carthage held every prospect of success.

The political history of the Gracchi and their importance in Roman constitutional history is excellently treated by LAST, but his praise of Sulla as a constructive statesman seems wide of the mark. The treatment of Pompey and Caesar by ADCOCK is judicious and impartial. Some may deny that Caesar was the greatest of the Romans, but all must agree that the senatorial aristocracy had long since forfeited its right to rule a world empire, and that its misgovernment and oppression were inevitably doomed to cease if Rome herself was to survive as an imperial state.

Other chapters written by specialists in their field maintain the high standard of excellence set in the earlier volumes. There is an excellent sketch of provincial government by STEVENSON, and the history of Roman Law by ZULUETA deserves high praise. As usual the serviceability of the volume is enhanced by good maps and an excellent bibliography.

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Geography of Claudius Ptolemy. Translated into English and edited by EDWARD LUTHER STEVENSON, with Introduction by Prof. Joseph Fischer, S. J. New York, the New York Public Library, 1932, Folio, XVI, 167, 29 double plates. Price \$60.

To have made the first complete translation into any modern language of the *Geography* of Ptolemy, the last of the Greek geographers, who worked at Alexandria 1700 years ago, notwithstanding that there have appeared over fifty editions of the Greek text since the *editio princeps* of Erasmus at Basel in 1533, is the noteworthy achievement of Dr. Stevenson, widely known for his contributions to historical geography and cartography. The size and cost of the present sumptuous volume are due to the cartographic supplement, which takes up nearly half of it, and to the superb paper, typography and binding in half leather.

The translation is based on Greek and Latin manuscripts of the *Geography*, the former dating from the eleventh century, the latter from the Renaissance or from the early fifteenth century; on important printed editions of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries; and on the critical studies especially

of F. G. Wilberg and Carl Müller. As a supplement to the translation are added twenty-seven photo-gelatine reproductions of maps recognized as essentially Ptolemaic. These are taken from the *Codex Ebnerianus*, in the Lenox collection now in the New York Public Library, prepared by Donnus Nicolaus Germanus ca. 1460, and the basis of those appearing in early Roman editions of the *Geography* from 1478 to 1508. These are the best reproductions of Ptolemaic maps now published, with the exception of the Greek *Codex Athous* from the cloister of Vatopedi on Athos, published by Didot in Paris, 1867, and Vol. IV of the *Codex Vaticanus Urbinas graecus 82*, published by Joseph Fischer, S. J. at Leyden and Leipsic, 1932. Two additional maps, made after the discovery of America, are the Ruysh World Map taken from the printed edition of 1508, and the New World Map of Lorenz Fries from that of 1522. The latter shows the name America across what is now S. America, where Martin Waldseemüller had placed it in 1507 on the World Map which accompanied his famous essay *Cosmographiae Introductio*, while on the former that area is marked *Terra sancte sive Mundus novus*, the latter part of that title being the same as Vespucci had used in his Lisbon letter of March or April, 1503.

The chief reason why there has never before been a complete translation of Ptolemy into a modern language—though incomplete versions exist in Italian and French—has been shown by Prof. Fischer to be the lack of a satisfactory critical Greek text or Latin translation. The early printed editions were critically worthless—the first Latin version of 1462 (?), which was followed by others in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the first Greek text of Erasmus already mentioned, and the first Greek text with Latin translation by Bertius, Leyden, 1618. The latter was regarded as the standard text down to the last century when the first attempt to make a critical edition was made by F. G. Wilberg and C. H. F. Grashof, Essen, 1836-45, followed by that of C. F. A. Nobbe, Leipzig, 1843-5. The latter, now in its 2nd ed. 1898 and 1903, shares with the Greek text and Latin translation made by C. Müller and C. T. Fischer (Didot), 2nd ed. 1, Pts. 1 and 2, 1883 and 1901, the honor of being the best today.

While the translation purports to be scientifically done, it is not difficult to point out certain omissions which one should not expect in such a publication. As there are over forty Greek and Latin manuscripts known, of various degrees of completeness and value, and many printed editions, the work should be accompanied by an *apparatus criticus*, giving, with some system of proper notation, the variant readings of all. In this way the reader might know which are “the generally recognized best

Latin and Greek texts" (XIII). Moreover, there should be a complete bibliography of manuscripts, editions, and studies of Ptolemy instead of the few works mentioned by Prof. Fischer in his Introduction (3-15). The analytic Table of Contents by book and chapter (VII-X) is serviceable, but it is needlessly repeated twice in the translation, at the beginning of each of the eight books and again at the head of each chapter of each book. A systematic index or indexes would have been invaluable—of countries, provinces, lands, tribes, seas, rivers, mountains, and especially of the 8,000 localities taken over by Ptolemy in Bks. II-VII from Marinus of Tyre, with their longitudes and latitudes correct to five minutes.

Nor can the reviewer wholly accept the author's praise of Ptolemy as a geographer. It should be remembered that Ptolemy's fame both in geography and astronomy has been largely adventitious. Though in both fields he wielded absolute authority for centuries—the "geocentric" theory of the *Almagest*, already disproved by Aristarchus nearly four centuries before but unfortunately taken over by the Church, not being destroyed till the time of Copernicus and the later Kepler and Newton, his geographical system gradually waning in face of the rise of modern geographical discovery—nevertheless his chief merit in both fields was not originality nor discovery, in which regards he stood far behind several of his predecessors, but merely industry and learning. Ptolemy was only a collector, reviser, and editor of works by men far his superiors, the *Almagest* resting on the labors of Hipparchus, the founder of scientific astronomy, the *Geography* being merely a corrected and amplified version of his immediate forerunner, Marinus of Tyre, to whose work he made only slight additions. Thus his importance as a geographer is due merely to the scientific form and systematic organization of his material; and only in that sense does he hold "the first place among ancient writers" (XIII).

Nevertheless, despite the shortcomings noted, the present translation and especially the reproductions of Ebner's maps to illustrate the text of the *Geography* chapter by chapter will prove of inestimable service to every student of Ptolemy or of ancient geography in general.

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Virgilio Minore. *Saggio sullo svolgimento della poesia Virgiliana*. By AUGUSTO ROSTAGNI. Torino, Chiantore, 1933. Pp. 390. Lire 30.

The author prefaces his work by stating that he intends to base his study of Vergil's minor works more on historical, psy-

chological, intellectual, and artistic considerations than on the purely verbal ones, linguistic, "stylistic," metrical, etc., of which we have heard so much. This is sound procedure, especially since studies of the latter type are never buttressed by extensive studies of modern authors, whose whole corpus is well authenticated, to prove that their earlier works show such verbal correspondences with their later ones as are demanded in the *Appendix Vergiliana*.

Genuinely Vergilian, according to ROSTAGNI, are the epigram on Ballista, the *Catalepton*, *Priapea*, *Epigrammata*, *Dirae*, *Culex*, and *Ciris*, and perhaps the *Aetna*. The *Copa* and *Moretum* he would exclude as not being on the Donatus-Suetonius list and having only the most general Vergilian characteristics.

The author adduces several new direct proofs of the authenticity of the several minor poems. In the preliminary chapter he discusses certain aspects of Vergil's will, as recorded by Donatus. The fact that the poet wished his unpublished works destroyed, but made no specific mention of the *Aeneid* (*nihil quidem de ea nominatim cavit*), implies that there were other unpublished works. We may not assume, however, that the whole *Appendix*, or even those parts of it most frequently accepted as genuine, were edited and published by the literary executors, for their work is traceable only in the collection and naming of the poems of the *Catalepton* and in their composition of the fifteenth poem of that collection as a seal of the authenticity of the collection.

The *Culex* is accepted as a poem presented to Octavian on his elevation to the pontificate in 48 B. C. An interesting discussion (pp. 82-91) of Statius' remark about Lucan leads to the conclusion that XXI is the proper reading of the well-known passage in Donatus. Lines 36-38 of the *Ciris*, which express the poet's desire to compose a great astronomical poem, are related by the author to passages in Vergil's later works showing the same interest (pp. 181-3, 195). He also remarks that the puzzling reference of Silenus in Ecl. VI to the older form of the Scylla legend is a proof of the authenticity of the *Ciris*, for Vergil in the later work is referring to the older form as a mere tale (*quam fama secutast . . . ll. 74 ff.*) implying his own correction of it.

The larger part of the book is devoted, however, to an erudite and interesting discussion of the meaning of the poems and their place in Latin literature and in the poet's development. The author suggests that Vergil felt the influence of Catullus before ever coming to Rome, on the ground that Catullus must have been much read in his native region and that *Cat. X*, "Sabinus ille," has not a single reference that can be located in Rome.

Ellis' identification of the scene of the *Culex* with the sacred

grove of Artemis in Illyria is taken up and the suggestion is made that the poem was founded on an aetiological myth designed to explain the name *Culices* sometimes given to the place. This is a tempting suggestion, but the author's further hypothesis that the poem was essentially an attempt to deal with the great problem of the life beyond can hardly be accepted.

The influence of Lucretius is thoroughly discussed. It can hardly be agreed (not that it makes any difference) that Lucretius alone turned the young Vergil to philosophy. The influence of his friends and acquaintances must have been strong. The discussion of the neoteric and Vergilian qualities in the *Ciris* will be useful.

The *Aetna*, according to ROSTAGNI, must have been the work of a contemporary of Vergil. He grants the force of the usual arguments for Vergil's authorship and adds a demonstration that the philosophy of the poem is Epicurean, not Stoic, but finds himself deterred by Donatus' doubts and by the fact that various Vergilian qualities which should have been displayed in such a poem are absent. The last two chapters, "Sulla soglia delle Bucoliche" and "Dal minore al maggiore Virgilio" contain many attractive suggestions as to the poet's development. One may regret that the author did not compress his material more for the sake of the reader who must hurry.

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Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch. Von ALOIS WALDE.

Dritte neu bearbeitete Auflage, von J. B. Hofmann. 5. Lieferung (cȳma-emō), 6. Lieferung (emō-ferē). Heidelberg, Carl Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1932. Pp. 321-480.

We welcome the continuation of this important work, which was threatened with serious delay (see this JOURNAL, LII, 388); but Dr. Hofmann, having severed his connection with the Thesaurus, is devoting his full energies to the Wörterbuch, with the results which we have before us. The full extent of his revision, or better still, of his rewriting, is seen when one notes that the first two fascicles covered 127 pages of the first edition, the next two covered 91 pages (127-218), the present two cover 65 pages (218-283): a progressive expansion which promises to make the complete work one of very imposing bulk.

The fifth fascicle, to the 160 captions in the corresponding part of the second edition, adds 42 items (mere cross-references are not counted in either figure): cyprīnus, dannus, darpus, dēliquium, dida, dīrēctus, diodela, dīrēctus, discus, doga, dolsa, dosinus, drachma, dracō, drappus, dravoca, drosca, druidēs,

druppa, drūsus (branded as a false reading), ducentī, duomvir, duprosopi, durcō, dureta, dūreus, dūriō, dusius, ē-, eā, ealē, ebulcalium, ecclēsia, Ēgeria, eglecopala, eh, ēheu, eho, ēlectarium, eleēmosyna, elleborum, ellychnium. The sixth fascicle, to the 127 captions of the second edition, adds 32: ēmolumentum, emplastrum, encaustum, ennam, enthēca, Ēōs, episcopus, epistula, equifer, equisō, erēmus, ergastulum, ērīcē, erysīpelas, eu, eugīum, euhān, ēvidēns, exacum, exbolus, exbrōmō, exclūdō, exenterō, exprētus, faccilo, facenia, famfaluca, fancuum, fara, fārior (a corruption), fārius, feber. While few of these words are of importance or of primary interest, they represent an extremely valuable addition to the work as making it a place of reference for even the rarest words.

The value has been enhanced by the inclusion of many cross-reference captions; I note especially such as dēlēniō, dēmō, di-dingua, discrīmen, ēducō, ellum, and numerous others (in all, 56 new cross-references in the two fascicles; cf. my remark in this JOURNAL, LII, 82 inf.). As in previous fascicles, some of the caption words are slightly changed, to place the supposedly oldest form in the first place: damma is set before dāma, and epulum before epulæ. An occasional caption of the first edition disappears, such as dēlictus, diennium, efferō; dictiō is no longer a caption, but is included under dīcō, and duim is reduced to a cross-reference to dō.

There are a few individual words on which a remark may not be out of place. Dīgnus receives a macron which it did not have in the second edition; Hofmann admits the later ī, referring to Sommer Hdb.² 121; I suggest that the older ī is a reflex of the long vowel in dīcō, with which dīgnus may have been associated in the popular mind (Walde, Hofmann, Meillet agree, of course, that it actually is a derivative of the root seen in decēt)—for I do not admit that vowels were lengthened before gn. Under diligō we find religiō, interpreted as 'Bedenklichkeit, Scheu' (a slightly different signification from that in the 2nd ed.); association with ligāre 'bind' is quite properly rejected. Discidium is taken as a derivative of scindō, not from cadō (as in 2nd ed.), nor from caedō. Discipulus is (as in 2nd ed.) taken from *dis-capiō (quite properly, as I think) and not from discō. On p. 358, line 6 from bottom, the reference v. Planta I 140 should be 146. Domicilium is taken as *domi-colium 'Hausbewohnen', and not as an extension of domicula, which, Hofmann says, does not exist. For dunc of imperial inscriptions, = dum, Hofmann proposes merely analogy of tum : tunc, whence dunc to dum. Duomvir is said to have its form fixed by the genitive plural duomvirum: I suggest that the invariable prior part in centumvir played a role in this fixation, as also in that of triumvir. Elementum is by Hofmann taken with Diels as for *elephantom, from Greek ēléphas, as a letter on ivory: an

etymology which seems dubious to me, but all the etymologies of this word are open to doubt. *Ex(s)ul* is pronounced a derivative of the root in Greek *ἀλάομαι* 'wander'; connection with *solum*, favored in the 2nd ed., is rejected.

Dr. Hofmann is to be congratulated on the service which in these fascicles, as in previous ones, he has done to the students of Latin; we trust that he may have strength and opportunity to continue the work to its conclusion.

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Index Aristophaneus ab O. J. TODD confectus. 4°. Ex Universitatis Harvadianae Prelis Cantabrigiae editus (Londini: ab Humphrey Milford apud Universitatis Oxoniensis Prela editus). 1932. Pp. x + 275.

Here is a useful volume, beautifully printed in double columns on fine paper that should last. It is dedicated to the memory of John Williams White, and in fact is based on the collections White made for an Index a generation ago. TODD follows the text of Aristophanes in the second edition of Hall and Geldart (but the line-numbering of Brunck), save for the intentional departures from that text which he records on p. ix, two-thirds of a page of minutiae. The work where I have tested it is conscientious and exact, abreast of the tide of scholarship. The usual remark must be added that manifold use alone can rightly test a production of this kind. I have found it more complete than Dunbar's Concordance, but shall still keep Dunbar at my elbow just because his work gives quotations, and not references only. TODD lists every *γάρ*, *δέ*, and *μέν* in the surviving plays and fragments of Aristophanes, six columns of *γάρ*, almost five of *δέ*, not quite two of *μέν*; twenty-one of *δ*, *ἢ*, *τό* (etc.), half a column of *οὖν*, over six columns of *οὗτος* and its inflections, over seven of *εἰμί*, eleven of *καί*. I have done the like with *esse* and *et* in a Concordance of Horace (merely listing the places where they occur), but find the rest of the book more illuminating because of the Latin quotations. Similarly with Dunbar, who even gives two quotations for *δέ* and two for *καί*. His book of iv and 342 pages, also in double columns, and beautifully printed by the Clarendon Press in 1883, the year of his death, can still be purchased in Oxford. My copy of it is as fresh as the review-copy of TODD's Index. Scholars clearly will wish to use TODD's fine compilation; yet we may fairly ask whether the time and pains and money which have been expended on this new Index would not have been better devoted to some comparable work that had no rival already in the field—for example, a Concordance of the Greek Anthology,

since the Index Herbert N. Couch is preparing is to be the bones of reference without the flesh of quotations. I advocate repentance before the fact. Had there been no such work for Aristophanes, or were there no adequate book of the sort in print, the case would be altered. And why does Todd not even mention Dunbar?

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Plauti Mercator edidit P. J. ENK. Pars Prior, Prolegomena et Textum continens, pp. vi + 98; Fl. 3.75 unbound. Pars Altera, Commentarium continens, pp. 217; Fl. 7.75. Lugduni Batavorum, apud A. W. Sijthoff, MCMXXXII.

Any play of Plautus ably edited is a welcome contribution. The edition by Dr. ENK now to be noticed is in Latin, a Latin that is clear and easy, fluent and idiomatic, and truly pleasant to read. The Latin further is reinforced by frequent and generous vernacular quotations in the idioms of German, Dutch, French and English. It will be clear to any reader that Dr. ENK loves his Plautus, and that he has a wide knowledge of classical literature as shown by the copiousness of literary and grammatical parallel that he cites.

The Prolegomena include the following divisions: 1. De Philemone Comico, ΕΜΠΟΡΟΥ Poeta. 2. De Mercatoris Argumento. 3. De Actuum Divisione. 4. De Numero Personarum. 5. De Demiphonis Somnio. 6. De Mercatore Plautina recte Aestimanda. 7. Quo Tempore Fabula Mercator Scripta sit Quaeritur.

The statement (p. 2) that Philemon's *Phasma* was the original of Plautus' *Mostellaria* hardly needs to be qualified by *fortasse*. On pp. 22 ff. is cited a long line of estimates of the Mercator from Camerarius down to the present time, estimates that may be characterized as Victorian in their condemnation of the play for its immorality. Only recently have a few scholars such as F. Marx and G. Norwood come to rate it high in dramatic technique quite apart from the moralities involved.

ENK's text follows rather closely that of Lindsay, and in most respects this does him credit. With the help of his pupil T. D. Berghuis he has made a new collation of the MS C. In one problem of the text however Lindsay left his discrimination unexercised, that of the EI-Readings and the traces of them found in the manuscripts, and this was felt by ENK. (Vid. Lindsay's edition of Plautus, Vol. I, p. vi; Enk, Vol. I, p. vi.) The *Mercator* contains by far the largest number of ei-readings to be found in any single play of Plautus. Of a total of approximately 243 instances in the Ambrosianus the *Mercator* contains

about one-fourth or 86 instances. Out of these 86 instances 67 have the ei for an original diphthong, while in 18 it stands for the monophthong ī and in one instance it actually stands for the monophthong ī, CVRABEIS, 526, ī being descended from the thematic vowel, unaccented ē. None of the last mentioned 19 instances can represent Plautine orthography. In the Palatine manuscripts there are in the *Mercator* traces of ei-readings in 7 places, all of them diphthongal and therefore probably genuine. Evidently without knowing of the investigation of A. R. Anderson, 'EI-Readings in the MSS of Plautus', abstract published in *Trans. Amer. Phil. Assn.*, XXXVII (1907), pp. 73-86, ENK attempted to remove the inconsistencies of Lindsay's text as concerning these readings. Accordingly wherever the MSS showed traces of ei in the forms of dīco (deico) and in the forms of īre (eire) he restored the ei-reading, even in the imperative singular ei(i), where Lindsay in a manner truly Lucilian arbitrarily read i in most passages. However ENK should have gone still farther and read ei also in a number of other passages, e. g. DEI in 285 (bis), 557; MEI (voc.) in 503, 525; SEI in 694; ADVEXEI 391 (he reads EMEI 500); SEIS (for SEI VEIS) 777; and perhaps PERIEISSE 266 and REDIEIT 530. On the other hand he should have rejected VEIVO 471, where ei is for Indo-European ī. It may be added that in 613 where ENK reads *di sierint* (*disierint* B, *deserint* CD) and Lindsay following Camerarius reads *di sirint*, the Manuscript readings may conceal *dei seirint*, cf. *Trin.* 521, where *sciris* P may be for *seiris*.

A student examining the text will frequently miss the evidence on which a given reading or a matter of orthographical usage is based. For instance, ENK following Lindsay correctly reads *minime* 418, as opposed to the u found in most other superlative forms, such as *pessumas pessum dedi* 847. For the form *minime* there should have been cited some such work as that of A. Brock, *Quaestionum Grammaticarum Capita Duo*, Dorpat, 1897; and as for *pessumas* the assonance *pessumas pessum*, cf. *pessum pessum date*, *Rud.* 617 (both passages quoted in note on verse 847) is not without significance. For *rursum* pronounced *russum* or *rusum* the reading of B. adopted in the assonance *rus rusum* 68 would have been pertinent.

In his commentary ENK makes several equations that are not really convincing; e. g. that of *satin* with *nonne* (337), the attitude of a speaker using *satin* being entirely different from that of one using *nonne*, cf. E. P. Morris, *Sentence-Question*, p. 39. The equation of *qui minus* with *oὐκοῦν* (825) entirely deletes the standard of comparison between the two things compared. The derivation of adjectives in *-osus* from **-ovenssus* (given on 505) is both doubtful and antiquated, vid. Stolz-Schmalz, *Lat. Gram.*⁵, p. 231.

In his note on v. 455 *quid ais?* used in the sense "Look here!" ENK cites some very valuable Greek parallels in which *τι φύσ;* has the same meaning, notably Soph. *Phil.* 805 *τι φύσ;* *τι σιγᾶς;* and 951 *τι φύσ;* *σιωπᾶς;*

In his appendix on H. Jacobsohn's metrical theory ENK, II, 202 ff. adopts a position between those who completely reject it—Sonnenburg, Lindsay, Skutsch—and those who accept it—Sonnenschein, Vollmer, Klotz, Fraenkel.

Misprints are rare and the typography is good. I have noted I, vi ftn. 1) *Lipsae* for *Lipsiae*; II, 54, l. 11 *has* for *hast*. The mark of exclamation is omitted from the passage of Ter. *Eun.* 553/4 quoted in the note to v. 157 as well as from Plaut. *Men.* 1005 quoted in note on v. 255. The mark of interrogation is omitted after *quin rogas* used in note to v. 182 and from *Rud.* 1269 ff. (1272) after *egone*. In the same note *Poen.* 428, *ego ne, ego ne, si* etc. should be corrected to the more up-to-date *egone, egone, si* etc.

The criticisms herewith made are not intended to convey the idea that ENK's edition is not good, but rather that it ought to be considerably better.

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